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Technology is playing a major role in changing how states conduct warfare and much research 
is being focused on this. This is a broad area of study and the present research will address only 
one aspect of it, which is the impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled autonomous weapon 
systems on a state’s nuclear deterrence. More specifically, this research’s main aim is to study 
how the rise of autonomous weapon systems could affect the US’s ‘second-strike’ capability. 
This term refers to the ability of a state to strike back in response to a first attack. The US’s 
nuclear deterrence could be affected in two primary ways. First, it could be affected practically, 
in that Autonomous Weapon Systems may effectively limit the US’s ability to strike back. 
Secondly, they could affect the US’s perception of its second-strike capability, meaning that 
the US could fear that Autonomous Weapon Systems could limit its ability to strike back, but 
this capability does not necessarily need to exist for this to happen. As perception is a central 
tenet in nuclear deterrence, the US needs only to perceive their second-strike ability to be under 
threat to feel insecure. The secondary aim was to see if the undermining of the US’s nuclear 
deterrence would lead to a potential disruption in strategic stability. Strategic stability is built 
on the premise of states being able to successfully deter one another; undermining this would 
lead to instability. This thesis further chose to contextualise this study by looking at President 
Trump and the role of identity politics. The aim of this secondary contextualisation was to 
create an understanding of why the US would pursue AI-enable autonomous weapon systems 
and whether Trump’s populist politics could explain why. This also allowed the study to better 
utilise Kaldor’s ‘New War thesis’. This sequentially allowed this study to understand the US 
perception of potential aggressors and its grand strategy.  
The reason for addressing this area of study is because AI has a huge and unknown potential 
to affect all aspects of the military. This creates the need to understand how such a technology 
could affect nuclear deterrence, which is the cornerstone of US National Strategic Security 
Policy. Nuclear deterrence has played a central role in protecting the US from potential 
aggressors since the time of the Cold War until today and potentially it will do so for the 
foreseeable future. Furthermore, with nuclear weapons becoming more prevalent in the global 
arena, there is a need to understand how autonomous weapon systems could affect them. This 
research used semi-structured interviews and secondary data analysis in order to gather data. 
The data indicated that Autonomous Weapon Systems offer huge potential to undermine the 
US’s nuclear deterrence in the future. They currently have significant shortcomings but with 




because they offer the potential to undermine the US’s ability to strike back. Finally, there 
needs to be continuous study on how Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Weapon Systems 
will affect the US’s military and international conflict. However, the current major threat that 
the US faces comes from the cyber domain. There needs to be further study into what type of 


























Tegnologie speel 'n belangrike rol in hoe lande se metodes van oorlogvoering verander, en baie 
navorsing word tans daaroor gedoen. Dit is 'n wye studieveld waarvan hierdie navorsing net 
een aspek sal ondersoek, naamlik die invloed  wat kunsmatige-intelligensie(KI)-gedrewe 
outonome wapenstelsels op lande se vermoë tot kernafskrikking kan hê. Die primêre doel van 
hierdie navorsing is dan spesifiek om te kyk hoe die opkoms van outonome wapenstelsels die 
VSA se vermoë tot 'n tweede slaanaanval kan beïnvloed. Dié term verwys na die vermoë van 
'n land om terug te slaan in reaksie op 'n eerste aanval. Die VSA se kernafskrikking kan 
hoofsaaklik op twee maniere geaffekteer word. Eerstens kan dit prakties geaffekteer word 
deurdat outonome wapenstelsels die VSA se terugslaanvermoë doeltreffend kan inperk. 
Tweedens kan die VSA se persepsie van hul vermoë om tweede slaanaanvalle te loods 
geaffekteer word. Hulle kan naamlik vrees dat hul vermoë om terug te slaan deur outonome 
wapenstelsels ingeperk kan word, maar die vermoë van sodanige stelsels hoef nie noodwendig 
werklik te wees om die persepsie te laat ontstaan nie. Omdat persepsie 'n sentrale aanname in 
kernafskrikking is, moet die VSA bloot bewus wees van die moontlikheid dat hul vermoë tot 
'n tweede slaanaanval bedreig kan word om onveilig te voel. Die sekondêre doel was om te kyk 
of die ondermyning van die VSA se kernafskrikking sou lei tot 'n potensiële ontwrigting in 
strategiese stabiliteit. Strategiese stabiliteit word gebou op die aanname dat lande in staat is om 
mekaar suksesvol af te skrik. Om hierdie vermoë te ondermyn sou kon lei tot wêreldwye 
onstabiliteit. Die navorsing word verder gekontekstualiseer deur te kyk na President Trump en 
die rol van identiteitspolitiek om sodoende te probeer begryp waarom die VSA volhardend bly 
streef na die gebruik van KI-gedrewe outonome wapenstelsels, en of Trump se populistiese 
politiek dalk 'n verklaring hiervoor kan bied. Die kontekstualisering het dit ook moontlik 
gemaak vir die navorsing om Kaldor se nuweoorlogshipotese beter te kan gebruik. 
 
Die rede vir die ondersoek in hierdie veld is omdat kunsmatige intelligensie 'n groot en 
ongekende potensiaal het om alle aspekte van oorlogvoering te affekteer. Dit is dus nodig om 
te begryp hoe sodanige tegnologie kernafskrikking kan beïnvloed wat die hoeksteen van die 
VSA se nasionale strategiese veiligheidsbeleid vorm. Kernafskrikking het sedert die Koue 
Oorlog 'n sentrale rol gespeel in die VSA se pantser teen potensiële aanvallers. Dit speel vandag 
steeds 'n rol wat in die afsienbare toekoms waarskynlik sal voortduur. Met kernwapens wat reg 
oor die wêreld meer prominent raak, is daar 'n toenemende behoefte om te begryp hoe 




halfgestruktureerde onderhoude en sekondêre data-analise om data in te samel. Die data het 
aangedui dat hoewel huidige stelsels betekenisvolle tekortkominge het, tegnologiese 
ontwikkeling kan veroorsaak dat outonome wapenstelsels groot potensiaal het om die VSA se 
kernafskrikking in die toekoms te beïnvloed omdat hulle die VSA se vermoë om terug te slaan 
kan ondermyn. Laastens is voortgesette navorsing noodsaaklik om te weet hoe kunsmatige 
intelligensie en outonome wapenstelsels die VSA se militêre en internasionale konflik daar sal 
laat uitsien. Die belangrikste bedreiging wat tans die VSA in die gesig staar, kom egter uit die 
kuberruimte. Verdere studie is ook nodig om vas te stel watter soort kuberaanval of -indringing 
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Chapter 1  
1.1 Introduction  
This research intends to clarify, among other things, the way that states go to war. This is based 
on the premise that technology changes the way in which states conduct warfare. This study 
will specifically focus on AI-enabled Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS)1, as it is not 
possible to include all the aspects of modern warfare. This research’s main aim is to elucidate 
how AWS will lead to potential disruption in traditional nuclear deterrence and the subsequent 
effect this will have on strategic stability. The chosen research site for this study will be the 
United States (US). The reason the US has been chosen is because they are prepared to spend 
about 3.5 percent of their gross domestic production on their military. The US does this in order 
to maintain their military supremacy and this will become abundantly clear as this research 
progresses. Furthermore, a disruption of the US’s nuclear deterrence is problematic for global 
security as multiple states require US military backing for their own security. Such states are 
Japan and the European Union (EU). 
The reason AI was chosen was owing to its potentially disruptive and transformative 
capabilities. The literature of Schwab (2016), the founder and executive chairman of the World 
Economic Forum, highlights how AI is a part of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 
4.0). Schwab (2016) states that the Fourth Industrial Revolution will be unlike anything 
humankind has experienced before. More specifically, when it comes to strategic stability, 
Altmann and Sauer (2017) indicate that AI will have a ‘detrimental impact’ on strategic 
stability and global peace.  This briefly shows why this research has chosen to look at AI-
enabled AWS. This is because of their potential to be extremely disruptive to strategic stability 
and also because of their impact on Industry 4.0. Finally, AI is a very broad concept and it 
covers many different aspects from logistics to facial recognition, which is why this research 
will specifically look at AI-enabled weapons systems (AWS) and how they could potentially 
affect the US’s  second-strike capability2. For this research to be more effective and coherent, 
a specific technology within AI needed to be selected. Due to this research focusing on strategic 
 
1 This research has made a decision to use the term ‘autonomous weapon systems’ (AWS) rather than the more 
commonly used ‘lethal autonomous weapon systems’ (LAWS). The term ‘LAWS’ lacks objectivity and is phrased 
by many theorists that advocate against ‘killer robots’. This research sees ‘weapon systems’ as an adequate 
indication that these systems are built for a lethal purpose.  
2 A second-strike capability refers to the ability of a state to respond to a first-strike; it is one of the central tenets 





stability as well, specifically nuclear deterrence, the area of AI that was chosen was AWS. This 
is important to understand as nuclear deterrence is seen as the cornerstone of the US National 
Security Strategy (NSS). Furthermore, AI offers capabilities that could potentially undermine 
the US’s ability to strike back against a potential aggressor. More specifically, AI has the 
potential to deliver capabilities to states that may allow them to have an increased advantage 
against an adversary. Such capabilities will come from what is called machine learning (ML) 
or deep learning, which will increase the speed of conflict as they will be capable of making 
decisions at ‘machine speeds’. Deep learning may also allow for better navigation as well as 
better target recognition. Finally, the invention of AI-augmented AWS will allow the US to 
bring mass back to the battlefield, as a fleet of AWS will potentially need fewer humans to 
watch over them compared to current modern drones.  
One of the most problematic aspects of AI-augmented AWS, and central to this thesis, is its 
potential impact on nuclear deterrence and subsequently strategic stability. More specifically, 
this research aims to look at how AWS will effect a state’s second-strike capability.  The 
second-strike capability is an important tenet of nuclear deterrence owing to the fact that many 
aspects of nuclear deterrence, such as brinkmanship and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), 
rely on it. MAD allows states to deter one another and maintain stability as long as each side 
maintains a secure second-strike capability. It also allows them to conduct a tit-for-tat exchange 
in a moment of crisis until one side finds the risk too high and steps down. This is known as 
brinkmanship, which will be discussed in more detail in the literature review.  Finally, Nuclear 
deterrence may seem like a distant theory utilised by Cold War superpowers, however, it 
remains relevant to strategic stability to this day. This is seen by the US’s pledge to modernise 
their nuclear triad, China’s dedication to building their triad, and Russia’s current nuclear 
modernisation as well. Furthermore, there is the issue of whether the US and Russia will renew 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the current end of the Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). 
AWS being introduced into the military sphere will ultimately change the way warfare is 
conducted; it may change how we perceive war and increase the possibility of war. This leads 
to the final theory that will be reviewed in this study: the ‘new war thesis’. This will be used in 
order to make a contextualization and theoretical framework for this study. The main theorist 
of the ‘new war thesis’ is Mary Kaldor. The importance of the new war thesis to this research 
comes from the four tenets of the new war thesis: actors, goals, methods and forms of finance 





literature review, that of ‘goals’ is noteworthy for this section, owing to the fact that ‘goals’ in 
the new war thesis are defined by what is known as ‘identity politics’. This section and ‘actors’ 
will be the main proponent for this study’s secondary contextualization. It will ultimately allow 
this research to understand President Trump as an actor and his populist politics. Furthermore, 
it will help to create a better understanding of the circumstances in which this study is taking 
place. One of the mainstreams of identity politics that will be looked at is ‘populism’. This is 
a hard concept to define, yet it is currently occurring everywhere in international and domestic 
politics. It led to the election of President Donald Trump of the United States (US) and the 
referendum held in Britain to leave the European Union, commonly referred to as Brexit. Such 
a movement has already had a severe impact on foreign and domestic policy in both the US 
and Britain; it can undoubtedly be argued that it is of critical importance to understand this 
form of identity politics. Such forms of politics have an effect on a country’s foreign policy: 
for example, President Trump had the largest increase in the defence budget only two years 
into his presidency. This contextualization will allow the study to gain a better understanding 
of how AWS will be pursued and create a clearer picture of the entire process. This allows for 
this research to create a more concise and whole analysis of how AWS will affect on the US’s 
nuclear deterrence. Wasko-Owsiejcsuk (2018) states that Trump’s doctrine and foreign policy 
contain doses of populism; this emerges from his use of slogans such as ‘Make America Great 
Again’ and ‘Putting America First’. This contextualization will look at how identity politics 
can explain how the US will pursue AWS and how it makes them ultimately perceive their 
adversaries. Finally, this main goal of this secondary contextualization is to use the new war 
thesis as a research strategy, as Kaldor (2013) suggests. The new war thesis will aid this 
research in creating a theoretical framework and secondary contextualization that allows for 
the entire impact of AWS to be analysed, from the actors involved, to the goals of the US, to 
the modes of warfare, and how they are financed. The approach of this research is to understand 
how the new war thesis can help create a contextualization of how the US will pursue AWS 
and its subsequent effect on nuclear deterrence which in turn affects strategic stability.  
1.2 Aims of the research   
The main aim of this research is to find out how AI-enabled AWS may affect a state's second-
strike capability. The secondary question will focus on how this will affect nuclear deterrence 
and how this will then subsequently affect strategic stability. The premise is that an insecure 
second-strike capability will make an ineffective nuclear deterrence which will then affect 





stability.  This will be analysed through the use of the new war thesis’s four central tenets. This 
will be used in order to understand the dynamics of how AWS will affect nuclear deterrence. 
The new war thesis will form the structure for this research’s theoretical framework and create 
a secondary contextualization for the study. This theoretical framework will help structure the 
research in order to understand the primary research question: How will AI-enabled AWS 
weapons systems affect the US’s second-strike capability? There are two main issues when it 
comes to AWS capabilities vs perceived capabilities. This is based on what the technology can 
do vs what an aggressor perceives the technology can do. Perception is key; this can be further 
built by applying the theoretical framework created to the data collected. Finally, the main 
premise of this thesis is that warfare has changed and that AWS is an important aspect in this 
change. Furthermore, this theoretical framework has two section in it that will help create a 
secondary contextualization for the study. These two section are ‘goals’ and ‘actors’. These 
two sections will enable this research to analyse President Trump’s populist politics. This will 
help create a more coherent background to this study. It will also help to understand the US’s 
perception of potential aggressors and how they will pursue AWS. The main reason for this 
contextualization is to better situate the readers and capture the entire phenomenon of how the 
US nuclear deterrence will be affected.  
1.3 Research questions  
Main Research Question: How will Autonomous Weapons Systems affect the US’s perception 
and/or capability of their second-strike capability?  
Secondary Research Question: Will this led to a disruption of traditional nuclear deterrence? 
or will this subsequently affect strategic stability?  
Secondary Contextualization: The new war thesis entails ‘goals’ which looks at how identity 
politics effects conflict. In order to create a background for this research populism and 
President Trump will be looked at. This is a more specific form of identity politics in the US. 
The goal of this is to create a contextualization for this study and not to research populism in 
the US. This will help create an understanding of how President Trumps populist politics 
affects his grand strategy. 
Broader significance of the study: Firstly, Autonomous Weapon Systems will affect the way 
states conduct warfare and more specifically their nuclear deterrence. It is important to get an 





Secondly, populism is a dominant political movement in the US and has been expertly utilized 
by President Trump. Understanding such a phenomomen will allow for this study to full capture 
the affect of the main research question.   
How this question relates to the problem/conversation in the literature: There is a high level 
of uncertainty around the issue of AWS, creating a need to fully understand the complexity and 
effect of such a transformative technology. Furthermore, populism is a rising political ideology 
that has the potential to affect international politics and US national security strategy. This 
means that it requires analysis in order to understand its potential affect internationally and not 
just domestically.  
1.4 Preliminary literature review 
The aim of this section is to briefly conceptualise the main variables of the study by conducting 
an introductory literature review. Here is a brief outline of all the major variables involved in 
this study, which were drawn from literature relevant to the field of study. 
1.4.1 Strategic stability 
Schebber (2008) and Gerson (2013) state that many theorists may refer to ‘strategic stability’; 
however, there is not a common understanding of what exactly it is. In order to overcome this, 
both authors argue about the need for a historical context. Simply defined, strategic stability 
was based on the premise of two equally powerful nuclear armed states facing off against one 
another, both with the ability to retaliate by launching a second-strike back at an aggressor 
(Colby, 2013: 48).  A country’s ability to strike back – its ‘second-strike capability’ – at an 
aggressor is the main premise that strategic stability is built on. The ability to launch a second-
strike capability would deter an aggressor from attacking in fear of having the same done to 
them as they are doing to another, the fear creates a stabilising effect. AI can create certain 
grievances when it comes to strategic stability, such as an arms race or the possibility of a 
second-strike being cancelled out. What it is meant by a second-strike being cancelled out is 
how a state would possibly not be able to respond to a first-strike owing to AI-enabled AWS. 
1.4.2 Nuclear deterrence 
Nuclear deterrence is a theory of strategic stability which came to prominence during the Cold 
War and World War II (Morgan, 2003; & Quackenbush, 2010). Nuclear deterrence can be 





itself in an unfavourable manner (Powell, 2003; Quackenbush, 2010; Morgan, 2003; Mazarr, 
2018; Giest & Lohn, 2018; & Wickham, 1974). Furthermore, when two states successfully 
deter one another, strategic stability can be achieved, this can be pursued through actions such 
as brinkmanship3 which can be reached through each side having a secure second-strike 
capability (Powell, 2003). Nuclear deterrence then becomes a game of risk-taking, in which 
each side ups the risk until the more resolute state wins (Quackenbush 2010). According to 
Quackenbush (2010:742), successful deterrence is based on three factors: a state must persuade 
an attacker that it has an effective military capability; that it can use this against an aggressor; 
and that the threat will be carried out. Two significant factors arise from Quackenbush’s (2010) 
literature; military capability and the use of fear when it comes to deterrence. However, none 
of this is important without credibility, which is important to Quackenbush’s (2010) third 
factor. Credibility comes about through the invention and protection of a second-strike 
capability4. An important factor connected to credibility is perception, how a state views the 
credibility of a threat. Another important aspect of nuclear deterrence is extended deterrence. 
Extended deterrence involves deterring attacks on a state’s allies, it is important for upholding 
a global security system. An example of this comes from the work of Payne (2015) who 
highlights how Japan planned to pursue other security options if the US nuclear umbrella 
disappeared.  
1.4.3 Artificial Intelligence  
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) (2019a) highlighted the issue that AI has 
‘significant implications’ for national security. This highlights its importance, but what exactly 
is AI? Boulanin (2019: 13) highlights that the term ‘AI’ was coined in  the mid-1950s by John 
McCarthy. McCarthy highlighted it as the ‘science and engineering of making intelligent 
machines’. Due to his extensive work on AI and AWS’s effect on strategic stability, Boulanin’s 
(2019) theories will be used as a basis and theorists such as Shi (2011), and Brynjolfsson and 
Mcaffe (2017) will be used as well. This will create a basis to understand AI, specifically neural 
networks, machine learning and deep learning. AI has had its ups and downs, going through 
periods known as AI winters. These periods are defined by low interest in the topic or they are 
 
3 Brinkmanship exists when states both have successful second-strike capabilities, it enables each side to increase 
the risk until the more resolute state wins. The more resolute state is the one that is willing to up the risk at any 
cost. The dynamics of brinkmanship are complex and will be looked at further in the review of literature.  
4 A second-strike capability is the ability for a state to strike back after receiving a first-strike from an aggressor. 
It is the linchpin of successful deterrence, AI-enabled AWS could have a harmful impact on keeping a second-





due to insufficient hardware. However, when interest was decreasing in AI, Geoffrey Hinton 
pioneered the work of neural networks, which led to the creation of ‘deep learning’ (Boulanin, 
2019: 15-16). Deep learning is the combination of ‘neural networks’ and ‘machine learning’. 
The discovery of deep learning reignited the interest in the field of AI. This came about owing 
to the increase in ‘big data’; improvements of machine learning and an increase in computer 
processing (Artificial Intelligence & National Security, 2018: 2). Machine learning is 
characterised by the development of software by humans that, once created, can learn and teach 
itself, no longer requiring human intervention. AI is very complex and problematic; in short, it 
aims to recreate human intelligence.  
1.4.4 Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) 
The creation of Machine Learning is having a significant impact on the sphere of military 
technology and it will continue to do so. As the CRS (2018) highlighted, AI will have an impact 
on logistics, cyber operations, intelligence gathering and analysis, information operations, 
command and control, and in semi-autonomous and autonomous weapon vehicles. As 
highlighted by the work of Boulanin and Verbruggen (2017), when it comes to AWS it is an 
argument about the degree of autonomy that these weapons have. Whether they are automatic, 
automated or truly autonomous. Boulanin and Verbruggen (2017) state that a machine’s 
autonomy is based on its ability to go into an environment and use its ability to sense, decide 
and act, based on the environment. Furthermore, theorists also highlight the issue of the 
involvement of humans in AWS; what Boulanin and Verbruggen (2017) describe as the 
‘human-machine command-and-control relationship’. These are all important aspects of AWS 
and are aspects that will be looked into further in the literature review. Other important areas 
of AWS are the ‘cost profile’ of AWS. Cost profile is a term used to describe how much 
‘transformative technologies’ such as AI or nuclear weapons cost to make (Allen, & Chan, 
2017). This is of obvious importance as the cost profile determines who is capable of creating 
and getting these weapons. Furthermore, the cost profile of AI described by Allen and Chan 
(2017: 46) is ‘diverse, but potentially low’. However, the most important aspect of 
understanding AWS is to build a basis of knowledge in order to understand how the 
‘transformative technology’ can have an impact on a country’s second-strike capability and 





1.4.5 New wars 
The new war thesis is a vastly contested theory with many scholars comparing it to ‘old wars’ 
and arguing whether new wars are inherently new at all. According to Kaldor (2013), new wars 
are the wars that occurred during the era of globalisation. Globalisation opened up economies 
and weakened authoritarian states, which has led to the breakdown of states. This made the 
distinction between state and non-state actors, external and internal, economic and political, 
public and private, and war and peace hard to tell apart (Kaldor, 2013: 2). Kaldor (2013: 2) 
states that the breakdown of these binaries can be seen as both the cause and consequence of 
violence. Furthermore, Kaldor (2013: 2) defines new wars based on actors, goals, methods and 
forms of finance. One of the factors on which Kaldor (2013) based the new war thesis is goals. 
For Kaldor (2013), goals have changed from ideology to identity politics, which is of 
importance to this research, as identity politics is dominating the current political climate and 
is having an effect on the international arena. As stated earlier, the new war thesis is highly 
challenged. One such challenger is Booth. Booth (2001) argues whether or not new wars are 
actually new at all, based on the premise that what is seen in new wars can be seen in old wars. 
Meanwhile theorists like Shaw (2000) argue that Kaldor helps to question the current mode of 
warfare, which Kaldor herself argues as well. The new war thesis will be further reviewed later 
on. However, this section ends by stating that the new war thesis can be critical in trying to 
understand how AI-enabled AWS will affect nuclear deterrence. 
1.4.6 Identity politics 
As already stated, Kaldor (2013) argues that new wars are fought through the use of identity 
politics over ideology. This section further emphasises what exactly identity politics is and why 
it is of such an importance to this research. Kaldor highlights the work of Sen, on how 
individuals have multiple identities, when one of these identities becomes overarching, conflict 
will ensue (Sen, 2006 as cited in Kaldor, 2013: 338). Kaldor (2013) furthers the construct of 
identity and conflict by describing it as a form of binary, this is also called a friend-enemy 
distinction. Kaldor (2013) gives the example of a Jewish person who is defined in relation to 
an anti-Semite. Furthermore, conflict and violence further engrain these identities (Kaldor, 
2013).  Such forms of identity can be a powerful tool for certain individuals. The literature of 
Fukuyama (2018) states that identity politics has moved into the global arena, as certain groups 
feel their identities are not receiving adequate attention. This is leading democracies to fracture 





and Persson (2019) state that such identities have been affected due to globalisation. For Besley 
and Persson (2019) this effect has led to the rise of dominant groups feeling threatened. 
Meanwhile, for Fukuyama (2018), globalisation has given previously invisible groups a 
platform where they can be seen, while Besley and Persson (2019) see these groups as the cause 
of Brexit and the election of President Trump as the result of these dominant groups feeling 
threatened. Furthermore, how can rhetoric like “Make America Great Again” help one to 
understand the political climate in the US and how the Trump presidency will ultimately pursue 
AI-enabled weapons? This means how does identity politics help understand how a presidency 
pursues its policies? One of the main factors that has arisen from these dominant groups is 
populism (Bresley & Persson, 2019). This shows how such movements have the ability to 
affect a state’s policy and policy is subsequently important to how states pursue military 
strategy. Populism is hard to define and no two populist movements are the same; however, it 
is seen as anti-elite and the voice of the ‘ordinary person’. Identity politics in the US will only 
be a contextual factor of this study.  
1.5 Research design and methodology  
This research method that was chosen was a qualitative approach and will be a small-n singular 
case study. This is owing to the fact that it will be based on semi-structured interviews and 
secondary data analysis. The semi-structured interview data collection process will be used in 
order to complement the secondary data analysis. It also allows for the research to get first-
hand knowledge of the field of study from experts within the field, which is a strong advantage 
to have. The experts will be chosen from different areas, ranging from industry to academia. 
Key informants that will be looked out for are AI, cyber and military experts. The semi-
structured interview questions will allow the interview to flow. Furthermore, this research will 
also utilise secondary data analysis. Secondary data analysis pertains to data that comes from 
sources such as journals, documents and opinion pieces. This study chose a singular case study 
owing to the fact that it will analyse the effect of AWS on the US’s nuclear deterrence. This 
research chose the US as its case study owing to the fact the world is multipolar and there are 
multiple nuclear-armed states. This means that this research cannot look at all the states that 
have nuclear weapons. This research will view these phenomena in one specific research site 





1.6 Outline of the study 
Chapter 1: This will begin with an introduction to the study, then the aim of the research will 
be discussed, followed by the research questions. After this it will conduct a preliminary 
literature review, followed by a look at the research design and methodology, and finally the 
outline of the study. This will create a rational summary as well as a roadmap to the study.  
Chapter 2: Literature review and theoretical framework: This chapter will review existing 
literature in order to conceptualise key concepts of the study and also to provide a theoretical 
foundation for the study. Concepts that will be looked at will be: Strategic Stability; Nuclear 
Deterrence; Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Weapons System; New Wars and Identity 
Politics. The theoretical framework refers to the theory or concepts on which the study will be 
based. This section will connect all the theories from the literature review together to make a 
coherent analytical lens for the research process. The conclusion sums up the chapter. 
 Chapter 3: This chapter will be used to contextualise the study. The main premise of this 
study is that technology changes the way states conduct warfare. This section will look at 
different major technological innovations and how these changed the way states went to war. 
The main technologies that will be looked at are: biotechnology, cyber, nuclear, and AI.  
 Chapter 4: Data analysis and findings: The data analysis will be based on a qualitative format. 
This study will use semi-structured interviews and secondary data analysis. Furthermore, this 
study will use a single case study with the research site being the United States. The new war 
thesis will be used as a research strategy to apply theories gained from the literature review to 
the data collected. 
 Chapter 5: This will be the final chapter of the study. This chapter will be made up of three 
different sections: evaluation of main findings and secondary contextualization, limitations of 
the study, and the conclusion and future avenues of study. The first section will focus on theory 
integration into that data in order to answer the main and secondary research questions. The 
next section aims to look at the limitations of this study. The final section concludes the 
research and offers possible avenues for future study.   
1.7 Conclusion  
The aim of this section was to create an outline to this study. It began with a brief discussion 
on why this area of study has been chosen. The aim of this was to create a basic 





this chapter highlighted the aims of this research which is to understand how AWS will affect 
the US’s nuclear deterrence. It then went on to indicate the main and secondary research 
questions as well as the broader significance of the study. The section that followed gave a 
preliminary literature review of the main theories involved in this research. This was done in 
order to better situate the reader in the area of study and understand what is to come. From 
there this section went onto the research design and methodology. Finally, the last section of 
this chapter created a basic outline to the study by highlighting what each chapter will entail. 










Chapter 2  
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction  
The aim of this literature review will be to review all the published research relating to 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS), strategic stability, nuclear deterrence and the new war 
thesis. This section will review publications on these key variables in order to understand how 
AWS will affect nuclear deterrence which in turn will have an effect on strategic stability and 
international powers. The state that will be used as a case study is the US. The US will be used 
because the international system is now multipolar. This means that the US’s actions need to 
be measured against the system and not just as a singular country.  The ‘new war thesis’ of 
Mary Kaldor, which is an analytical lens utilised in order to understand contemporary warfare, 
will be used to create a secondary contextualization for this study as well as a theoretical 
framework. This section’s main aim is to review the literature on these dominant themes in 
order to build a basis to understand how AWS will affect nuclear deterrence and strategic 
stability. It then aims to create a secondary analysis and background for the study by reviewing 
the literature on the new war thesis and President Trump’s populist politics.  
This review of literature will start off with an overview of the strategic stability of the US. This 
is one of the main variables when it comes to AWS, as this research is trying to forecast the 
effect of AWS on strategic stability. The section that follows is nuclear deterrence, which is 
another important variable to the study, which looks at the effect of AWS on nuclear deterrence 
that will in turn affect strategic stability. This next section will discuss Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) which is the basis of AWS and it is thus of significant importance. Following this, the 
issue of AWS will be discussed as well as strategic stability, bringing together AWS, strategic 
stability and nuclear deterrence. This will be done in order to bring together the literature of 
the main variables of this study. The section that will follow is the ‘new war’ thesis. There are 
four main tenets of the new war thesis: actors, goals, methods and forms of finance. One of the 
main theories within the tenet ‘goals’ is identity politics, which is an important theory and is 
extensively spoken about by Kaldor. The next section  will focus on ‘identity politics’. Identity 
politics is an important theory to review literature on, due to its extensive effect on domestic 
politics and global politics recently. Meanwhile, the form of identity politics known as 
‘populism’ that is plaguing the US is not so easily defined. However, populism and identity 





countries conduct their policy; this will be analysed further in the identity politics section. It is 
also of significance importance when it comes to creating context for this study, which will 
help to better situate this research.  
2.2 Strategic stability 
Schebber (2008) and Gerson (2013) both state that many theorists refer to ‘strategic stability’; 
however, many neither define it or, even more problematically, there is no common 
understanding of it.  Both Schebber (2008) and Gearson (2013) state that there is a need for a 
historical analysis of strategic stability in order to gain an understanding of what it is. Gerson 
(2013: 2) goes on to say that there is also a gap when it comes to how nuclear-armed countries 
view and define the requirements for stability. Another issue bought forward by Gerson (2013: 
2) is how the world is now multipolar. This means that stability has changed since the end of 
the Cold War, with a move away from a bipolar power configuration to a multipolar arena. 
Strategy stability during the Cold War was built on the logic that if both sides had the ability 
to strike back effectively after an attempted disarming first-strike this would create a stabilising 
effect (Colby, 2013: 48). Strategic Stability in the Cold War was known as nuclear deterrence 
and it is still the bedrock of US strategic security policy. Furthermore, Colby (2013) brings 
forward one of the most important tenets of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence, which is 
the ability of a state to strike back. This is known as a ‘second-strike capability’ and is arguably 
the most important tenet of nuclear deterrence. This section’s aim is to create a basic 
understanding of strategic stability; it will mention tenets and aspects of nuclear deterrence, 
which is unavoidable as the two are interconnected. 
The previous stability metrics were built on the tenets that there were two equally aggressive 
powers, each equipped with large nuclear forces and extensive defence strategies with each 
fearing a ‘bolt out of the blue’ strike from the other side (Scheber, 2008). This was the basis of 
stability metrics in a bipolar world. Currently there are multiple states that have nuclear 
capabilities and other states pursuing such capabilities. According to the Federation of 
American Scientists (FAS) there are currently nine states with nuclear weapons: Russia, US, 
China, France, UK, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea (Kristensen & Korda, 2020). Out 
of these states, 91 percent of all nuclear warheads are owned by Russia and the US (Kristensen 
& Korda, 2020). Furthermore, strategic stability gets more complicated based on the issue of 
legitimate threats and how states perceive these threats. Scheber (2008) supports this statement 





comes to actors such as Iran or North Korea. The way states dealt with such issues, according 
to Gerson (2013), was because stability was built on the freedom from a surprise attack. This 
is based on the inspection of a potential enemy and the strength of their forces, and 
subsequently it is also based on the vulnerability of one’s ability to strike back (Gerson, 2013). 
What Gerson (2013) means is that a state needs to have reliable retaliatory forces in order to 
respond to a first-strike from an aggressor. If both sides have reliable retaliatory forces, this 
gives the aggressor a strong reason not to attack; this means that a retaliatory capability has a 
stabilising effect. A secure second-strike capability is an important tenet of nuclear deterrence 
and this will be discussed in the next section.  
Altmann and Sauer (2017: 119-120) state that stability has two dimensions, the first one being 
‘military stability’ and the second being ‘crisis stability’. Military stability and crisis stability 
are interlinked to one another. According to Altmann and Sauer (2017: 119), ‘military 
stability’, is built on the issue of proliferation of arms and the emergence of an arms race. The 
role of new technologies can be further destabilising when they offer a qualitatively clear 
advantage and are close at hand (Altmann, & Sauer, 2017: 120). Furthermore, when an 
adversary deliberately pursues such a technology there could be an increase in mutual 
observation and uncertainty (Altmann, & Sauer, 2017: 120). This shows that the countries 
pursing AI capabilities can be problematic for military stability. The other issue of stability 
outlined by Altmann and Sauer (2017) is crisis instability and escalation. Crisis instability and 
escalation refer to either a move from peace to war or when war has broken out and there is a 
move from conventional to nuclear weapons (Altmann, & Sauer, 2017: 120). These two 
different dimensions, according to Altmann and Sauer, are interlinked; new weapons developed 
out of an arms race can subsequently cause crisis instability (Altmann, & Sauer, 2017: 120). 
What this means is that the mere pursuit of a new technology that gives an adversary an 
advantage can be destabilising and cause instability, triggering military or crisis instability. 
What is more alarming is that AI is more than just a new technology; it could potentially be the 
fourth and final industrial revolution. This promises a technology that could possibly cause a 
considerable amount of military and crisis instability due to its potential and its uncertainty.  
What was gained from this section was a basic understanding of strategic stability. Strategic 
stability was a theory of stability that arose during the Cold War; it helps theorists to understand 
how hostile super powers with nuclear capabilities maintained stability. Stability seems to be 
defined by states having a second-strike capability. What a second-strike capability gave states 





strike. A first strike is also referred to as a disarming strike, as stated by Gerson (2013). What 
this gave states was a degree of legitimacy, what Scheber (2008) called a ‘punitive threat’. 
Furthermore, a second-strike capability gave the aggressor a reason not to attack. A second-
strike capability has more benefits for stability metrics; however, this will be discussed in the 
next section   on nuclear deterrence. It is important to look at this concept in detail owing to 
the fact that this research is aiming to see the effect of AWS on nuclear deterrence and its 
subsequent effect on strategic stability.  
2.2.1 Nuclear deterrence 
Nuclear deterrence was a dominant strategy during the Cold War when it came to a state’s 
national strategic security policy and maintaining strategic stability. Podvig (2012) states that 
strategic stability is achieved when a state is assured that an adversary will not undermine their 
nuclear deterrent capability. This rudimentary explanation helps link nuclear deterrence to 
strategic stability and this section now considers nuclear deterrence. Morgan (2003), a theorist 
highlighted in the work of Quackenbush (2010), states that deterrence is hard to explain and 
became an area of study during World War II (WWII) and the Cold War. Prominent theorists, 
when they define nuclear deterrence, simplify it as a state taking action that threatens another 
state, the aggressor, if they act in an unfavourable manner, thus preventing them from acting 
on an unwanted action (Powell, 2003; Quackenbush, 2010; Morgan, 2003; Mazarr, 2018; Giest 
& Lohn, 2018; & Wickham, 1974). Furthermore, nuclear deterrence was not just a theory in 
the study of international politics, it was an actual national strategic security policy employed 
during the Cold War until today. It remains the foundation of US national security strategy 
under the Trump administration. Morgan (2003: 86) states that the role of nuclear deterrence 
was at the ‘heart’ of every major nation’s ‘national security strategy’.  Its importance in the 
Cold War can be seen in the declassified document of former United States National Security 
advisor General Brent Wickham (1974). Wickham in his memorandum on ‘Nuclear Weapons 
Employment Policy’ defines deterrence as:  
“The principal objective of US strategy is deterrence of nuclear and conventional 
attacks or attempts at coercion under a threat of nuclear or conventional attacks against 
the United States, its allies and any nation whose security is vital to the US interest.” 
(Wickham, 1974). 
The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) states the same sentiment as Wickham’s 





non-nuclear strategic attacks and large-scale conventional aggression (2017). It further states 
that the US has nuclear weapons so that its allies do not have to and this helps ensure their 
security (NSS, 2017). This briefly shows the importance of nuclear deterrence to US NSS 
policy from the Cold War era to the Trump administration. This section now looks at key tenets 
of nuclear deterrence to build a deeper understanding of this strategy, allowing the research  to 
progress to understanding how AWS will effect nuclear deterrence.  
2.2.2 Diplomacy of violence: Fear and perception 
One of the most important tenets of deterrence is perception and fear. A state must show that 
it has both the will and military might to execute a high-cost retaliation on an aggressor 
conducting an unfavourable action or attack. Morgan (2003), referenced by theorists such as 
Quackenbush (2010), states that deterrence is the action of a state preventing another state from 
executing an action they do not agree with; this is done by threatening unimaginable damage 
on that state. Long (2008: 7) states that the central premise of deterrence is the generation of 
fear. Long5 (2008) states that this is done by imposing a high cost as a result of unfavourable 
action being taken by an adversary on the defending state. Fear plays a vital role in a state’s 
successful deterrence, it must convince the aggressor that it will impose a high cost on any 
action that it deems to be an act of aggression. The defending state must convince the aggressor 
that this cost will be carried out; the aggressor may just need to perceive the threat as real to 
step down. Perception plays a key role in nuclear deterrence and subsequently this thesis and 
this will be discussed further.  
Another theorist that, like Long, equates deterrence to the use of fear, is Schelling (1966). 
Schelling (1966) states that fear is used in order to deter an aggressor. This fear is generated 
by the threat of an unfavourable outcome or punishment on the aggressor by the defender, 
which will therefore, stop an actor from  acting in an unfavourable way out of fear of the 
consequences (Schelling, 1966: X) For Schelling, military strategy has become what he terms 
‘The Diplomacy of Violence’ which is a form of bargaining power based on fear and military 
might (Schelling, 1966). For Quackenbush (2010: 742), a state must perceive that an attack 
will be carried out; this is done by a state showing that: “1) it has an effective military 
capability; 2) that it could impose unacceptable costs on an attacker, and 3) that the threat 
 
5 It must be stated that Long is an influential theorist owing to the fact that Long belonged to Research and 






would be carried out if attacked.”. These are all factors which can fit into a state’s ‘diplomacy 
of violence’. This diplomacy of violence creates a narrative for the aggressor to see that a state 
maintains a degree of might and that this might will be used in order to deter possible 
aggression or unfavourable behaviour. Diplomacy of violence is based on the perception of the 
aggressor; a threat needs a degree of credibility for it to be successful, meaning that the 
aggressor needs to perceive that the threat will be carried out.  
2.2.3 Credibility: How to secure an aggressor’s perception 
Deterrence is based on fear and perception. For this to be effective, there needs to be credibility. 
An aggressor must perceive that a state has both the will and military might in order for it to 
back down in a tit-for-tat exchange in a moment of crisis. This can be done through credibility; 
credibility is based on a number of tenets and will be discussed in this section. Credibility, 
according to Powell (2003: 89), came through the technological innovation known as a 
‘second-strike capability’. According to Powell (2003), this gave states the ability to put 
pressure on each other. This can be done by leaving certain aspects to chance, which is why 
the nuclear forces of each state do not cancel each other out (Powell, 2003). Also, the more that 
is at risk, the more the state will be willing to risk; this is known as ‘brinkmanship’ (Powell, 
2003). Powell (2003) states that brinkmanship is a model that allows states to employ coercive 
pressure on each other if both sides have a second-strike capability. Quackenbush (2011), who 
references the work of Powell, also states that brinkmanship is the strategy in deterrence where 
it becomes the competition of risk-taking. Risk-taking is a strategy in brinkmanship that 
involves the act of upping the risk until one state backs down, this is what Powell refers to as 
the ‘Dynamics of Brinkmanship’ (Powell, 2003). Powell (2003) states that the dynamics are 
based around the issues of a resolute state.  
For Powell (2003: 91), a crisis will only arise if there is a substantial level of uncertainty of the 
‘balance of resolve’. Escalation, according to Powell (2003: 91), is then dependent on the 
complex interaction between a state’s level of resolve and that state’s uncertainty about another 
state’s resolve. A state’s level of resolve determines whether it will acquiesce or continue to up 
the risk (Powell, 2003: 92). An equilibrium is therefore made up of the state’s resolve, its 
perception of the other state’s resolve, and uncertainty regarding its own resolve (Powell, 2003: 
96). Ultimately, the more resolute state will up the risk and the less resolute state will find the 
risk too high and back down (Powell, 2003). The argument is used in order to express why 





to up the risk of war, meaning that Powell’s theory helps with the issue of uncertainty. Even if 
there may be uncertainty, how resolute a state is will create credibility. Morgan (2003) also 
highlights the importance of credibility when it comes to successful deterrence. According to 
Morgan (2003: 4), the best strategy for credibility is convincing the enemy of your military 
capability, the costs that will be inflicted and the willingness to inflict these costs. Long (2008), 
like Powell (2003), also highlights ‘credibility’ as the ‘linchpin’ of deterrence; however, along 
with this he states that threats are hard to estimate in practice. A net assessment can be 
conducted in order to understand a nation’s credibility. The assessment contains three elements: 
“aggregate forces, proximity, and power-projection capability” (Long, 2008: 11). However, 
these are very hard to measure, thus making uncertainty high and sustaining credibility as 
problematic. But for Schelling (1966), uncertainty makes a threat credible, a response that 
carries some risk of war is credible, even if war seems unreasonable or implausible. This 
manipulation of risk and that the slightest possibility of risk may equate to war shows how 
Schelling (1966) views brinkmanship. This subsequently shows the complexity of credibility 
along with a state’s perception of this risk or its ability to manipulate this risk. However, there 
are ways so ensure risk; namely a second-strike capability.  
This section, thus far, has highlighted two concepts that are central to this thesis: the issue of a 
second-strike capability and its credibility. These two central tenets give states that ability to 
conduct brinkmanship. Brinkmanship is the action where states manipulate risk based on how 
resolute they are and their perception of how resolute their enemy is. Perception is key when it 
comes to deterrence, an enemy just needs to perceive a threat to be credible and escalation can 
ensue. Mazarr (2018: 9) states that the most important tenet of deterrence is perception, on the 
basis of whether a state sees a need to act on aggression or not. Mazarr (2018: 10) states that 
the potential aggressor must have the perception that the defender has the capability and will 
to proceed with its threat. This is what, as already mentioned, Powell (2003) would call a 
resolute state. Morgan (2003) would also agree with Mazarr (2018) as the credibility of an 
attack is important to a successful deterrence. For Mazarr (2018: 10) this highlights two 
important factors, capability and will; perceived weakness in either of these factors could 
equate to undermined deterrence. Payne (2015) states that deterrence is constructed by human 
perception and calculation which is affected by multiple factors that are beyond ‘confident 
prediction’. A state’s perception of an adversary’s capability being threatening to it could have 
adverse effects on nuclear stability; an adversary may just perceive that their nuclear missiles 





2.2.4 Building credibility 
A way in which credibility can be built, according to Dannereuther (2007), is by arms control. 
This is built on the premise that the fundamental factor that nuclear deterrence is built on is 
MAD. By implementing arms control, MAD can be turned into Mutually Assured 
Vulnerability (Dannereuther, 2007: 229). This was achieved by creating the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile treaty of 1972 which assured both superpowers, the US and the former Soviet Union, 
that they both had assured second-strike capabilities (Dannereuther, 2007: 229). Another 
example of an arms treaty was the Nuclear Non-proliferation act between Nuclear Weapon 
States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States, which provided certain countries with the safety of 
not pursuing nuclear weapons and the promise they would not be attacked by states with 
nuclear weapons (Dannereuther, 2007: 230). This reassurance of a second-strike capability 
being secured created a degree of credibility between superpowers, the credibility in terms of 
them being able to retaliate. With this mutually assured vulnerability came about a stabilising 
effect; showing that arms control legislation can create credibility and more importantly create 
stability. Furthermore, it gave states without nuclear weapons a reason not to pursue them and 
a subsequent safeguard allowed for the limitation of states with nuclear weapons. This research 
notes that there are now are nine different states that have nuclear capabilities, based on the 
arms control association statistics (2019). This makes the dynamics of brinkmanship and 
nuclear deterrence more complex. As noted already, deterrence used to be based on a bipolar 
model. Furthermore, the concept of MAD is highlighted here. This tenet is of importance to 
nuclear deterrence as MAD is built on a second-strike capability, if a state were to lose their 
second-strike capability due to AWS it could force them to fear their ability to strike back 
against an aggressor. This shows that AWS could potentially threaten MAD, which in turn 
could have a destabilising effect.  
2.2.5 Extended deterrence 
There is a further explanation of deterrence which is termed ‘extended deterrence’. There are 
two types of deterrence; direct or ‘extended’ deterrence of other countries by a state with 
nuclear capability (Mazarr, 2018).  
“Deterrence can be used in two sets of circumstances. Direct deterrence consists of 
efforts by a state to prevent attacks on its own territory—in the US case, within the 
territorial boundaries of the United States itself. Extended deterrence involves 





direct deterrence involved discouraging a Soviet nuclear attack on US, territory; 
extended deterrence involved preventing a Soviet conventional attack on North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) members” (Mazarr, 2018: 3).  
Morgan (2012: 87) states that extended deterrence became central in international politics, in 
the form he calls ‘extended protection’, this was for states and non-state actors. Morgan (2012: 
87) highlights the United Nations (UN) Security Council as an example of extended deterrence, 
it also involves: “alliances, interventions, arms transfers, power projection efforts, military 
training programs and non-proliferation pressure.”. Morgan (2012: 94) highlights that during 
the Cold War extended deterrence entailed a singular state projecting its decisions onto others 
and preventing them from getting weapons of mass destruction; however, a ‘collective actor 
deterrence’ is more relevant today. Deterrence is now about upholding a global security system 
through a collective effort, which means that deterrence needs to be adjusted (Morgan, 2012: 
94). Huth (1988: 82), in a review highlighted as a critical study by RAND, states that extended 
deterrence is a confrontation between states in which the defender threatens force against the 
aggressor to prevent them from using military force against an ally or territory under the control 
of an ally. Payne (2015) highlights the importance of extended deterrence to the US and its 
allies, highlighting how Japan stated that they would pursue other security options if the US 
‘nuclear umbrella’ disappeared. This shows that extended deterrence was an important factor 
during the Cold War. It is of importance to understand, however, that this research focuses on 
a US-centric view. Although extended deterrence is still of importance to US NSS policy, this 
thesis aims to look at direct deterrence and not extended deterrence.  
2.2.6 Nuclear deterrence: What was important?  
This section aimed at reviewing the literature on nuclear deterrence. Key tenets that emanated 
from the literature were: second-strike capability, credibility, arms race, arms control and 
brinkmanship. The technological innovation of second-strike capability allowed states to 
contain the ability to strike back against an aggressor’s first-strike. This ability to retaliate gave 
states the ability to manipulate risk. This was done by states taking steps that increased the 
level of risk until the more resolute state won and one state backed down; this manipulation of 
risk is termed brinkmanship. Both states having a second-strike capability is called MAD, as 
the escalation to war combined with a state’s ability to strike back would equate to both being 
destroyed. Furthermore, arms control allowed this to happen, as a state’s second-strike 





of the key issues to nuclear deterrence and brinkmanship is credibility. Credibility is influenced 
by a state’s perception of a threat’s certainty. If a state knows for certain that if they act in an 
unwanted way the defender will act in a way that inflicts an unacceptable cost, the state will 
not act in this unfavourable manner. Furthermore, a state’s capability is of importance, as this 
is important to the credibility of threat. In summary, there are three tenets of brinkmanship: 
military capability, which allows for the ability to inflict an unacceptable cost and this must 
carry a level of credibility to be effective. Most importantly, the main issue that can be 
emphasised from this section is the importance of a state’s second-strike capability and the 
credibility this strike has.  
2.2.7 Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Weapons Systems 
Now that nuclear deterrence has been examined, this section aims to look at what AI and AWS 
are. A CRS (2018) report on ‘Artificial Intelligence and National Security’ highlights that there 
is significant implication for national security when it comes to Artificial Intelligence. Due to 
this, the US Department of Defense (DOD) and other nations are developing AI for a range of 
military applications (Artificial Intelligence and National Security, 2018). The domains in 
which AI is being developed in, according to the report, are logistics, cyber operations, 
intelligence gathering and analysis, information operations, command and control, and in semi-
autonomous and autonomous vehicles (Artificial Intelligence and National Security, 2018). 
This section will review the literature on AI by beginning with a brief review of its origin, what 
exactly AI is; and what Machine Learning is; Deep learning, and the issue of autonomy when 
it comes to AI and Autonomous weapons systems.  
What is the origin of AI? The origin of AI has been referenced to the Dartmouth conference of 
the mid-1950s and is attributed to John McCarthy (Brynjolfsson & Mcaffe, 2017; Ng, 2019; & 
Boulanin, 2019: 13). The concept of AI that was coined by McCarthy was based on the science 
and engineering of making machines with intelligence (Boulanin, 2019: 13). AI has faced ups-
and-downs when it comes to development, due to issues such as funding and hardware not 
being capable of running such software. But one of the most significant breakthroughs in AI 
was the work of Hinton, who was one of the last scholars to focus on the issue of AI, as interest 
was being lost in it (Boulanin, 2019: 15-16). What Hinton had theorised came to be known as 
‘deep learning’, which combined ‘neural networks’ and ‘machine learning’ (Boulanin, 2019). 
This discovery ended what can be termed an ‘AI winter’ and sparked interest in AI again, due 





Security, 2018: 2) highlighted the origin of AI in the 1940s and the re-emergence of AI around 
2010 due to three different factors: “(1) the availability of ‘big data’ sources, (2) improvements 
to machine learning approaches, and (3) increases in computer processing power.” The 
Artificial Intelligence and National Security (2019) report shows similar evidence to that of 
Boulanin (2019), as machine learning (ML) came about due to these factors highlighted by the 
report, showing that the re-emergence of AI happened around 2010. This also highlights the 
importance of machine learning, an important aspect of ‘deep learning’, which this review will 
come to after machine learning. ML benefits come from its capability to improve its 
performance without human intervention, as it has the ability to learn and improve itself 
(Brynjolfsson, & Mcaffe, 2017: 2). Finally, Brynjolfsson and Mcaffe (2017) highlighted the 
importance of ML, stating that machine learning has become more effective and more available 
in the last couple of years.  
The two major tenets that have come from the literature so far are ML and deep learning. Ng 
(2019) emphasises the importance of ‘deep learning’ by citing Hinton and how it sparked a 
second war of development in neural networks.  Deep learning is an important technological 
innovation in recent years, it has led the CRS to claim that AI is one of the key factors in the 
US being able to fight and win wars of the future (Artificial Intelligence and National Security, 
2018: 1). However, it is not just the US that believes in the capabilities, so do its adversaries. 
The CRS report highlights how China aims to be in the lead of AI development by 2030 and 
so does Russia (Artificial Intelligence and National Security, 2018: 1). Such great power 
competition to achieve general AI could lead to a possible arms race, as AI is viewed as having 
the ability to fight and win wars of the future. This issue of an arms race will be further 
discussed in the strategic stability section. Finally, the importance of perception of an 
adversary’s capabilities must be emphasised when it comes to the issue of nuclear deterrence. 
States must merely view their adversary as having advanced capabilities in order to feel 
insecure. This brief introduction now leads this section to look at what exactly AI is.  
2.2.8 What is AI?  
Shi (2011: 1) defines AI as: “the science and engineering of imitating, extending, and 
augmenting human intelligence through artificial means and techniques to make intelligent 
machines”. Cummings (2017: 2), in his book AI and the Future of Warfare states that there is 
no commonly agreed on definition of AI, however, there is a general definition: “the capability 





perception, speech recognition and decision-making”. The aim of AI research is to make 
machines capable of mimicking human intelligence by being able to view the world through 
learning, vision or processing natural language (Boulanin, 2019: 13). Furthermore, Boulanin 
(2019): 13-14) takes intelligence further by separating AI into two different levels: ‘Artificial 
General Intelligence’ and ‘Narrow Artificial Intelligence’. Artificial General Intelligence, 
according to Boulanin (2019: 13-14), is human-level intelligence and the issue of it ever being 
reached is questionable. Narrow AI has been around for a while and is subsequently widely 
used. They are complex software programs that can complete intelligent tasks; however, they 
are brittle in nature (Boulanin, 2019: 13-14). Shi (2011) also categorises AI into ‘narrow’ and 
‘general’ intelligence. Narrow intelligence is the ability of AI to process data and make 
decisions. In the age of ‘big data’, AI is thriving (Shi, 2011) The work of Geist and Lohn (2018: 
12) highlights general intelligence as ‘super intelligence’. This is a point where machines will 
outmatch human intelligence. Garnham (1987) sees AI as the study of intelligence, he argues 
for the link between AI and psychology and how both are interdependent. Owing to the fact 
that AI aims to recreate human intelligence, what can be seen thus far is how AI seems to 
already be divided into two sections based on how different theorists define its ability of 
intelligence. This degree of intelligence has a direct correlation to human intelligence, as AI 
aims to recreate human intelligence or better it. These sections will be defined as narrow and 
general in this research. Narrow refers to the machine’s basic abilities to process data and make 
decisions. General intelligence is based on a machine’s ability to match a human’s intelligence. 
The concept of a machine being intelligent is difficult as it currently stands, therefore, for this 
research to define ‘general intelligence’ as a machine’s ability to be more intelligent than a 
human seems to be ahead of its time. 
2.2.9 Towards a more coherent understanding of ML and deep learning 
This section of the literature review now aims to further the understanding of machine learning 
and deep learning.  This section will first begin with ML. Boulanin (2019) states that ML is the 
approach to software development where the system is built first so that it can learn and then 
teach itself using a variety of methods such as supervised learning, unsupervised learning and 
reinforced learning. This allows for these programs to not be hand-coded by humans which 
leads to hard-code (Boulanin, 2019: 15). These programs can subsequently code themselves 
and do not need human intervention. This is important as hand-code can be very complex and 
difficult as the environment gets more complex (Boulanin, 2019: 15-16). When it comes to ML 





relationships in large sets of data; the more data there is the more the machine will learn. 
Furthermore, according to Boulanin and Verbruggen (2017: 17), ML is not new, it has in fact 
been around for decades and has taken great strides owing to improvements in computer power 
and the growth of deep learning. One of the capabilities ML allows is better pattern recognition, 
which in turn, allows for the improvement of navigation and target recognition (Boulanin, & 
Verbruggen, 2017: 17). This starts to highlight the possible military applications for machine 
learning. What if ML gave a state the capability to increase its navigation and target recognition 
which could allow it to successfully hunt another state’s second-strike capability such as a Ship, 
Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear Submarine (SSBNs)? 
This section will now move on to deep learning. One of the most important aspects of deep 
leaning, apart from machine learning, is a neural network. A neural network and machine 
learning put together is what is known as ‘deep learning’. This begs the question, what exactly 
is a neural network? According to Schmidhuber (2014) a neural network consist of many 
processors called neurons, which are either activated through sensors perceiving the 
environment or other neurons that have been activated by  these sensors. Boulanin (2019: 17) 
states that neural networks draw on knowledge of “the human brain, statistics and applied 
math”. Boulanin (2019) gives an in-depth definition of what deep learning is:  
“Deep learning is a type of representation learning, which in turn is a type of machine 
learning. Machine learning is used for many but not all approaches to artificial 
intelligence. Representation learning is an approach to machine learning whereby the 
system ‘learns’ how to learn: the system transforms raw data input to representations 
(features) that can be effectively exploited in machine-learning tasks. This obviates 
manual feature engineering (whereby features are hard-coded into the system by 
humans), which would otherwise be necessary. Deep learning solves a fundamental 
problem in representation learning by introducing representations that are expressed in 
terms of other, simpler representations. Deep learning allows the computer to build 
complex concepts from simpler concepts. A deep-learning system can, for instance, 
represent the concept of an image of a person by combining simple concepts, such as 
corners and contours. Deep learning was invented decades ago but has made important 
progress in recent years, thanks to improvements in computing power and increased 





Deep learning is one of the most important spheres of AI application that can have an effect on 
military technology; the other being autonomous weapons systems which has given rise to the 
evolution of ML and deep learning. But before autonomous weapons systems are looked at, 
what are the challenges and opportunities for ML and deep learning? Boulanin (2019: 17) 
boldly states that ML does not need to demonstrate its potential as it has already allowed 
computers and robots to perceive the world better. It has also accelerated the development of 
autonomous systems like self-driving cars and voice assistants (Boulanin, 2019: 17). For 
Horowitz, Allen, Saravalle, Cho, Frederick and Scharrre (2018), in the defence domain, AI and 
machine learning will allow for more challenges in a wider range of environments to be tackled. 
ML, according to Boulanin and Verbruggen (2017: 17), has been around for decades; however, 
it has made recent improvements owing to the increase in computer power and the development 
of ‘deep learning’. Payne’s (2018) research also highlights how the advancements in AI and 
neural networks are of importance to military strategists and will have a subsequent effect on 
strategic affairs. Owing to this, ML has allowed for better pattern recognition and targeting 
(Boulanin, & Verbruggen, 2017: 17).  
Furthermore, as stated in the previous section, ML and deep learning offer great potential. 
However, some problems are highlighted by Boulanin and Verbruggen (2017: 17), the first 
being a requirement issue in ML, the issue of data and the need for large sets of data. Another 
important issue of ML, if not the most, is the issue of a neural network being a ‘black box’ 
(Boulanin, & Verbruggen, 2017: 17). Brynjolfsson and Mcaffe (2017) highlight how deep 
learning is hard to diagnose and correct, due to the inability to find out what goes on within the 
neural network.  “The input and the output of such a system are observable, but the 
computational process leading from one to the other is difficult for humans to understand” 
(Boulanin, 2019: 20). This makes it important for regulators, users and developers to find a 
way to responsibly adopt and use this technology, which according to Bouanin (2019: 20-21), 
they are currently struggling with. 
2.2.10 The issue of autonomy and uncertainty  
However, one of the important aspects of ML is its ability to develop autonomy. What is 
autonomy? For Boulanin (2019: 21) autonomy can be based on a machine’s ability to execute 
a task without human input by using sensors, computer programming, and an actuator for that 
environment. The first issue of autonomy that will be looked at is the debate by theorists as to 





that, in his view, current systems are more automated than autonomous, as they require serious 
human intervention. Cummings (2017: 8) further states that current ML and deep learning only 
have the capability to detect patterns that are significantly tuned by humans and must also be 
interpreted by humans for them to be useful. Cummings (2017) plots how the more uncertainty 
involved in the task of a skilled based behaviour, the harder a task becomes to code. There are 
two different factors when it comes to uncertainty; rule-based behaviour and knowledge-based 
reasoning; as uncertainty increases, rules-based reasoning gives way to knowledge-based 
reasoning (Cummings, 2017: 6). What this means is that AI is easier to program when a skill-
based behaviour is quantifiable, the more qualitative or abstract it is, the harder it is to program 
(Cummings, 2017). For Boulanin and Verbruggen (2017: 5), autonomy is usually understood 
as the ability for hardware or software, once activated, to perform functions or tasks on its own. 
However, Boulanin and Verbruggen (2017) state that autonomy is defined differently over 
different disciplines, but they chose how computer science, robotics and engineering define it 
by quoting the work of Paul Scharre. Boulanin  and Verbruggen (2017: 5) define autonomy 
into three different categories: “(a) the human-machine command-and-control relationship; (b) 
the sophistication of the machine’s decision-making process; and (c) the types of decisions or 
functions being made autonomous” .  
The human-machine command-and-control relationship involves assessing the extent to which 
humans are involved in the execution of tasks (Boulanin, & Verbruggen, 2017: 6-7). There are 
a further three categories: 1. Human involvement at some stage of the task execution (semi-
autonomous/Human-in-the-loop), 2. Human oversight in case an error occurs (human-
supervised autonomous/human-in-the-loop), and 3. Fully autonomous machines that do not 
require human intervention (fully autonomous/human-out-of-the-loop). ‘Sliding Autonomy’ is 
where a machine can go between human supervision and full autonomy. (Boulanin, & 
Verbruggen, 2017: 6-7).  
The sophistication of the machine’s decision-making process involves the machine’s ability to 
execute self-governance and deal with uncertainties in the environment it operates in 
(Boulanin, & Verbruggen, 2017: 6). There are a further three categories here: automatic, 
automated and autonomous ((Boulanin, & Verbruggen, 2017). Automatic involves the machine 
responding to a sensory input by following a set of rules with no uncertainty involved, while 
automated or autonomous have self-governance and respond to the environment (Boulanin, & 
Verbruggen, 2017) These are conceptually challenged terms. Once again the idea is that 





This has the ability to make the outcome inevitable, meaning there is an ability to predict 
behaviour and lower uncertainty. Furthermore, autonomous can select a range of outcomes 
based on the data from sensory input received but there may be some human intervention.  
The final category is the types of decisions or functions being made autonomous. This deals 
with the issue of the task that is being executed over the issue of autonomy of the system as a 
whole (Boulanin, & Verbruggen, 2017: 6).  For Boulanin and Verbruggen (2017) autonomy is 
best understood in terms of what task is being executed at a function level or subsystem level 
(6). Some functions may not have any risk or ethical issues, while a function such as targeting 
may cause great ethical or risk issues (Boulanin, & Verbruggen, 2017: 6). This last category, 
favoured by the authors, is the ‘functional approach’ when it comes to autonomy (Boulanin, & 
Verbruggen, 2017: 7)  
“It recognizes that the human–machine command-and control relationship and the 
sophistication of a machine’s decision-making capability may vary from one function 
to another. Some functions may require a greater level of self-governance than others, 
while human control may be exerted on some functions but not others depending on the 
mission complexity and the external operating environment, as well as regulatory 
constraints. Also, the extent of a human operator’s control or cancel functions may 
change during the system’s mission.” (Boulanin, & Verbruggen, 2017: 7)  
This means that their research was based on the study of the autonomy of weapons systems 
and not the study of autonomy inside weapons systems. For Bounanin and Verbruggen (2017: 
7), this allows for the research of a larger range of weapons systems. The authors further 
describe autonomy as a machine’s ability to transform data from the environment into a set of 
plans or actions to execute (Boulanin, & Verbruggen, 2017: 7) This literature states that 
autonomy always involves the same three capabilities being integrated into one; the three being 
sense, decide and act. Ultimately, autonomy comes from the ability of a system to sense and 
act to an environment in order to achieve its goal (Boulanin, & Verbruggen, 2017: 11).  
Bieri and Dickow (2014: 2) break autonomy down into three different degrees: remote control, 
autonomous manoeuvres under human steering control, and autonomous execution of tasks 
without human control, but with a veto right. As with the views of Boulanin and Verbruggen 
(2017) discussed above, Bieri and Dickow’s (2014) degrees of autonomy are based around 
human intervention. When it comes to ‘remote control’ a robot executes missions with a distant 





Dickow, 2014: 2). ‘Autonomous manoeuvres under human steering control’ involves a 
machine that operates autonomously; however, it can be overridden by a human being at any 
point, for example: changing the course of the flight (Beiri, & Dickow, 2014: 2). ‘Autonomous 
execution of tasks without human control, but with veto right’ is when a human can only 
intervene with a veto command, like activating an emergency stop button (Beiri, & Dickow, 
2014: 2). These all have different degrees of autonomy; however, they are maintaining some 
type of human-in-the-loop scenario. Subsequently, Beiri and Dickow (2014) do not deal with 
the issue of autonomy, for example ‘Autonomous manoeuvres under human steering control’ 
describes a machine that Boulanin and Verbruggen (2017) would have arguably seen as 
‘automated’ rather than autonomous.  
This can be stated owing to the fact the machine is flying based on a ‘predetermined routes’, 
meaning that the machines have been programmed to operate in a certain environment. The 
AWS is not collecting data from its environment through sensors and making decisions based 
on a system like deep learning and executing the task according to the outcome of the neural 
network. Noone and Noone quote the US Department of Defense definition of AWS:  
“[A] weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous 
weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of 
the weapon system but can select and engage targets without further human input after 
activation” (DoD, 2012 as cited by Noone, & Noone, 2015: 27).  
Noone and Noone state that they view autonomy closer to being automation (2015) as an 
automatic system will carry out a task based on a preprogrammed sequence of operations or  
move in a structured environment (Noone, & Noone, 2015: 27-28). Noone and None then go 
on to discuss how AWS should be able to select and engage a target in an unstructured 
environment without human involvement (2015). Noone and Noone are dealing with the issue 
of whether weapons systems should have a closed loop system, meaning that there is no human 
intervention; the machine is able to take off, select and engage a target by itself (2015). Noone 
and Noone then go on to highlight the three types of weapons systems:  
“1. Human-in-the-loop or semi-autonomous systems require a human to direct the 
system to select a target and attack it, such as Predator or Reaper UAVs.  
2. Human-on-the-loop or human-supervised autonomous systems are weapon systems 





include Israel's Iron Dome and the U.S. Navy's Phalanx Close In Weapons System (or 
CIWS).  
3. Human-out-of-the-loop or fully autonomous weapon systems can attack without any 
human interaction; there are currently no such weapons” (Noone, & Noone, 2015: 28). 
For Boulanin (2019), automation could have both a positive and negative impact on the risk of 
nuclear war, with the negative impact being on a state’s perception of the efficiency of their 
second-strike capability. The issue of second-strike capability was highlighted earlier as a 
factor of importance when it comes to nuclear deterrence and subsequently this research. 
Autonomous systems offer the potential capability of speed and reliability, which could tempt 
states to use them as early warning systems according to Boulanin (2019: 83). This could cause 
states to feel insecure; it must be reiterated that a state needs to only perceive the capability in 
order for it to feel insecure, the technology doesn’t necessarily need to be efficient or 
functional. A state only needs to perceive that another country’s AWS is capable of a disarming 
strike to cause strategic instability, as the eradication of a second-strike capability then equates 
to the dynamics of nuclear deterrence being unbalanced. This would then lead to more 
insecurity, showing that AWS would have an adverse effect on nuclear deterrence and 
subsequently strategic stability. Payne (2018: 7) states that there are some intriguing parallels 
between the development of ‘deep learning’ methods and the development of nuclear weapons 
during the Cold War, whereas Giest and Lohn (2018) state that AI may lead to possible nuclear 
escalation or the use of nuclear weapons. Allen and Chan (2017) highlight that AI will likely 
have an impact on military superiority and along with this, they use different cases of 
‘transformative technology’ in order to understand AI. This highlights the importance of 
understanding nuclear technology as a case study to create the ability to gain insight on how to 
understand AWS. 
What can be noted from this section on AI and AWS are a number of tenets that can be 
important for this research. Firstly, AI can be deemed as the science of making intelligent 
machines. This statement is twofold, owing to the fact that AI researchers are trying to recreate 
human intelligence and this highlights AI’s connection to psychology. When it comes to AI, it 
is further divided into ‘narrow’ vs ‘general’ intelligence. Some authors may use different 
terminology; however, this research has chosen to go with this owing to the fact it is more 
commonly used. ‘Narrow’ intelligence involves a machine’s ability to process data and find 
patterns within it; ultimately not equal to human intelligence. Meanwhile, ‘general’ intelligence 





the most important aspect of AI to arise from the literature is termed ‘deep learning’; which is 
the combination of ML and Neural Networks. Deep learning may equal better navigation and 
target recognition, which in theory can help find and target a country’s second-strike capability. 
Two issues do arise from deep learning: the issue with it being a ‘black box’ and the need for 
large datasets. Furthermore, there is the issue of autonomy when it comes to AWS; the 
argument around autonomy is based around human intervention in a task that is being executed. 
Boulanin and Verbruggen’s (2017: 5) framework for the issue of autonomy will be used; they 
define autonomy based on three sections: “(a) the human-machine command-and-control 
relationship; (b) the sophistication of the machine’s decision-making process; and (c) the types 
of decisions or functions being made autonomous”. These sections all look at the degree of the 
machine’s ability to autonomously sense, decided and act with or without human intervention. 
This creates an understanding of how AWS will work, by understanding the fundamental 
technical aspects behind this technology.  
2.3 New wars 
This chapter now moves onto the new war thesis, which a stated already, is being used to create 
a secondary contextualization for the study and theoretical framework. New wars is a term that 
is highly contested by many scholars and the literature around the debate of new wars is vast. 
However, the author who originally coined the term ‘new wars’ was Kaldor. There are four 
quintessential tenets when it comes to new wars: actors, goals, methods and forms of finance. 
This section will start with a look at the main theorist of the new wars thesis, Kaldor. This 
section will review how Kaldor views new wars and ultimately how she defends them. It will 
then follow the literature and find out what other theorists argue about the new war thesis; be 
they for it or against it. It must be noted that most authors challenge new wars on the basis of 
‘old wars’ or ‘Clauswitzian wars’. This section will aim to review the new war thesis as it will 
become the structure for the theoretical framework. Kaldor (2013) states that she created the 
new war thesis in order to make a research strategy or a policy guide to understand the logic of 
contemporary warfare. Kaldor (2013) highlights that the ‘new’ in the new war thesis is a 
research strategy (2013). For Kaldor (2013), the new war thesis is enshrined in ‘old’ war logic 
and this gives the new war thesis the ability to understand contemporary conflict. Kaldor’s 
(2013) new war thesis does not focus on a particular issue, but rather creates an ‘integrative 
framework for analysis’. This ‘integrative framework’ will help to build a theoretical 
framework that will create a microscope that can be used to understand the data of this research. 





violence and also builds a way of understanding the characteristic of violent conflicts. Kaldor 
(2013) ultimately sees the new war thesis as a form of analysis that allows for scholars to 
understand the dynamics of conflict.  
2.3.1 Kaldor’s ‘New War Thesis’  
What is a ‘new war’ according to Kaldor? Kaldor (2013: 2) argues that new wars are wars in 
the era of globalisation that take place in authoritarian states that have been weakened by its 
affects. In these contexts there is a mix of state and non-state actors, private and public, internal 
and external, war and peace, and political and economic that all become hard to distinguish 
from one another (Kaldor, 2013: 2). This breakdown of distinction is both the cause and 
consequence of such conflict (Kaldor, 2013: 2) Furthermore, Kaldor defines new wars based 
on actors, goals, methods and forms of finance (Kaldor, 2013). When it comes to the actors of 
new wars they differ from that of ‘old war’; old wars were fought between regular armed forces 
of states (Kaldor, 2013: 2). According to Kaldor’s 2013: 2) article, new wars are composed of 
state and non-state actors; non-state actors entail regular armed forces, warlords, paramilitaries, 
private security contractors, jihadists and mercenaries. When it comes to new wars their goals 
are different from those of old wars according to Kaldor (2013: 2), as old wars were fought for 
ideological and geopolitical interest, while new wars are fought in the name of ‘identity 
politics’. It must be noted how Kaldor continuously describes new wars by showing how they 
are or are not different from old wars. Identity politics differ from geopolitics or ideologies 
based on their logic, as identity politics is aimed at a certain group rather than pursing policies 
or programmes that are in the general public interest (Kaldor, 2013: 2). Kaldor (2013: 2) 
attributes the rise of identity politics to new communication technologies; migration, both 
domestic and international; and the erosion of more inclusive political ideologies such as 
socialism. However, Kaldor (2013: 2) argues that the most important part of identity politics 
construction is war. This means that the aim of new wars is political mobilisation based on 
identity, rather than an instrument of war (Kaldor, 2013: 2). When it comes to the methods of 
war, Kaldor saw old wars entailing a ‘decisive encounter’ (Kaldor, 2013: 2-3). The method of 
war was capturing territory through military means; however, in new wars battles are rare and 
the territory is captured though political means (Kaldor, 2013: 2-3). The political means that 
are utilised to capture a territory are through the control of the population (Kaldor, 2013: 2-3). 
When it comes to how wars are financed, old wars were financed mainly by taxation, while 
new wars entail a very different form of financing, according to Kaldor (2013: 2-3). Finance in 





such as looting, taxation of humanitarian aid, kidnapping, or smuggling of natural resources, 
and illicit trade like drugs (Kaldor, 2013: 2-3). For Kaldor old wars economies were 
‘centralizing, autarchic and mobilized the population’, while new wars are a part of the ‘open 
globalized decentralized economy’ which has low participation and the revenue is dependent 
on the violence (Kaldor, 2013: 2-3). When it comes to war, according to Kaldor, old wars were 
about state building, while new wars are about the dismantling of the state (Kaldor, 2013: 3)  
2.3.2 Are New Wars ‘New’?  
Is the new war thesis true, are new wars truly ‘new’? One of the critics of Kaldor’s (2001: 163) 
new war thesis is Booth, who takes issue with the term ‘new’. This statement is based on the 
premise that wars have not changed significantly enough to be termed as ‘new’ (Booth, 2001: 
164). Booth states that the temptation to oversimplify war must be resisted and that wars such 
as colonial, guerrilla, rebellions were side-lined by Kaldor (Booth, 2001: 164). What Booth 
(2001) is trying to maintain here is that warfare between a state and non-state actors has been 
a feature of warfare throughout history; it is not specific to ‘new wars’. What Booth (2001) is 
maintaining is that there is significant historical evidence that what is entailed in ‘new wars’ 
has happened before. As argued by Kaldor (2013), new wars have elements of old wars, the 
new war thesis is ultimately a research strategy. Shaw (2000: 173) argues that some will 
challenge the historical issues of the new war thesis; however, these characteristics may have 
been seen before, but the combination of them in new wars is distinctive. For instance, the 
genocide in Nazi Germany compared to the Genocide in Rwanda contain very different modes 
(Shaw, 2000). Shaw (2000) states that what happened in Rwanda was ‘amateurish’ compared 
to the Nazis. This statement is built on the premise that new wars are built on targeting the 
civilian population as a mode of warfare, they are targeted due to uncertainty (Shaw, 2000). 
This means, that for Shaw (2000: 179), new wars are genocidal. Ultimately for Shaw, Kaldor 
introduces globalisation as the new form of a war economy, but for Shaw it is presented as 
external to war. Shaw (2000: 179) states that globality can be traced to the contradiction of 
war, along with this, globalisation can not only be linked to the end of the Cold War, but also 
the weakening of the relationship between the war machines and the economy. Ultimately for 
Shaw (2000), Kaldor illustrates a new form of war and helps question the contemporary mode 
of warfare.   
Like Shaw (2000), Newman (2004: 179) states that new wars’ key characteristics that are 





new. One of Newman’s (2004) most important critiques of new wars is that it lacks a sufficient 
historical context; however, Newman states that it has helped scholars to understand civil war 
better. Newman (2004) states that Kaldor is not incorrect in her analysis of new wars, but that 
she negates the issue of the goals, methods and how they are financed which can be historically 
found in other wars. What Newman (2004) is arguing for is a more accurate and in-depth 
analysis of the historical context of war, especially civil wars. Even if there is incomplete data, 
analysts looking at the new war thesis must build a database of all civil wars in order to create 
a more accurate analysis of new wars. As aspects such as the targeting of civilian populations 
and forced human displacement have been a tactic of certain wars, however, the fact that it is 
more a tactic of war over being a consequence of war is appealing for Newman (2004: 181-
182). Newman (2004: 183) highlight that the new war thesis describes the social and economic 
context of war based on a failed or weak state, with a collapsed formal economy and rivalry 
between different criminal groups over illicit activities or resources. The issue of a failed or 
weak state comes about owing to the erosions of the state by globalisation and neoliberal 
economic policies (Newman, 2004: 175).  Newman (2004: 186) finds the economic and social 
dynamics explained by the new war thesis as important to understanding contemporary conflict 
owing to the fact that it points analysts in the direction of understanding human insecurity and 
violent conflict. Newman highlights how (2004) ‘war economies’ are characterised by violence 
over resources, the black market or external assistance; this comes about owing to the issue of 
globalisation which Newman highlights extensively. This is what is termed as a ‘globalised 
war economy’, driven by the desire to gain wealth and power, meaning the violence is 
perpetuated in order to continue the cycle of gaining wealth and power (Newman, 2004). The 
groups fighting for power are defined by some form of identity such as religion and ethnicity 
(Newman, 2004: 174).  
In summary, Newman (2004: 185) agrees that wars have changed owing to technological 
innovation and socio-economic changes, but the historical perspective is still an important 
factor in the analysis of new wars. However, Kaldor (2013) emphasises that the ‘old’ is a part 
of the ‘new’ and that the new war thesis is a research strategy. However, the historical 
perspective is of importance to this research, which is why nuclear technology has been chosen 
as a case study. The benefits of such a strategy are twofold, it allows for an understanding of a 
transformative technology and how this technology affected the mode of warfare. Furthermore, 





current ‘goals’ of the US. As democracy drove the goals of the Cold War, will the rise of 
populism have the same effect on driving US strategy now?  
2.3.3 Globalisation: A further investigation into the economics of warfare 
Berdal (2003: 478) has a more in-depth focus on the economic agenda of the actors involved. 
He states there is a need to widen the debate owing to the fact that: economic agendas of war 
are affected by the change of the economic environment, and focusing on one set of factors, 
his literature can add to the discussion of new wars. For Berdal (2003: 479), the lack of 
precision when it comes to applying globalisation is problematic, as it is more than just a 
‘metaphor’. He wants a more precise definition as a lack of a precise definition is what a lot of 
the new war literature suffers from according to Berdal (2003: 480-481). Berdal (2003: 482) 
attributed globalisation to the easy access to capital and finances, better communications and 
transportation, some partial deregulation of industry, and transnational processes of exchange 
and production, which are the agreed-upon drivers of globalisation. Berdal (2003: 482) focuses 
on how a deregulated and open international economy has allowed for belligerents to develop 
economic interests and sustain conflict.  
“By posing the question of what functional utility violence may be serving to 
participants in wars to elites, ordinary people caught up in war, and external actors that 
stand to gain from the conflict it becomes possible to discern how a set of vested 
interests in the continuation of war may emerge” (Berdal, 2003: 482).  
This will eventually equal a war economy, turning into the form of a regional pattern of 
informal economic activity (Berdal, 2003: 483-484). This self-interest of local elites, external 
actors pursing profit and a vulnerable population concerned with survival help further explain 
globalisations effect on new wars (Berdal, 2003: 490).  
Another author that emphasises the importance of economics of war is Munkler (2005: 1), who 
argues that to understand new wars there needs to be an understanding of its economic 
foundations. Once again, Munkler (2005) is yet another theorist who has a critique of the new 
war thesis. Munkler (2005) states, like Berdal (2003), that new wars are not inherently new. 
Alike the work of Berdal (2003) and Newman (2004), Munkler (2005: 2) highlights the 
importance of the historical perspective. He reiterates the need for ‘new wars’ to be compared 
to ‘old wars’. Most of the literature reviewed compared ‘new war’ to ‘old war’, another term 





between the eighteenth to mid-twentieth century; they were built on the premise of two states 
fighting each other in a decisive manner, involving actions such as statecraft and state-building.  
Munkler (2005: 8) would, however, disagree with the statement that new wars are state-
disintegrating and not building, he states that they may contribute to state-building. Munkler 
(2005: 10) argues that states not being able to control the development of their national 
economy is due them being linked to the world market system. This statement holds true, as 
the era of globalisation has changed the way wars are financed. They are no longer based on 
taxation like that of old wars, they are based on other forms of finance, like looting, external 
assistance and selling of resource rights.  
When it comes to how new wars are financed, Kaldor (2013: 3) compares how old wars were 
financed against how new wars are financed. Old wars were financed by taxation or by private 
patrons, while new wars are financed by looting, taxation of aid, diaspora support, kidnapping, 
exploitation of natural resources or selling of their rights. Berdal (2003: 485) similarly 
highlights how natural resources or outside assistance help consolidate power and the ability 
to keep these wars going when he states: “Angola, Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone all 
illustrated how, in the context of acute state weakness or state collapse, war and violence will 
give rise to economic opportunities for a range of actors, both at the level of elites and among 
populations adjusting to the dislocation and stresses of war”. Berdal (2003) views these 
warlords as businessmen, who have been given this ability due to natural resources and the 
interconnectedness that came about due to globalisation.  
What Berdal is stating is that these local warlords require global connections in order to sustain 
their wars.  
“Globalization has opened up new opportunities for individual nonstate actors within 
weak states to link to global trading networks and potential partners without state 
interference. Improved communication technology, fast capital movements and 
increased deregulation in Western economies have created the necessary preconditions 
for coalitions between local warlords, private business, intermediary agents and 
emerging private security companies to capitalize upon the lack of states control on 
resources extraction” (Berdal, 2013: 489).  
This shows how ‘new wars’ are inherently affected by globalisation. This will be of importance 





technology compared to cyber which is seen as having a ‘low’ cost profile. When it comes to 
artificial cost profile, Allen and Chan (2017: 46) define the cost profile as ‘diverse, but 
potentially low’. Developing AI and ML capabilities will cost firms millions or billions of 
dollars (Allen, & Chan, 2017: 46).  However, the cost could also be relatively low owing to 
open-source code libraries and COTS or rented hardware that will allow for the development 
of AI for less than $1 million (Allen, & Chan, 2017: 46). There is also the possibility that it 
may be free if copies are leaked (Allen, & Chan, 2017: 46). As stated by Munkler (2005: 98), 
wars have become cheaper and the ability to equip armies has become easy owing to open war 
economies. They rely on light weapons and trucks over jeeps. Larger weapons which are used 
by these armies are usually leftovers (Munkler, 2005: 74). Could AWS possibly become the 
new light weapon or truck of new wars? This section has helped to build an understanding of 
how wars are financed. Furthermore, it has highlighted the importance of the effect of 
globalisation on new wars.  
2.3.4 Kaldor’s ‘New War Thesis’: A research strategy 
This literature review bases itself on Kaldor’s (2013) view that the ‘new war’ thesis is 
ultimately a research strategy. What are the implications of this for Autonomous Weapons 
Systems (AWS) and strategic stability?  It is important to understand the economics of warfare, 
or how wars are ‘financed’. This is what Allen and Chan (2017) refer to as a ‘cost profile’. The 
goals, mode and historical perspective, the main tenets gained from the literature above are of 
significant importance; however, the economic aspects are of considerable importance when it 
comes to transformative technology, especially AWS. This section now starts to move from 
the general debate around new wars, with each different theorist discussed so far, and starts to 
group them in Kaldor’s main tenets.  
2.3.5 The goals of new wars 
In terms of the ‘goals’ of new wars, theorists such as Booth believe that what new war thesis 
claims can be seen in earlier wars, meaning that identity politics in not necessarily new (2001: 
163). However, Kaldor (2013: 3) argues that with globalisation came the rise in identity 
politics. For Kaldor (2013: 2), identity politics is constructed through war, meaning that 
political mobilization around identity politics is the aim of war, rather than being an instrument 
of war which was seen in ‘old wars’. Shaw (2000: 172) argues that new wars are about political 





of new wars are about identity politics in contrast to geo-political or ideological goals of earlier 
wars.” (Kaldor: 2013: 6) For clarification Kaldor (2013: 6) defines ‘identity politics’ as the 
claim to power based on a certain identity, such as nationality, clan, religion or linguistics.  
Identity politics can now either be local or international owing to globalisation, which saw the 
increase of interconnectedness due to technological innovations (Kaldor: 2013).  
2.3.6 The methods of new wars 
Another important aspect of the literature that emerged was what Kaldor (2013: 2-3) termed 
the ‘methods’ of new wars. For Kaldor (2013), the method of old wars was a decisive battle 
between two or more nation-states with armies, the aim was to capture the territory of another 
sovereign state. Shaw’s (2000) research analyses of Kaldor’s concept of this type of warfare, 
referred to so far in this literature review as ‘old war’ or ‘Clauswitzian war’. Shaw (2000: 173) 
states that some many argue that new wars are not so new; however, the combination of them 
in new wars is highly distinctive. Kaldor (2013: 10) argues that the Clauswitzian ‘trinitarian 
concept of war’, which is the state, the army and the people, is no longer relevant to modern 
warfare. Kaldor (2013) states further that the difference between new and old wars is a contrast 
between ideal types rather than actual historical types. Kaldor does concede that the wars of 
the twentieth century are closer to old wars; however, wars of the twenty-first century are closer 
to Kaldor’s (2013: 13-14) depiction.  
Although Flemming (2009) found that the premise that new wars are post-Clauswitzian wars 
to be unfounded, this does not then mean that the new war thesis is irrelevant. What Flemming 
(2009) is arguing for is based in the logic of Clauswitz, that theory should not become a 
doctrine, it must instead become an area of study, meaning that inquiry is the most important 
aspect of theory. Flemming (2009) states that two different theories too often become polarised 
rivals, whereas they can subsequently be used together to understand war.  
“Clauswitzian concepts can be used as analytical tools in ostensibly new wars, just as 
the ‘new war’ trends can open up the complexity of war and the requirements to find a 
political solution to contemporary humanitarian and conflict solutions” (Flemming, 
2009: 238).  
Mello (2010) furthermore argues that the work of Clauswitz can be useful when analysing 
modern warfare, as it allows for the study and comparison of all warfare. While this may be 
true, Kaldor’s (2013: 4) aim with the new war thesis is to look at the changing nature or 





interconnected characteristics of contemporary warfare.  Kaldor (2013) concedes that while 
historically there are wars that are similar, this is a form of analysis and a research strategy. 
Newman (2004: 180) also highlights the importance of Kaldor’s new war thesis as a form of 
analysis, as it has allowed analysts to focus on these issues and subsequently understand 
conflict dynamics. However, Kaldor (2013) does not see the need for the historical perspective, 
while Newman (2004) sees the historical perspective as an important factor of the new war 
thesis. The issue of historical perspective is of importance to understand transformative 
technology in the twenty-first century, which is why this research will see the historical aspect 
as an important tenet of the new war thesis.  
2.3.7 The actors: Who fights these wars?  
The final tenet of the new war thesis to be reviewed is the ‘actors’ that are involved in new 
wars. Kaldor (2013: 2) states that older wars were fought by states with armed forces while 
new wars are fought by a varying combination of state and non-state actors. Examples outlined 
by Kaldor (2013: 2) are: “regular armed forces, private security contractors, mercenaries, 
jihadists, warlords, paramilitaries, etc.” This comes about due to the state’s monopoly of 
violence being eroded by it becoming privatised. The actors involved in new wars are of 
increasing importance when it comes to AWS, owing to the fact that nuclear deterrence is based 
on perception and an adversary. This research will not focus on non-state actors as it will take 
a state-centric view. This research will use the US’s NSS in order to find out who the US views 
as a potential aggressor and what this means for their policy. Depending on how the US views 
other actors will influence how they pursue AWS.  
There are four main tenets of the new war thesis that are highlighted by Kaldor: they are the 
actors, goals, methods and forms of finance. The main tenet that needs to be re-emphasised 
here is the economics of warfare, how they are financed. This is a focal point owing to what is 
called the ‘cost profile’ of AWS. It is undoubtedly clear that AWS will change the mode of 
warfare. When it comes to the goals, the world is experiencing a rise in identity politics, making 
it a significant factor when understanding the goals of actors. Kaldor also highlights identity 
politics as an important aspect of the new war thesis. Can identity politics be applied to the US 
and help one to understand the US goals? The next section will aim to further look at identity 
politics and lead into populism, which will provide a basis to build on to understand the goals 





2.3.8 Identity politics  
The role of identity politics, and more specifically populism, is to create a better 
contextualization for this research. The rational for this contextualization is to create an 
understanding of the circumstances in which this study is taking place. This backdrop will 
allow this research to better understand how President Trump and populism affect the main 
research question. This section will look at how Kaldor views identity politics.  Kaldor (2013: 
2) states clearly that old wars were fought through the means of the interest of a geopolitical 
location or ideology; an example would be democracy or socialism. When it comes to new 
wars, according to Kaldor (2013), they are fought through the means of ‘identity politics. These 
statements are not new to this review of literature, as they have been extensively discussed 
above. However, this section aims to further review the literature of identity politics. Identity 
politics is arguably what led to the election of President Donald Trump and the United 
Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union. These are two well-cited examples of 
identity politics and what is known was ‘populism’. In the literature, populism and identity 
politics seem to be interlinked, however, identity politics seems easier to define than populism. 
Therefore, this section will commence with a review of literature on identity politics. It will 
then move on to the review of populism, and finally how the two are interconnected. The reason 
this concept is being further reviewed is owing to the fact that this research is forecasting that 
identity politics, specifically populism, will have an impact on US national strategic policy, 
arguably in a way that democracy or communism influenced countries’ policies during the 
Cold War. This will help to further develop the ‘goals’ section of the theoretical framework, as 
this research will have a more in-depth understanding of what identity politics is. Furthermore, 
this will create a background and secondary contextualization for the study.  
2.3.9 What is identity politics? 
To further this secondary contextualization, this section will begin with a brief overview of 
how Kaldor views identity politics, as Kaldor is the major theorist behind the new war thesis 
and subsequently of significance importance to this study. In Kaldor’s (2013: 337) article 
‘Identity and War’ she uses the work of Sen when talking about the construction of identity. 
Kaldor (2013: 337) highlights the literature of Sen (2006) who states that an individual can 
have multiple identities, it is when one of these identities becomes overarching, it is inevitable 
and natural that conflict is likely. Kaldor (2013: 338) states that identity should be seen as a 





there is not a process of identification and a singular identity becomes prevalent it is known as 
a unidimensional identity, which is the cause of violence and conflict (Sen, 2006 as cited in 
Kaldor, 2013: 338).  A unidimensional identity is uniquely defined in relation to other identities 
that are also unidimensional (Kaldor, 2013: 338). Kaldor (2013: 338) states that unidimensional 
identities are built out of binaries and sometimes a triangular distinction. For example, a Jewish 
person is defined in relation to an anti-Semite (Kaldor, 2013: 338).  When it comes to the 
binaries that identity is built on, Kaldor refers to the work of Schmitt, who states that ‘the 
political’ is defined by the friend-enemy distinction (Schmitt, 1927 as cited in Kaldor, 2013: 
338). Kaldor (2013: 339) states that violence is a form of communication between the victim 
and the perpetrator. Whatever the motivation is, fear and hate are what is communicated 
(Kaldor, 2013: 339). Furthermore, violence allows for a narrow binary distinction between the 
victim and perpetrator what is called a ‘friend’ and ‘enemy binary’ by Kaldor (2013: 339). 
Kaldor (2013: 339) states that violence divides the binaries even more. Kaldor’s (2013) 
argument is that war constructs unidimensional identities which are the opposite to an 
individual’s multidimensional identity. Kaldor (2013: 2) also highlights how identity politics 
is most importantly constructed through war. 
Schafer (2005: 93) sees ethnicity as a process, which he terms ethnicization, a tool that can be 
used for political power. A collective identity is a powerful tool for actors with or without 
economic and/ or political control according to Schafer (2005: 94). Schafer (2005) also 
highlights that identity politics is a process that can be used by the political elite or actors who 
have an interest. However, unlike Kaldor (2013), who sees individuals as having multiple 
identities, Schafer (2005) focuses on the issue of ethnicity and religion. For Schafer (2005: 94), 
ethnic and religious identities represent a way of truth, dignity and life for individuals.  
However, when it comes to identity politics the implications for conflict can be problematic. 
Schafer (2005: 94) states that identity-based conflicts lack clarification that led to difficult 
negotiations, this is owing to the fact that they lack clear goals and reasons; Schafer states that 
they lean on the side of mystification. Further, these conflict values go beyond the individual, 
meaning that human life is not of high importance (Schafer, 2005: 94). Like the work of Kaldor 
(2013), the more the violence and cohesion continue the more the hatred increases, on top of 
this Schafer (2005) states the more the violence continues, the more the guilt increases. Schafer 
(2005: 96) goes on to further talk about the role of ‘symbolic violence. “In these clashes of 
mobilized identities, symbolic violence gains an important role. First of all, it means not 





(labelling)” (Schafer, 2005: 96). Schafer (2005: 96) states that actors opt for racism, which is 
a strategy of fundamentalism.  
For Fukuyama (2018), politics today is less concerned with economic or ideological concerns, 
but with the issue of identity. “Now, in many democracies, the left focuses less on creating 
broad economic equality and more on promoting the interests of a wide variety of marginalized 
groups, such as ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, women, and LGBT people. The 
right, meanwhile, has redefined its core mission as the patriotic protection of traditional 
national identity, which is often explicitly connected to race, ethnicity, or religion” (Fukuyama, 
2018: 91). Fukuyama (2018) highlights how these leaders utilise the issue of dignity, which 
was also seen in the work of Schafer (2005) and Kaldor (2013) when it comes to identity 
politics. For Fukuyama (2018: 92), identity politics has moved away from university campuses 
and ‘cultural wars’, and towards a concept that can help explain what is going on in global 
affairs. This comes about, according to Fukuyama (2018: 92), owing to the fact the groups 
believe their identities are not receiving adequate recognition. Fukuyama (2018: 92-93) states 
that globalisation has led to rapid economic growth and social change, this had made societies 
more diverse, making groups that were previously invisible to the mainstream demand 
recognition; this has subsequently led to a backlash as certain groups feel a loss of status and a 
sense of displacement. Fukuyama (2018: 93) argues that democratic societies are fracturing 
into ever-narrowing identities which threatens the ability of a society to deliberate and act as a 
whole. Fukuyama (2018: 93) states that this leads to the breakdown of the state and to its 
ultimate failure. The solution to this mandate according to Fukuyama (2018: 93) involves 
liberal democracies moving back to a more universal understanding of human dignity, 
otherwise they are doomed to continue conflict along with the rest of the world. This shows 
how Fukuyama (2018) not only views identity politics, but also how dangerous they can be. 
This also presents the importance of continuing to look at identity politics in its own separate 
section. Kaldor’s identity politics is based in civil wars, Fukuyama (2018) helps to move 
identity politics away from it and into global affairs.  
Besley and Persson (2019) state that there are two factors that drive identity politics.  
“Increased economic polarization has been a short-run consequence of the recent 
financial crisis and a long-term consequence of manufacturing jobs being swept away 





emerged among traditionally dominant groups, who feel threatened by immigration and 
gender equality.” (Besley, & Persson, 2019: 2) 
Besley and Persson (2019: 2) attribute the election of President Trump and the Brexit vote as 
a result of radical-right populist parties and that this trend is seen across the world. Besley and 
Persson (2019: 2) have developed a model that allows for a two-way feedback between political 
culture and policy; their approach sees social identification as having that ability to influence 
policy. This model brings this literature review to an important point. Identity politics is not 
just a phenomenon seen in culture wars or civil wars. It is of importance to understand identity 
politics and its ability to affect national strategic security policy. This will in turn give this 
research the capability to predict how a state will pursue AWS; based on the premise that 
ideologies affected the Cold War and identity politics will affect new wars.   
2.3.10 Populism and identity politics  
This section reviews the literature of identity politics and furthermore the basis of knowledge 
of identity politics. This part now aims to take a step towards a more specific example of 
identity politics, populism. By understand populism and President Trump this research will 
then have a better background and contextualization of the entire process of how AWS will 
affect the US’s nuclear deterrence.  Identity politics is an important tenet of Kaldor’s new war 
thesis and has an effect on the goals of warfare and how war is conducted. This research is an 
attempt to understand how a prominent movement like populism can affect a state’s national 
strategic security policy. Slogans like ‘Make America Great Again’ convey the idea that 
America under the Trump presidency may pursue AI in order to maintain their military 
dominance. Now that a general outline of different theorist on identity politics has been 
outlined, this section will further deal with the issue of identity politics and discuss what the 
correlation is between identity politics and populism. Due to this research being based on the 
US as a research site there is a need to understand the identity politics that are dominating its 
domestic politics. One of the most prominent identity politics that is currently dominating US 
politics is populism; known as the alt-right. It is important to understand this phenomenon in 
order to see its possible effect on US policy which can then impact how the US will pursue 
AWS. This will remain a part of Kaldor’s central tenets of the new war thesis. It is just 
worthwhile getting a further understanding of what this complex theory is. 
Marchlewska, Cichoka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, and Batayneh highlight the work of Müller, 





151). Marchlewska et al highlight how Müller states that populists combine ‘anti-elitism’ and 
what a true vision of a citizen of a nation looks like (Müller, 2016 as cited by Marchlewska et 
al, 2017: 151). Subsequently, the opposite of the populist agenda is then termed as a threat to 
national interest (Marchlewska et al, 2017: 151). Arguably, here is what Kaldor (2013) would 
call the ‘friend-enemy’ binary that is involved in identity politics of the new war thesis. 
Fukuyama’s (2017) view of populism goes on to further state how ‘populist nationalism’ is a 
threat to liberal international order. This shows that populism is not just an issue within a 
sovereign territory, it can also be a threat to the liberal international order. Fukuyama (2017) 
states that populism is a term that is loosely used in order to describe a range of phenomena 
around the world. This is unlike the words of Marchlewska et al (2017) who believe that 
populism is based on a ‘national collective narcissism’, which they define as an unrealistic 
belief of the greatness of a national group. Fukuyama (2017: 1) states that there are three 
characteristics that can be associated with populism: “[t]he first is a regime that pursues policies 
that are popular in the short run but unsustainable in the long run, usually in the realm of social 
policies. Examples would be price subsidies, generous pension benefits, or free medical 
clinics”, “[a] second has to do with the definition of the “people” that are the basis for 
legitimacy: many populist regimes do not include the whole population, but rather a certain 
ethnic or racial group that are said to be the ‘true’ people”, and “[a] third definition of populism 
has to do with the style of leadership. Populist leaders tend to develop a cult of personality 
around themselves, claiming the mantle of charismatic authority that exists independently of 
institutions like political parties”. These leaders try to make a connection with ‘the people’ and 
along with this they tend to denounce the elite (Fukuyama, 2017: 2). According to Fukuyama 
(2017: 2), this style of leadership is an issue for modern liberal democracies that are built 
around power-sharing institutions, such as courts, federalism, legislatures, and a free media. 
These are roadblocks for populist leaders, which subsequently makes them at threat from 
populist leaders. There are three definitions of different populist leaders: the issue of 
economics, who the people are, and the cult of the personality. Fukuyama (2017: 2) states that 
Donald Trump fits into all three of these categories.  
Fukuyama (2017) further categorises populist movements into two categories by geographical 
area. Populist movements in Latin America and Southern Europe tend to be Left and focused 
among the poor and advocating social programmes that aim to rectify social inequality 
(Fukuyama, 2017: 2). They do not emphasise the issue of ethnicity or take a stance against 





less on the poor and more on the declining middle or working class and are more right-wing 
and anti-immigrant (Fukuyama, 2017: 2). They want to protect the existing welfare state; 
however, they do not emphasise a rapid expansion of social services or subsidies (Fukuyama, 
2017: 2). Fukuyama (2017) then goes on to state that there are also populist movements that 
exist, yet do not fit into either of these categories.  
For example, Wasko-Owsiejcsuk (2018: 83-84) states that Trump’s emerging doctrine and 
foreign policy have a ‘large dose of populism’. This means that Trump’s foreign policy is 
dominated by the discourse of ‘Making America Great Again’ or ‘Putting America First’. This 
has subsequently affected US national security strategy in multiple ways, one of the main ones 
being economic strength which leads to military strength which subsequently leads to possible 
military dominance (Wasko-Owsiejcsuk, 2018: 91). This subsequently shows the effect of 
populism on National Security policy and the importance of understand such a theory. It is 
important to understanding the forces behind a country’s policy as this can help predict how a 
policy is pursued or if it will be pursued.  
What can be taken away from this section is the causality between identity politics and conflict, 
specifically, when a singular identity becomes overarching and how this equates to inevitable 
conflict. A singular identity is problematic owing to the fact that humans have multiple 
identities. However, Schafer (2005) states that the quintessential characteristics of identity are 
religion and ethnicity. For Schafer (2005), religion and ethnicity mean truth, dignity and life to 
an individual. Schafer (2005) states a valuable point of debate, as the issue of ethnicity is central 
to Fukuyama’s (2017) populism definition. Furthermore, for Kaldor (2013), war constructs 
these identities. Conflict based on identity also becomes more problematic to negotiate an end. 
Furthermore, these conflicts can be termed as symbolic violence as the aggressors do not see 
the other identity as legitimate. But these conflicts based on identity are not just found in 
‘culture wars’, according to Fukuyama (2017). Identity-based conflicts have moved into global 
affairs (2017). Fukuyama (2017) states that democratic societies are fracturing into separate 
identities based on economic polarisation and social identification. This brings populism to the 
fore, populism is a form of identity. It is based on what a true citizen looks like and ‘anti-
elitism’. For Fukuyama (2017) it is a direct threat to international order.  Finally, and most 
importantly, Fukuyama (2017) defines populism based on: 1. A regime pursuing certain 
policies popular in the short term and not sustainable in the long term, 2. It is based on ‘what 
are the people?’ which is based on an ethnic or racial group, and 3. There is a cult of the 





that social identification has the ability to affect policy, showing the importance of 
understanding the ‘goals’ of the new war thesis and more importantly it has helped to 
understand what populism is.  
2.4 Theoretical framework 
This section creates the theoretical framework in order to make sense of and answer the 
research questions. This means that all the relevant information will be extracted, and a 
microscope created. The framework will be based on Kaldor’s (2013) new war thesis.  As 
already stated, four main tenets of the new war thesis that have been outlined by Kaldor (2013): 
actors, goals, methods and forms of finance. This framework will be based predominantly on 
Kaldor (2013); however, it will be adjusted accordingly based on the literature review of the 
new war thesis. Furthermore, the rest of the literature reviewed in this section will be added in 
each of the relevant sections in order to further build the theoretical framework.  
 New War 
Actors • This section combined with goals will be used to create a secondary 
contextualization for the study.  
• Range of actors; such as regular armed forces, non-state actors, warlords 
and private security contractors.   
Goals • Are fought on the basis of identity politics, whilst old wars were fought 
on the basis of ideologies such as democracy or communism (Kaldor, 
2013). 
• Individuals have multiple identities; however, when one identity becomes 
overarching, conflict will ensue (Kaldor, 2013). 
• Identity is a process of inventing and reinventing oneself. 
• A unidimensional identity is the cause of violence and conflict (Kaldor, 
2013) 
• Identities are formed in relation to another (Kaldor, 2013).   
• Unidimensional identity built on binaries or sometimes a triangular 





Methods • This section will will help to understand the strategies employed.  
• Old wars were fought through the means of a decisive encounter and the 
method involved capturing territory through military means (Kaldor, 
2013). 
• New wars involve targeting of civilians and the capturing of territory 
through political means (Kaldor, 2013). 
• The method of warfare chosen is nuclear deterrence.  
• Nuclear deterrence has three important tenets: military capability; 
unacceptable costs can be imposed; and credibility that this cost will be 
carried out on the aggressor (Morgan, 2003: 74). 
• Finally, AWS will effect a state’s mode of warfare and more specifically 





• The section will analyse how AI and AWS are financed and who exactly 
is financing them. 
• New wars are financed through what can be deemed as criminal activity 
and it is arguable that these wars are continued based on economic gain 
(Kaldor, 2013) 
• Old wars were largely financed by states through taxation or outside 
patrons (Kaldor, 2013). 
• The cost profile of AI is ‘diverse, but potentially low’ (Allen & Chan, 
2017: 46)  
• Finally, can AWS lead to a form of military dominance that allows a state 
to increase its economic dominance by increasing its military capability.  
 
Table 1: Theoretical Framework compiled by the author from Kaldor (2013)  
2.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to review the literature of the main theories and create a theoretical 
framework to understand the chosen case studies. The chapter began with the review of 
literature on strategic stability in order to gain an understanding for the next section, nuclear 
deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is a strategy of strategic stability but also an important tenet of 
this research, which aims to look at the causality between AWS and nuclear deterrence. More 
specifically than nuclear deterrence, the research will look at the effect of AWS on a state’s 
second-strike capability. The section that followed this was the review of literature on AI, 
which was done in order to build a basis for AWS. The reason for reviewing this literature was 
to build a basis of knowledge of what exactly AWS is and what the major theoretical issues 
around it are, for example: the issue of autonomy. This literature review then moved forward 





war thesis as a research strategy. It also contains valuable information, making it more than 
just a research strategy. This was of importance owing to the fact that the new war thesis was 
used in order to build the theoretical framework for this study. From the new war thesis arose 
the issue of identity politics, a concept dominating the political arena worldwide. It also 
allowed this research to build a secondary contextualization in order to better situate the reader 
in the circumstances in which this study is taking place. As AWS affecting nuclear deterrence 
is the end process of politics, there is an entire phenomenon before that needs to be clarified, 
that phenomenon being populism and President Trump. This led to a further investigation of 
the ‘goals’ of the new war thesis; which is identity politics. This drove the research towards 
populism, a form of identity politics currently dominating the US. This research aims to create 
a contextualization of the causality between populism and how states will pursue their national 
strategic security policy. The final section of this literature review was the development of the 
theoretical framework, which involved the combination of all the literature to create a 
theoretical lens in which the case study can be understood. The chapter to follow will be the 
contextualisation of the different transformative technologies and how they impacted how 






Chapter 3  
3.1 Introduction: Transformative Technology and Warfare  
The aim of this chapter is to create contextualisation and background for this study. The basis 
for this contextualisation is the causality between the creation of a ‘transformative technology’ 
and its subsequent effect on how warfare is conducted. This chapter will be based on Allen and 
Chan’s (2017) literature that focused on what lessons can be learnt from previous 
‘transformative technologies’. The four key transformative technologies that Allen and Chan 
(2017) looked at were biowarfare, cyberwarfare, aerospace and nuclear warfare. This section 
aims to study different transformative technologies and their effect on warfare. The 
transformative technologies this research has decided to cover are nuclear, cyber, biowarfare, 
and AI. This study chooses to omit aerospace as it cannot cover all aspects of warfare; 
furthermore, aerospace is a very broad and literature-rich sector. However, air warfare will be 
briefly touched on in the nuclear warfare section and AI section. This is owing to the fact that 
heavy bombers play a vital role in the US’s ‘nuclear triad’ strategy. Also, the advancements in 
AI are playing a vital role in the aerospace domain.  
The approach that has been chosen in this section is because this study researches how AWS 
will affect nuclear deterrence. What this means is that this study wants to understand how states 
go to war. By looking at important transformative technologies, this thesis will create an 
understanding of how these innovations change the way states conduct warfare. Furthermore, 
this section will look into nuclear warfare and create a better understanding of how the US 
conducts its nuclear deterrence. This means that the nuclear technology section has two main 
aims: Firstly, to understand how transformative technology impacts how states go to war, and 
secondly to create a more in-depth understanding of how the US conducts its nuclear national 
strategic security policy.  
Each section will begin with an origin of the technology and general background, which will 
entail aspects such as its capabilities, greatest innovations and problems encountered. From the 
literature of each of these technologies their prominent examples were mentioned. This will 
help to understand the importance of understanding the role of technology in warfare and how 
it changes the way warfare is conducted. This section will also look at how these technologies 
all have dual uses, meaning that they can be used in the private sector as well as for military 





or have this technology accessed by non-state actors or potential adversaries. Furthermore, it 
will highlight how the US strives for technological superiority when it comes to warfare.  
3.2 The origin of biowarfare 
This section will first look at bioweapons and will subsequently only discuss bioweapons and 
not chemical weapons. Chemical weapons have similarities with bioweapons, however as 
stated by Spiers (2010), bioweapons have the potential to be more dangerous than chemical 
weapons. Many theorists, such as Allen and Chan (2017), Van Aken and Hammond (2003), 
and Zanders, Hart and Kuhlau (2001), all state how biowarfare is not a new strategy as to how 
states conduct warfare. Zanders et al (2001) state that biowarfare is almost as old as human 
civilization, they state that the Athenians were pushed into a marsh that contained a ‘virulent 
epidemic’ during the summer which halted their siege of Sicily. Van Aken and Hammond 
(2003) highlighted that the Mongolians would catapult plague victims into besieged cities, 
which could have possibly caused the first epidemic in Europe. Allen and Chan (2017: 100) 
also highlight how the Mongol army at the siege of Caffe in 1346 catapulted plague-infected 
corpses over the walls of the besieged city. Furthermore, Allen and Chan (2017: 100) state that 
the use of infectious diseases can be seen as early as 600 BCE. Another prominent example of 
the use of infectious diseases was in North America during the eighteenth century (Allen and 
Chan, 2017; Zander et al, 2001). The British used smallpox-infected blankets to cause an 
epidemic in an enemy native American tribe (Allen & Chan; 2017: 100). Zanders et al (2001: 
2) state that there were several examples of the deliberate use of smallpox during the wars in 
North America. This included the French, the British and the Indians (Zanders et al, 2001: 2). 
During the American wars, smallpox was a valuable tactic for the British as their soldiers were 
inoculated and the American soldiers were not, giving them a military advantage (Zanders et 
al, 2001). This advantage was then taken away when Washington mandated that all soldiers in 
the American military be vaccinated (Zanders et al, 2001). This section, so far, briefly shows 
different prominent examples of how biowarfare was used by different militaries. This chapter 
will now move on to biological weapons and biowarfare by looking at WWI, the Spanish Flu 
and WWII.  
3.2.1 Biological weapons and biowarfare: WWI, the Spanish Flu and WWII 
This section discusses different examples of biological weapons and biowarfare during the 
twentieth century. The CRS define biological weapons as: “…a biological agent that is 





2001: 1) The type of biological agents is typically bacteria, viruses, fungi or rickettsia 
(Biological weapons: a primer, 2001: 1). Biological weapons come from biotechnology, 
Zander et al (2001: 7) define biotechnology broadly as: “any technique that uses living 
organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, improve plants or animals, or 
develop microorganisms for specific uses.” This highlights the issue that becomes problematic 
for biotech, its dual use, which is why bioweapons are defined by their intention when it comes 
to using biotech, not what it is (Biological weapons: a primer, 2001). Now that biowarfare has 
been defined, the section turns to the role biotechnology has played in warfare. Once again, the 
premise of this section is the effect of technology on how states conducted warfare. 
Furthermore, these sections will highlight how the US always strives for technological 
superiority.  
By 1914, according to Zander et al (2001), microbiology had made incremental advancements. 
According to Zander et al (2001: 2), there had been isolation and cultivation of major bacterial 
diseases. Furthermore, there was the existence of viral diseases, but they were not well 
understood (Zanders et al, 2001: 2) There was also studies conducted on parasitic diseases 
(Zanders et al, 2001: 2). Zanders et al (2001: 2) state that there was a understanding of how 
diseases were transmitted which contributed to better countermeasures, prevention and 
prophylaxis. Zander et al (2001) states that these insights were used by hostile purpose in WWI, 
they were, however used for sabotage purposes and subsequently not directed at humans. Allen 
and Chan (2017) state that bioweapons did not play a role during WWI, however, the Spanish 
Influenza did.  
The Spanish Influenza infected one-third of the world’s population and killed an estimated fifty 
million people (Allen and Chan, 2017). The Spanish flu and the better understanding of disease 
transmission which followed created concern for bioweapons (Zander et al, 2001). 
Furthermore, the fact that the Spanish Flu caused more fatalities than WWI caused concern 
among the great powers (Zander et al, 2001).  Major European powers began to fear the 
feasibility of biological warfare and what pathogen would be best for weaponisation (Zander 
et al, 2001: 3). This fear of biological warfare was bought on by faulty intelligence and the fear 
of vulnerability according to Zander et al (2001: 3). Germany and the Allies tried, but no 
operational offensive Bioweapons (BW) were made before the end of WWII (Zander at el, 






The Geneva Protocol had banned the use of bioweapon, however, they did not prohibit the 
development and stockpile of bioweapons (Allen & Chan, 2017: 101). Major powers were 
experimenting with various apparatus before, during and after WWII (Spiers, 2010: 22). The 
Soviets had perfected an attack termed a ‘line source’ which involved the dispersion of a 
biological agent from either tanks or Ilyushin bombers in a straight line for hundreds of miles 
(Spiers, 2010: 22). The purpose of this attack was to wipe out livestock and crops in wide areas 
over a matter of months (Spiers, 2010: 22). Furthermore, the Allies pursued bioweapons after 
Germany had invaded France, this was done due to the fear of the Germans gaining French 
biotech capabilities. The UK with the assistance of the US and Canada had mass-produced 
bioweapon munitions during WWII (Allen & Chan, 2017: 101). However, the US based its 
policy on ‘no-first-use’ and bioweapon munitions were developed as a deterrent to stop other 
states using them on them (Allen & Chan, 2017: 101). Despite all major powers pursuing 
bioweapon capabilities, the only offensive use of bioweapons was by the Japanese against the 
Chinese and attempted against the Russians (Allen & Chan, 2017). 
The Japanese used disease-infected fleas, kamikaze soldiers, and the infecting of water wells 
as vectors for their attacks (Allen & Chan, 2017: 102). According to Christian (2013: 730), the 
Japanese developed a Uji bomb which was filled with pathogenic bacteria and fleas which it 
used against the Allies. These plague-infested fleas were also sprayed by the Japanese by using 
aircraft, resulting in an outbreak that killed 50 000 people (Christian, 2013: 730). Other similar 
attacks are believed to have caused a death toll of more than 100 000 (Christian, 2013: 730). 
Allen and Chan (2017) state that although these attacks did cause significant suffering among 
Chinese civilians, they did not give the Japanese a significant military advantage during WWII. 
Christian (2013: 730) further highlights other examples used in WWII, such as the French and 
Germans trying to use insects to destroy crops, the Soviets using typhus-infected lice against 
the Germans, the Japanese trying to experiment with aerosolised anthrax, and there were 
allegations of tularaemia being used by the Soviets against the Germans.  These highlights 
indicate the pursuit of bioweapons during WWII but they did not subsequently deliver the 
military capability many states had hoped for. 
3.2.2 Cold War era biowarfare  
After WWII the most prominent developers of bioweapons, according to Zander et al (2001), 
were the US and the Soviets.  Both of these nations saw biological weapons as having the 





2017). This subsequently led to the US and the Soviets pursuing bioweapon programmes. Allen 
and Chan (2017: 102) stated that by the mid-1960s the US was spending $300 million annually 
on chemical and biological weapon programmes. There is no credible evidence that the United 
States ever used bioweapons (Allen & Chan, 2017). However, the US bioweapons offensive 
programme was short-lived as they terminated it by 1969 in favour of a biodefence programme 
(Allen & Chan, 2017). Davis (1999: 509) states that the US offensive bioweapon programme 
was banned owing to several factors, such as secret intelligence information, the Vietnam war 
and new technological innovations. President Nixon stated in a formal policy review in 1969 
that the US would formally dismantle its bioweapons. Furthermore, the US began negotiating 
with the Soviets and other nations which culminated in the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC) in 1972 (Allen & Chan, 2017: 102). Both nations signed it and it was enacted in 1975; 
however, it is arguable whether both sides truly complied. 
The Russians were fully committed to their bioweapons programme, according to Davis 
(1999), hiding this program behind the façade of biotechnology.  
“By addressing every aspect of weapon production, from selection of new strains of 
organisms to the behaviour of biological aerosols under every possible condition of 
climate and topography, through the genetic engineering of antibiotic resistance and the 
design of optimum dissemination and delivery systems, the former Soviet Union was 
able to envisage the achievement of a miniaturized mobile production and weapon-
making capability invulnerable to clandestine monitoring, invasive arms inspection, or 
attack in the event of war (because it was beyond identification); agents precisely 
matched to particular scenarios and human targets and incapable of being treated; a 
variety of dissemination systems, including cruise missiles; agents resistant to 
degradation by heat, light, cold, UV radiation, ionizing radiation, and various 
antibiotics; and dry formulations of agents capable of remaining viable in long-term 
storage” (Davis, 2019: 511).  
The Russians were able to arm MIRVed warheads with a plague (Davis, 1999). Defectors 
helped the West challenge Russia openly in 1993 about their programmes; however, the 
capabilities remained largely unknown (Davis, 1999). 
It was not only the Russians that had questionably defied the BWC. After Nixon renounced the 
American bioweapons programmes, several government departments conducted biodefence 





what exactly was the US bioweapons programme before the BWC? In 1969 the US was able 
to produce 650 tons of agent per month that could then be filled into weapons, these type-
classified agents were produced at plants such as Pine Bluff in Arkansas (Davis, 1999: 509). 
According to Davis (1999: 509) this was a thriving offensive programme that was eventually 
abandoned due to a mixture of politics, intelligence, other technological developments, and the 
Vietnam War. In brief, it can be stated that the US and Russia both took their biotechnology 
seriously, showing the US’s need to pursue technological innovation. It can be seen how the 
US saw the potential for biotechnology to rival nuclear weapons and subsequently pursued it 
by spending $300 million on the programme annually (Allen& Chan, 2017: 102). The barriers 
between peaceful biotechnology and bioweapons has changed which poses a threat to effective 
proliferation management (Allen & Chan, 2017: 103). The rise of the commercial biotech 
industry has made knowledge and resources widespread and affordable (Allen & Chan, 2017). 
Furthermore, they are easy to hide. This means that the US has spent billions on their 
biodefence in fear of a terrorist attack. The next section will look closer at the capability of 
biotechnology and the issue of it being dual-use. 
3.2.3 Biowarfare capability and current threats 
Biotechnology is very appealing when it comes to military application owing to the fact that it 
is comparable to nuclear weapons in damage and as pointed out by Spiers (2010) there is only 
a need for a small amount to get an effect. Spiers (2010) highlights a quote by Judge William 
Webster who said: “biological warfare agents, including toxins, are more potent than the 
deadliest chemical warfare agents, and provide the broadest area coverage per pound of 
payload of any weapons system”. Spiers (2010) goes on to highlight how these weapons have 
not been used extensively in warfare and have only been used in demonstrations. This section 
has highlighted so far, the immense potential of what biotechnology can do for warfare and 
how states have actively pursued these programmes.   
3.2.4 Biotechnology 
This section will discuss the technical side of bioweapons. Firstly, it will look at major 
innovations in biotechnology and then at apparatus used to disperse these agents and current 
examples of biowarfare threats. 
The work of Zander et al (2001) highlights two important breakthroughs in biotechnology: 





breakthrough in genetics is problematic for international peace and security. The risk of 
biowarfare has increased owing to a revolution in biotechnology such as new tools for 
analysing and modifying an organism’s genetic material (van Aken & Hammond, 2003). 
According to van Aken and Hammond (2003), there are several factors that have increased this 
risk. Firstly, research and development in the medical sector has led to the availability of 
knowledge and facilities; secondly, facilities can be converted to create bioweapons and many 
countries have them; thirdly, by using genetic engineering, biological researchers have already 
developed weapons better than their natural counterparts (van Aken & Hammond, 2003). 
Making bacterial pathogens antibiotic resistant is an example of genetic modification. An 
example of this given by van Aken and Hammond (2003) is the Soviet’s ‘invisible anthrax 
which involved the introduction of an ‘alien gene’ that altered the immunological properties 
making existing vaccines ineffective against it. A current example of such a technology is 
highlighted by the CRS and is known as CRISPR-Cas9. CRISPR-Cas9 is a genetic 
modification or DNA-modifying technology which is ‘low cost’ technology’ (Advanced gene 
editing: CRISPR-Cas9, 2018). This technology is capable of being relatively easy to use and 
delivers a high level of precision and efficiency (Advanced gene editing: CRISPR-Cas9, 2018).  
The CRS states that such a technology could be used to either enhance or degrade military 
personnel (Advanced gene editing: CRISPR-Cas9, 2018). The proliferation of synthetic 
biology may lead to the creation of genetic code that doesn’t exist and allow for the increase in 
the number of actors that are able to create such a technology (Advanced gene editing: 
CRISPR-Cas9, 2018). Owing to this issue, the US Intelligence Community’s Worldwide 
Threat Assessment cited genome editing as having the potential to be a weapon of mass 
destruction (Advanced gene editing: CRISPR-Cas9, 2018). An example of gene editing being 
done by CRISPS-Cas9 is with Aedes aegypti mosquito (Caplan, Parent, Shen, & Plunkett, 
2015). Caplan et al (2015) state that researchers, both academics and at private biotech firms, 
aim to either stop the female from carrying a disease or to make the male sterile by editing its 
genes. Aken and Hammond (2003) highlight the criteria for a successful bioweapon: it must be 
capable of being produced in large amounts, it must act fast, it must be robust in the 
environment, and it must be treatable to protect one’s own soldiers. A theoretical argument 
could state that CRISP-Cas9 could allow a potential aggressor to edit the genes of a mosquito 
to make the disease it is carrying more severe and at the same time make their soldiers immune 
to it. CRISP-Cas9 could allow for researchers to edit how fast it acts and how robust it is in the 





is a very rudimentary example; however, biotechnology such as CRISPR-Cas9 offers a very 
disruptive potential and high capability potential for the future battlefield. These criteria are 
also highlighted in the next section. They must also be environmentally robust, meaning that 
they must be capable of being delivered successfully into the environment.   
When it comes to other forms of delivery method of biotechnology, the main method seen in 
the literature is aerosol, meaning that it is released into the air (Spiers, 2010; &  Davis, 1999). 
There are other delivery methods, and some have been mentioned in this section, for example 
missiles and rockets. The most worrying aspect was the testing of Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBMs) and cruise missiles as a delivery method by the Soviets (Spier, 2010: 23). 
But this section will focus on the aerial dispersion of biowarfare agents, as the age of drones 
may make such an act easier to conduct than arming a warhead.  The main issue with this 
delivery system is that once the agent is in the wind it is susceptible to the wind and can only 
be stopped with special clothing and collective protective devices (Spiers, 2010: 13). Once they 
are in sunlight and exposed to other environmental factors, they must retain their viability and 
virulence (Spiers, 2010: 13). Furthermore, according to Spier (2010: 13), they may infect other 
organisms and spread to cause an epidemic. The final aspect is the need for only a small 
amount. Aerial warfare allowed for innovation in BW (Spiers, 2010). The attacks could use 
spray apparatus, with either pressure or no pressure release (Spier, 2010). These attacks could 
be transported at subsonic speeds and at low levels which could allow for surprise attacks and 
a large area of coverage (Spier, 2010:21-22). However, bioweapons dispersed from aerosol are 
largely unpredictable as they are dependent on wind, rain, temperature and geography. But at 
the same time, they only need a small quantity to cause a large amount of damage and they are 
easily concealed.  
The Covid-19 pandemic has had a severe impact on states globally and this impact will be 
continued to be seen for years to come. There is a large amount of uncertainty about Covid-19; 
however, it has highlighted how unprepared the US is for a targeted biological attack. Bertrand 
and Lippman (2020) state that the Covid-19 pandemic has shown, at all levels, how the US 
government was completely unprepared to deal with a pandemic that moved slowly. A 
biological attack would undoubtedly overwhelm the US (Bertrand & Lippman, 2020). From 
the examples used above, a biological attack using drones armed with aerosol or CRISP-Cas9 
modified disease could be potentially damaging for the US. Especially if the disease released 
by one of the two technologies was fast-acting and deadly. This technology combined with the 





biowarfare can be. However, as highlighted by Bentley (2020), the Covid-19 pandemic offers 
the opportunity to create an understanding of what a biowarfare attack could look like. These 
technologies and the Covid-19 pandemic show the destructive power that biowarfare could 
have on the world.  
3.2.5 Summary  
The aim of this section was to look at biotechnology and bioweapons in order to create a 
contextualisation of how technology affects how states conduct warfare. This section decided 
to only look at bioweapons and not chemical weapons. What was found in this section is that 
biowarfare is not new and has been around since the Athenians and Mongolians. It is a tactic 
that has been employed by militaries for centuries and can have potentially devastating effects 
as seen with the Mongolians and how they potentially started a plague that went through 
Europe. The next area of biowarfare that was highlighted was WWI, the Spanish Flu and 
WWII. This gave this research an opportunity to look at the role that biowarfare played during 
twentieth century warfare. This section looked at different definitions of what biowarfare is. It 
was found that biological weapons are weapons that are created to intentionally harm or kill 
humans, plants, or animals through the use of a biological agent (Biological weapons: a primer, 
2001: 1). Such agents are bacteria, viruses, rickettsia or fungi according to the CRS (Biological 
weapons: a primer, 2001: 1). The next section discussed the role of biowarfare in the Cold War. 
It found that both the Soviets and the US had extensive bioweapon programmes at that time. 
However, the US policy based itself on non-first-use strategy and used it only to deter 
aggressors. The final part of this biowarfare section looked at current threats by looking a major 
innovation of biotechnology and potential dispensing apparatus. This section considered both 
the strengths and weaknesses of biotechnology. It can be concluded that biowarfare has 
immense potential to be both destructive and unreliable. It offers the ultimate strategy in 
warfare as it will allow states to win wars without destroying vital infrastructure.  
3.3 Nuclear technology  
When it comes to how a technology influenced how states went to war there is no better 
example than nuclear technology. Nuclear weapons ultimately became a key part of the US’s 
national security strategy (U.S strategic nuclear forces: background, development, and issues, 
2020). The CRS goes on to state how the US does not have plans to eliminate their nuclear 
weapons or to remove their nuclear deterrence strategy (U.S strategic nuclear forces: 





has been a key strategy of the US for the last 60 years (U.S strategic nuclear forces: background, 
development, and issues, 2020). Nuclear weapons have arguably been able to maintain stability 
over this time. Younger (2000) states that due to the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, 
any form of conflict between superpowers became an unviable option. This allowed the US to 
maintain their deterrence capability to protect both their allies and interests. The Trump 
administration, according to CRS (U.S strategic nuclear forces: background, development, and 
issues, 2020), in its nuclear posture review stated a continued support for the US’s nuclear 
arsenal. The US maintains the need for its nuclear arsenal in the current threat environment and 
the need to modernise the arsenal (U.S strategic nuclear forces: background, development, and 
issues, 2020). This highlights the importance of nuclear weapons in the US’s current national 
security strategy. Furthermore, it must be stated that this section does not intend to look at 
nuclear deterrence theory, this has already been covered in-depth in Chapter 2. This section 
aims only to research the most significant aspects of nuclear weapons such as the Manhattan 
project, the nuclear triad, and the importance of modernising the nuclear triad.  
3.3.1 The Manhattan Project 
The Manhattan Project is an example of the cost as well as impact a transformative technology 
can have on how states conduct war. This is a sterling example as AI could potentially face a 
similar trajectory when it comes to cost and impact. This section also allows a brief overview 
of the origin of nuclear weapons. The Manhattan Project got under way by the military in the 
US in 1942 At that time, its three-year cost of $2 billion6 made up only 1 percent of the US’s 
GDP (Allen & Chan, 2017: 71). The US went on to enlist the world’s leading mathematicians, 
engineers and scientists for the Manhattan Project (Allen & Chan, 2017: 71). The Manhattan 
project was born out of a small research programme in 1939, the roots of which came from the 
fear of Nazi Germany gaining nuclear weapons before the US (Manhattan Project, 2007). Due 
to these concerns, key scientists proposed that the US accelerate their atomic research response 
(Stine, 2009). The project ran from 1941-1946 under the control of the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers and administered by General Leslie R. Groves (Manhattan Project, 2007). 
Once the project expanded it had multiple secret production and research facilities, with the 
primary ones being: “the plutonium-production facility at what is now the Hanford Site 
(Washington state); uranium-enrichment facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and the weapons 
research and design laboratory, now known as Los Alamos National Laboratory in New 
 





Mexico” (Manhattan Project, 2007). By 1945 two designs came from the project, “one utilizing 
enriched uranium and the other its newly discovered derivative, plutonium” (Manhattan 
Project, 2007). By 1948 the US had created enough parts to create 56 atom bombs, that 
increased to 300 by 1950 and in 1967 the size had increased to 31 255 nuclear warheads (Allen 
& Chan, 2017: 73). The Manhattan Project was a key initiative for the US during WWII and 
more importantly during the Cold War. It allowed the US to gain nuclear weapons and 
ultimately maintain their technological innovation. They were further allowed to show their 
dominance by using these weapons against Japan to ultimately end WWII.  
The first use came after Roosevelt gave the final approval in 1942 to create the first nuclear 
bomb (Stine, 2009). This led to the first successful test of a bomb using plutonium in July 1945 
(Stine, 2009). The Trinity test was detonated on July 16th 1945 just before sunrise at 5:30 a.m 
(Reed, 2014). The test, although rushed due to the intense pressure put on Groves7, was deemed 
a spectacular success with the yield being estimated at 21 kt TNT equivalent (Reed, 2014). 
Reed highlights a description of the explosion written by Groves that was sent to Henry 
Stimson Potsdam:  
“The light from the explosion was clearly seen at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, El Paso, and 
other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard … generally to 
100 miles. Only a few windows were broken, although one was some 125 miles away. 
A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 ft … in the 
center was a shallow bowl 130 ft in diameter and 6 ft in depth … The steel from the 
tower was evaporated … I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a 
bomb … My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, 60 miles away (reported) a 
blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northwestern sky” (Grooves as cited by 
Reed, 2014: 23). 
The explosion from Trinity was so powerful that it could have been seen from the moon (Reed, 
2014). The following month President Truman decided to use a nuclear bomb against Japan 
(Stine, 2009). For this mission to be executed a special Army Air Force unit known as the 509th 
Composite Group was established (Reed, 2014). The aircraft that were to be used in order to 
conduct this mission were B-29s called Enola Gay and Bockscar (Reed, 2014). The atomic 
bombs that were used were known as the ‘Little Boy’ and ‘Fat Man’ (Reed, 2014). Little Boy 
 
7 Brigadier General Leslie R. Groves was the head of the Manhattan Project, succeeding Col. James Marshall. 





was released from Enola Gay at a height of 1900 ft at 08:16 local time. It caused an estimated 
15kt yield, killed 66 000-69 0000 people, and injured an estimated 255 0000 people (Reed, 
2014). The release of this bomb did not force the Japanese to surrender and this led to the 
release of the ‘Fat man’ onto Nagasaki 8(Reed, 2014). The Fat Man yielded a load of 21kt and 
the casualties were estimated at 39 000 dead and 25 000 injured (Reed, 2014). Japan 
surrendered a few days after the two bombs were used against them and the project was 
considered fulfilled (Stine, 2009). This remains as the only use of nuclear weapons in warfare. 
The atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ultimately changed the nature 
of warfare. The atomic bombs used showed the true destructive power of this technology and 
have managed to stop any major conflict between superpowers since its invention. Whether the 
US should have used the atomic bomb against the Japanese is highly contested by theorists. 
What can be concluded, with a final emphasis, is that the invention of the atomic bomb changed 
the way states conducted their strategic security policy and stopped the outbreak of war 
between superpowers. The next important aspect of nuclear weapons was developed during the 
1960s, it was the delivery method and was termed the ‘nuclear triad’. This section will not look 
at the Cold War arms race or dynamics as it cannot look at everything. It aims to look at the 
origin of nuclear weapons and the importance of the triad. This research sees these two sections 
as important aspects of nuclear weapons. This now brings this section to its most important 
topic, looking at the US nuclear triad. 
3.3.2 The US nuclear force structure: The nuclear triad 
The nuclear triad consists of three different areas of the US army: land, sea and air. The CRS 
states that the nuclear triad came about because each military force wanted to play a role in the 
US nuclear arsenal (U.S strategic nuclear forces: background, development, and issues, 2020). 
Analysts argued that each section had its strengths and weaknesses; furthermore, it would 
complicate a Soviet attack and allowed for some of the force to survive to allow a second-strike 
(U.S strategic nuclear forces: background, development, and issues, 2020). Futter and Williams 
(2016) state the same premise, that the US developed its nuclear triad in order to secure a 
credible nuclear deterrent. Each leg of the triad offered different strategic advantages to the 
US, with all three combined it allowed the US to not need to fear a ‘bolt out of the blue’ attack, 
as the triad allowed the US to overcome potential systems failures (Futter & Williams, 2016: 
 
8 The Fat Man atomic bomb was originally destined from Kokura, however, smoke and faulty equipment made it 
difficult to conduct a visual raid (Reed, 2014). This made Bockscar change its target to Nagasaki and forced it to 





247). This allowed the US to have a capable nuclear force that was able to retaliate because of 
the triad (Futter & Williams, 2016: 247) Futter and Williams (2016) state that the nuclear triad 
came into existence owing to the technological advances in ICBMs and Submarine-launched 
Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).  
This gave the US capability and flexibility owing to the fact that the US bombers were 
vulnerable to Soviet air defences (Futter & Williams, 2016). “Long range bombers remained a 
useful way of signalling intent and could be called back; ICBMs offered the ability to respond 
rapidly and with massive firepower; while SLBMs provided the ultimate guarantee through 
their ability to remain undetected beneath the surface of the ocean” (Futter & Williams, 2016: 
247). The CRS states that ICBMs had the ability to respond quickly and accurately at hardened 
targets such as Soviet command posts and ICBMs Silos (U.S strategic nuclear forces: 
background, development, and issues, 2020). The SLBMs had the survivability as they 
complicated the Soviet’s ability to dismantle the US second-strike, and bombers could be 
released quickly and subsequently recalled if the crisis de-escalated (U.S strategic nuclear 
forces: background, development, and issues, 2020, 3). Now that a general outline and 
importance of the nuclear triad has been done, this section now aims to give a more in-depth 
study of the three different domains: air, land and sea, starting with their capabilities during the 
Cold War and the subsequent plan for the US to upgrade each leg of the triad. 
3.3.3 Air 
Before the conclusion of the START treaty with the Soviet Union in 1990 the US had 94 B-
52H bombers, 96 B-1 Bombers and older B052G bombers (U.S strategic nuclear forces: 
background, development, and issues, 2020). Furthermore, they had two of the new B-2 
bombers (U.S strategic nuclear forces: background, development, and issues, 2020). This force 
consisted of 260 bombers with the ability to carry over 4 648 weapons (U.S strategic nuclear 
forces: background, development, and issues, 2020). The current Air part of the triad owing to 
the START treaty consists of 46 nuclear-capable B-52H and 20 nuclear-capable B-2A strategic 
bombers (Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 2018). These bombers can carry a variety of nuclear 
weapons that add to the US triad’s capabilities and flexibility. The B-2A carried a gravity bomb 
while the B-52H bombers carried ALCMS which allowed for different yield options (NPR, 
2018: 47). Meanwhile the B83-1 and B61-11 have the capability to hold a variety of protected 
targets at risk (NPR, 2018: 47). This highlights the importance of technology in how the US 





own section. Ultimately bombers play a critical role in US strategy, as they are able to take off 
and be recalled if the crisis de-escalates, thus creating flexibility (NPR, 2018). Furthermore, 
they have an unlimited range as they can be fuelled during flight, allowing for flights abroad 
to show their capabilities (NPR, 2018). The NPR (2018: 47) goes on to state that the only long-
range bomber capable of penetrating the enemy defence system is the B-2A.  
The US plans to modernise the B-2A along with the B-52H to make sure that they remain 
effective into the future (NPR, 2018: 50). With the improvement and current proliferation of 
adversaries’ air defences the US has aimed to initiate a programme to build and deploy the next 
generation bomber (NPR, 2018: 50). The B-21 Raider project aims to replace the currently 
ageing B-52H and its ALCM and B-2A missiles (NPR, 2018: 50). This bomber will replace 
the nuclear-capable bomber force beginning mid-2020s (NPR, 2018: 50). Northrop Grumman 
indicates that the B-21 will be able to penetrate the toughest air defence and be capable of 
delivering a precision strike anywhere in the world; they further state that it is the future of 
deterrence (B-21 Raider, 2020). Northrop Grumman state that the B-21 Raider will be designed 
to have a high survivability, be long range, and capable of carrying a mix of nuclear and 
conventional ordinance (B-21 Raider, 2020). This will join the nuclear triad as a flexible and 
visible deterrent which will maintain national security objectives and reassure the US’s allies 
and partners (B-21 Raider, 2020). The US Air Force aims to acquire 100 of these aircraft, with 
Northrop Grumman claiming they may acquire as many as 200 (B-21 Raider, 2020). This 
shows the US’s commitment is to nuclear security strategy, the nuclear triad, and maintaining 
its technological dominance when it comes to fighting wars. 
3.3.4 Sea 
Futter and William (2016: 247) state that SLBMs allowed for the ultimate guarantee for a 
secure second-strike owing to the fact that they could remain undetected below the surface of 
the ocean. Furthermore, CRS highlights how the former Commander of the US Strategic 
Command (STRATCOM) stated that SLBM force provided survivability (U.S strategic nuclear 
forces: background, development, and issues, 2020: 6-7). This means that SLBMs allowed the 
US to secure their second-strike capability, which is pivotal for maintaining nuclear deterrence 
and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The NPR (2018: 44) highlighted in 2018 that the 
US was currently operating Ohio-class Submarines that were Ballistic Missile equipped and 
Nuclear powered (SSBNs). The missiles that these submarines were equipped with were 





are, at present, virtually undetectable, and there are no known, near-term credible threats to the 
survivability of the SSBN force” (NPR, 2018: 45). Their ability to be constantly ready and have 
intercontinental range allows for these submarines to hold selected targets at risk throughout 
Eurasia and the Pacific Ocean. This shows that SSBNs are both undetectable and very capable 
of taking out targets faraway, making them a very credible threat to aggressors.  
Furthermore, NPR (2018: 45) states that they are able to hold highly accurate and high-yield 
warheads that leave targets at high risk. These warheads can travel at hypersonic speed and can 
subsequently reach their targets quickly after launch (NPR, 2018: 45). Finally, according to the 
NPR (2018), these SSBNs are highly mobile which can demonstrate US nuclear presence. This 
will reassure their allies and show their commitment to deterrence. The OHIO-class is expected 
to have a life-span lasting until 2042. It cannot be extended further than this and it has been in 
service since 1981 (NPR, 2018). The NPR (2018: 45) goes on to state that advances in 
adversaries’ anti-submarine warfare and missile defence may cause challenges for the SSBN 
system, showing the US’s continued outlook of striving to be more technological advanced 
than its adversaries. What this section on SSBN shows is the importance of technology when 
it comes to how states conduct warfare. The introduction of the OHIO-class SSBN allowed the 
US to secure their second-strike capability, creating a credible threat of destruction to any 
aggressors and MAD to other nuclear-armed states.  
3.3.5 Land-based deterrent force 
ICMBs allowed the US to gain responsiveness and accuracy to take out potential hardened 
targets such as Soviet command posts and ICBM silos (U.S strategic nuclear forces: 
background, developments, and issues, 2020). According to the NPR the United States ICBMs 
force had 400 single-warhead Minuteman III ICBMS in 450 underground silos that are spread 
across several different states (NPR, 2018: 45). NPR (2018) also highlights how responsive the 
ICMS are and how this is of importance to the nuclear triad. Furthermore, ICBMs are highly 
survivable against all attacks, apart from a large-scale nuclear attack (NPR, 2018: 46). To 
successfully carry out such an attack, the aggressor must launch a precise attack with hundreds 
of high-yield warheads, a task that the NPR (2018) states can only be conducted by Russia. 
Without the ICBM force, other parts of the triad could potentially be subjected to a nuclear 
first-strike that involves a relatively smaller number of nuclear weapons (NPR, 2018: 46). The 
part of the triad that could potentially be vulnerable would be SSBNs in port and non-alert 





could be confident in their ability to destroy them prior to launch (NPR, 2018). Furthermore, 
the range of these weapons can hold targets at risk throughout Eurasia, reaching any target in 
30 minutes or less (NPR, 2018). 
Once again, the NPR (2018) has stated that the US plans to modernise its ICBMS due to their 
critical importance in the nuclear triad. The US will be fielding the Ground-Based Strategic 
Deterrent (GBSD) as a replacement to the ICBMs by 2029 (NPR, 2018: 49). This replacement 
aims to modernise 450 ICBM launch facilities in order to support fielding 400 ICBMS that will 
replace the Minuteman III that are being retired after six decades of service (NPR, 2018: 50). 
This will make the land-based deterrent leg of the triad effective into the future. This once 
again highlights how the US aims to maintain its technological edge over its adversaries. This 
section has, however, not touched on the reason behind the US’s justification to renew its 
nuclear triad in the NPR. The following section will discuss the main drivers behind this 
renewal. 
3.3.6 The US’s motivation to maintain technological edge over its 
adversaries  
This section aims to outline the motivation behind the NPR and why the US aims to renew its 
nuclear triad. Klare (2019) highlights that the Trump administration claims that the US 
infrastructure is out of date and that China and Russia have taken advantage of the US 
complacency. The NPR (2018: V) states that they have added new nuclear capabilities and 
have also increased the salience of their nuclear forces in their plans and strategies. 
Furthermore, according to the NPR (2018: V), they have shown more aggressive behaviour 
that spans cyberspace and outer space as well. The US maintains that Russia and China are 
contesting the international norms and order that have been built by the US and its allies (NPR, 
2018: 2). Furthermore, while the US has reduced the number and salience of their nuclear 
weapons, the US claims that China and Russia are moving in the other direction (NPR, 2018: 
2). Furthermore, China’s expansion of its nuclear forces has little or no transparency according 
to the US NPR (2018). Due to the current threat environment combined with future 
uncertainties, the NPR (2018: 3) mandates that the US needs to commit to a modern and 
effective nuclear force along with the infrastructure needed to support it. Due to these factors, 
the US started to pursue the modernisation of their nuclear forces. It must be noted that this 
section does not aim to debate whether the US is correct or incorrect in these assumptions. It 





whether or not this makes the US feel more or less secure. Subsequently it can be stated that 
the activities of Russia and China have made the US feel insecure in their technological edge. 
This has subsequently forced them to pursue the modernisation of their nuclear triad, as the US 
perceives this modernisation as critical to deterring threats.  
3.3.7 Summary  
The aim of this section was to look at nuclear technology and how it changed the way the US 
went to war. This section also highlighted how important nuclear weapons are to the US and 
how they are subsequently becoming even more important. The section began with an overview 
of the Manhattan project to create an understanding of the origins of nuclear weapons. From 
there this section went on to discuss the structure of the US nuclear forces by looking at the 
nuclear triad. The triad plays a vital role in maintaining the credibility of the US’s nuclear 
forces and it does this by having three different legs. The three different legs are based in the 
different domains of combat: land, air and sea. All these legs combined help cancel out each 
other’s weaknesses and this is what makes the triad so effective. The most important leg of the 
triad is the sea-based leg, more specifically, SSBNs which help to maintain the credibility of 
the US’s second-strike capability.  
3.4 Cyberwarfare 
This section aims to look at cyberwarfare, another form of a transformative technology. The 
government has played an important role in the development of digital computing, 
cryptography, and the internet network; furthermore these three technologies enabled the 
creation of the modern day cyberspace (Allen & Chan, 2017: 91). According to Allen and Chan 
(2017) these three technologies enabled cyberspace by: 
“1. Digital computing (especially using silicon integrated circuits), which allows 
storage and processing of information by machines 2. Internet networking, which 
allows for the connection and unification of different types of networks according to a 
single standard, namely internet protocol 3. Cryptography, which allows for unrelated 
users to share data and infrastructure while maintaining data confidentiality and 
integrity All three technologies were actively supported by the US. government.” (Allen 
& Chan, 2017: 91). 
The US government was in full support of all three of these technologies and this allowed for 





& Chan, 2017). Furthermore, the emergence of cyberspace has revolutionised how global 
communities interact with each other (Ween, Dortmans, Thakur, & Row, 2017: 337). It also 
bought with it vulnerabilities, such as malicious use of information and communication 
technologies (ICT); this is used in order to interfere with physical, electronic and online system 
functions (Ween et al, 2017: 337). This is what Ween et al (2017) refer to as cyberwarfare and 
subsequently the main point of this section. This section will begin by defining cyberwarfare 
and the implications that cyberwarfare has for military strategy. The next part of this section 
will then discuss the most prominent example of cyberwarfare; Stuxnet. The final section will 
consider the dual-use of cyber technology. This chapter will outline how the US seeks to 
maintain technological dominance over its adversaries and this is an implicit example of how 
technology will affect how states conduct war.  
3.4.1 Defining cyberwarfare 
As stated already, Allen and Chan (2017) see cyberspace as the connection of digital 
computing, cryptography, and internet networking. Robinson, Jones and Janicke (2015: 72) 
define cyberspace as a ‘global domain’ within the information environment which uses the 
electromagnetic spectrum and electronics to store, modify, exchange, create and exploit 
information. This is done by interdependent and interconnected networks which use ICT 
(Robinson et al, 2015: 72). Libcki (2009: 6) also states the same: “[c]yberspace, as such, can 
be characterized as an agglomeration of individual computing devices that are networked to 
one another (e.g., an office local-area network or a corporate wide-area network) and to the 
outside world”. This shows that cyberspace is a global, as well as local, connection of 
computing devices to one another using ICT. Solis (2014) states that cyber refers to computers 
and computer networks, not just the internet but all things that connect to computers. While 
this is not a physical battlefield, the actions within cyberspace can enact themselves into the 
physical domain (Ween et al, 2017). Cyberspace is a global commons which is decentralised, 
meaning that no nation state has the control over its resources and it extends outside their 
borders (Ween et al, 2017). Furthermore, Ween et al (2017), state that intent and attribution of 
actions that have taken place in cyberspace are hard to determine, which may affect the 
response and create a ‘strategic shock’. This shows what cyberspace can be defined as and 
starts to unravel the complications of cyberwarfare.  
As already stated, Ween et al (2017) see cyberwarfare as the use of ICT in order to interfere 





specifically as warfare waged in space, which includes the defending of information and 
computer network. Solis (2017: 3) goes on to further state that it involves deterring information 
attacks and also denying an adversary from doing the same. It can also have an offensive nature 
by operating information operations against an adversary (Solis, 2013: 3). What Solis (2017: 
3) means is that cyberwarfare entails defence, offence, and deterrence. Theohary and Rollins 
(2015) define cyberwarfare as state-on-state action that is the equivalent of an armed attack or 
an act in cyberspace that may equal a kinetic force response. However, Theohary and Rollins 
(2015) state that there are no clear criteria to define when a cyberattack can equate to kinetic 
force. According to Theohary and Rollins (2015) there isn’t a criterion that clearly determines 
whether a cyberattack is an act of terror, a nation state equivalent of a kinetic attack or 
hacktivism. The US took the stance under Article 2(4) of the UN Charters and customary 
international law; meaning that a cyberattack that results in death, destruction or injury will be 
viewed as an act of kinetic force (Theohary & Rollins, 2015). What this shows is that 
cyberwarfare is defined based on what is a cyberattack.  
Solis defines (2014: 12) a cyberattack as: “a trans-border cyber operation, whether offensive 
or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons, or damage or 
destruction to objects.” Solis (2014) also defines the difference between a cyberattack and 
‘cyber intrusion’, stating that a cyber intrusion does not rise to a level of a cyberattack. 
“A cyber attack, as opposed to a cyber intrusion, constitutes a "use of force" if 
undertaken by a state's armed forces, intelligence services, or a private contractor whose 
conduct is attributable to the state, and its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber 
operations that rise to a level of a use of force.” (Solis, 2014: 15). 
Solis separates the two by the results of the attack, which equates to the use of force (2014). 
Robinson, Jones and Janicke (2015) stated that a cyber is based on an actor’s intention. They 
thus define a cyberattack as an attack with a warfare-like intent. Theohary et al (2015) highlight 
different types of cyber ‘threat actors’ across the cyberwarfare ecosystem. These actors are 
cyberterrorists, cyberspies, cyberthieves, cyberwarriors, and cyberactivists (Theohary et al, 
2015). This section will now compare the definitions of cyberterrorists, cyberspies and cyber 
warriors as stated by various researchers. Jones et al (2015) define cyberspies as actors who 
steal information used by governments or private corporations that will allow them to gain a 
strategic, financial, security, or political advantage. Cyberwarriors are defined as actors that 





Theohary et al (2015) state that these entities are either acting on behalf of a government or not 
when it comes to who they target, the timing of the attack, and the type of attack that is used. 
They are then also blamed when accusations are made by the attacked state. Theohary et al 
(2015) state that these threats will often cross over and are ultimately hard to assess. 
Furthermore, there is no criteria to distinguish what type of cyberattack occurred (Theohary et 
al, 2015).  
3.4.2 Examples of cyberattacks and Stuxnet 
This section aims to look at different examples of cyberattacks or intrusions. This section does 
not aim to look at the laws of armed conflict, it merely aims to take a look at how authors view 
the attack and the consequences of such an attack. A few examples would be looked at, 
however, the main example to be focused on in this section will be Stuxnet. It is referred to by 
many authors and is a critical example of how intrusive and destructive a cyberattack could be.  
3.4.3 Georgia and Estonia 
One example of a cyberattack is the use of a distributed denial of services (DDoS) (Solis, 2014; 
Theohary, 2015; Libicki, 2009; & Lin, Allhoff, & Rowe, 2012). There are two main cases cited 
in the literature: a DDoS attack on Estonia and Georgia. A DDoS involves an attack in which 
a server is overwhelmed with internet traffic so that access to this cite then becomes degraded 
or denied (Theohary, & Rollins, 2015: 1). The DDoS attack on Estonia was the result of the 
Estonians moving a Russian war memorial from the city to a military cemetery; this led to riots 
and a DDoS attack (Libicki, 2009, Ottis, 2008). According to Ottis (2008) the Russian minority 
in Estonia saw the statue as a representation of the liberation of Russian people while Estonians 
saw it as a symbol of oppression. Libicki (2009) states that it was tracked back to the Kremlin. 
However, whether the Russians were behind the attack is difficult to prove. Ottis (2008) states 
that the cyberattack campaign lasted for 22 days and were a part of a wider political conflict 
between Estonia and Russia. The DDoS attack was focused on state and commercial websites 
that ranged from defence and foreign ministry to media outlets and banks (Estonia denial of 
service incident, 2007). A DDoS attack is executed by overloading bandwidth of websites and 
overloading their services with ‘junk traffic’ (Estonia denial of service incident, 2007). Many 
well-known methods include udp flood, malformed web queries, ping flood, email spam and 
web queries (Ottis, 2008). More complicated methods were used such as a SQL injection, some 
were successful at ‘non-critical sites’ (Ottis, 2008).  In order to counter this the Estonian 





(Estonia denial of service incident, 2007). The outcome of this attack was the conviction of 20-
year-old Estonian student Dmitri Galuškevitš (Ottis, 2008: 3). The Estonian State Procurator 
made a request to the Russian Supreme Procurator for assistance in a formal investigation to 
find the attackers residing in Russia (Ottis, 2008). A report by the BBC on 27 April 2017 states 
that Estonia’s request for help was ignored by the Russians (McGuinness, 2017).  
In the case of Georgia, an internet security firm reported that a DDoS had taken place against 
websites in the state (Korns & Kasternberg, 2009: 60). An internet security firm reported that 
on 19 July 2008 a DDoS attack was aimed at websites in Georgia (Korns & Kasternberg, 2009: 
60). The attack, that was carried out by Russia, also involved an invasion by air and land as 
well as a blockade at sea (Theohary & Harrington, 2015: 10). The result of this cyberattack left 
the Georgian government barely capable of communicating on the internet (Korns & 
Kasternberg, 2009: 60). Theohary and Harrington (2015) state that the Russian hackers 
besieged Georgia’s internet for the duration of the armed conflict. Pernick (2018: 59) states 
that the attacks that were planned in advance but carried out on 9 August and attacked fifty-
four Georgian websites which included ninety percent of state institutions’ websites and a large 
number of .ge domain addresses. Theohary and Harrington (2015) state that the attacks in 
August started on 8 August and came as Russian tanks crossed the border into South Ossetia 
in Georgia. Theohary and Harrington (2015) also state that the attacks targeted 54 websites, 
however, the first attack targeted pro-Georgian hackers. This attack against the pro-Georgian 
hackers was unable to completely reduce the counterattacks against Russian Targets 
(Theohary, & Harrington, 2015: 10). As Russian troops moved in Georgia became unable to 
access the 54 websites that have been mentioned so far; the scope of these websites were 
government, communication, finance and critical information (Theohary, & Harrington, 2015: 
11). Pernick (2018) states that this cyber espionage campaign was more sophisticated. It had 
Russian military connections and was pre-planned (Pernick, 2018).  
A subsequent section will discuss how Israel ‘prepared’ the battlefield, which can be argued to 
be a similar tactic as that employed by the Russians. The pro-Russian hackers were able to 
attack critical Georgian infrastructure before and during the Russian invasion of Ossetia. 
Theohary and Harrington (2015) state that DDoS attacks were carried out prior to ground troop 
movements or bombings. These DDoS took out communications prior to these military actions 
(Theohary, & Harrington, 2015). Korns and Kastenberg (2009) state that the DDoS attack left 
the Georgian government cyber-locked and barely able to communicate over the internet. The 





the US, Poland, and Estonia (Korns, & Kastenberg, 2009; Theohary, & Harrington, 2015). An 
example given by Theohary and Harrington (2015) tells how a web-hosting company called 
Tulip Systems gave refugee status to the Georgian government websites without the US 
government’s approval. 
Pernick (2018) draws some conclusions from these attacks on Estonia and Georgia. What was 
shown by Russia attempting to undermine Estonia was that it had enhanced capabilities when 
it comes to outsourcing cyberattacks, controlling information and military operation among 
various actors, and using strategic impact gained from cyber-espionage operations (Pernick, 
2018: 60). Meanwhile, the Russian attack on Georgia showed how cyberattacks could be used 
to support military and strategic objectives (Pernick, 2018). Furthermore, the result of the 
attack on Estonia lead to the creation of the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence 
(CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia in 2009 (Theohary, & Rolins, 2015: 5). The Tallinn Manual 
was created at this centre. Despite its name, it was more an academic paper than a set of laws 
that states were bound to (Theohary, & Rolins, 2015: 5). 
3.4.4 The United States 
Solis (2014) highlights more US-centric examples of cyberattacks including ones that involve 
China and Russia. Solis states that China has two network-monitoring states in Cuba, one to 
monitor US internet traffic and another to monitor the US DoD. The ‘Night Dragon’ is an 
example of a cyber intrusion which ran from 2007 until Lockhead and Martin discovered it 
only in 2009 (Solis, 2014: 4). This cyber intrusion involved the theft of terabytes of information 
including the US F-35 fighter (Solis, 2014: 4). The Research and Development (R&D) for the 
F-35 cost in excess of $50 billion and the Chinese were believed to have acquired all the 
intellectual property of the F-35 program (Allen & Chan, 2017). In 2010 Pentagon systems 
were penetrated to see how the command-and-control systems could be crippled (Solis, 2014). 
The Pentagon uses a password and token security system (Solis, 2014). The token is a USB 
that makes a new number every sixty seconds (Solis, 2014). The company that made these 
were, according to Solis (2014), hacked by another foreign intelligence service. Using this 
information, they hacked Lockheed Martin in March 2011 and they subsequently lost 24 000 
files, which: “included plans for missile tracking systems, satellite navigation devices, 
surveillance drones and top-of-the line jet fighters" (Solis, 2014). This continues to highlight 
the impact transformative technology can have on how states conduct warfare, in this scenario, 





weaponry can hand a state a strategic advantage, financially, as they will not have to spend 
excessive amounts on developing them.  
3.4.5 Israel: Prepping the battlefield 
Another example of cyberattack mentioned by Solis is how the Israelis ‘prepped’ a battlefield 
for an act of war (Solis, 2014: 6-7). This is an example of how a modern day transformative 
technology such as cyber can impact the way states conduct warfare. This section highlights 
how cyber intrusions handed the Israelis a strategic advantage before the conflict even started. 
AI and AWS may potentially offer even more valuable strategic advantages on the future 
battlefield. The Israelis took control of the air defence network at night-time and uploaded an 
image containing nothing, meaning the air defence missile couldn’t be fired as they had no 
targets in the system (Solis, 2014: 7). This allowed the Israel Air Force to apparently fly into 
Syrian air space and bomb a reactor without altering their air defence systems (Cohen, Freiligh, 
& Siboni, 2016). Syrian fighter jets could not be scrambled owing to the fact that their system 
had no targets (Solis, 2014: 7). This was allegedly accomplished by taking over the Syrian air 
defence system and tricking them into thinking nothing was happening (Cohen et al, 2016). 
Even when the attack was under way the radar still did not show anything (Cohen et al, 2016). 
Israel allegedly decided not to shut down the radar as this would have alerted the Syrians; they 
instead reprogrammed the system to function ‘normally’ (Cohen et al, 2016). The site that was 
a target for the Israeli’s clandestine attack was an alleged Syrian Nuclear reactor (Sharp, 2009). 
According to Sharp (2009) the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a report in 2009 that 
drew a connection between Syria and North Korea’s clandestine nuclear program. According 
to the actual report by IAEA, the agency had been given information that alleged that the site 
destroyed by Israel was a nuclear reactor (IAEA annual Report, 2009). Furthermore, the report 
states that the site was not operational and was allegedly being built with assistance from the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (IAEA annual report, 2009). This shows how 
cyberattacks could be used to ‘prep’ future battlefields that are reliant on computer systems. 
This is giving a strong argument for how technology affects how states go to war and how it 
changes a state’s strategy for conflict.  
3.4.6 Stuxnet 
Langer (2011) states that Stuxnet was the first cyberwarfare weapon. Stuxnet was aimed at the 
industrial controls of a nuclear centrifuge, using a SCADA application as a means of 





the controller of the centrifuge (Langer, 2011: 49). A controller, as defined by Langer (2011: 
49), is a real-time computer system that affects the outputs through electrical input signals and 
programming logic. The devices are connected to a controller’s area drivers, pumps, valves, 
thermometers, and tachometers (Langer, 2011: 49). The controller communicates with these 
devices through a fieldbus connection (Langer, 2011: 49). Stuxnet was aimed at manipulating 
the controller and Microsoft was the delivery method to get to the controller.  
Stuxnet infested an Iranian nuclear processing facility in 2010. This was its main target, but 
this worm went far beyond its intended targets (Lin et al, 2012: 25). However, although it 
infected many Windows computers, it was particular about the controller which it targeted (Lin 
et al, 2012; Langer, 2011). Stuxnet would only target controllers from Siemens, meaning that 
the worm would go through a series of complicated fingerprinting processes to make sure that 
it had the correct controller (Langer, 2012: 49). The program that was downloaded conducted 
a process that would check model numbers, configuration details and even download another 
program that checked if it was the right program (Langer, 2012: 49). After this process, it would 
then load a rogue code into the one of the Siemens 315 and 417 controllers (Langer, 2012). 
Furthermore, Stuxnet would manipulate the system to show that nothing was going wrong with 
the nuclear centrifuges (Solis, 2014). This set the Iranian nuclear programme back years as the 
code made the centrifuges violently self-destruct (Singer & Frieman as cited by Allen & Chan, 
2017). This supposedly took out a fifth of the Iranian nuclear centrifuges (Allen and Chan, 
2017). 
Stuxnet went on to spread itself. This was problematic as the code was exposed and revealed 
its secrets (Solis, 2014). Solis (2014) states that such a code would have taken a large team of 
experts about six months to build the worm. Allen and Chan (2017) further this point by stating 
in their literature that Stuxnet would have required resources and capabilities that only military 
or intelligence agencies would have. Solis (2014) finally states what would have been the 
implications if this was a kinetic attack. This shows the danger of cyberattacks. As stated by 
Allen and Chan, this type of attack could be used, in principle, to damage much civilian and 
military infrastructure (2017). 
3.4.7 Discussion on cyberwarfare   
The aim of this section was to understand the cyber domain of warfare and look at the most 
prevalent examples of cyberwarfare. This chapter began with looking at what exactly the cyber 





Furthermore, it is a decentralised area owing to the fact that no state has control over its 
resources, and it goes beyond borders (Ween et al, 2017). This is ultimately a global domain 
that uses the electromagnetic spectrum and electronics to create, change, modify and store 
information (Robinson et al, 2015). Cyberwarfare was then defined as the US of this domain 
in order to interfere with physical, electronic, and online systems (Ween et al, 2017). When it 
comes to a cyberattack, it is hard to define when it becomes an act of war, but it is usually 
equated to an act of war when it equals a kinetic attack. A kinetic attack is when there is a use 
of force. Robinson et al (2015) state that a cyberattack is conducted with warfare-like intent. 
The literature also showed the difference between a cyberattack and a cyber intrusion which is 
defined based on intent. This section finally looked at different actors involved in cyberattacks 
such as cyberterrorists, cyberspies and cyberwarriors. The next part of this chapter looked at 
major cyberattacks found in the literature. The attacks that were looked at are Stuxnet, Georgia 
and Estonia, The US, and Israel preparing the battlefield. The next section will look at AI.  
3.5 Artificial Intelligence  
AI is integral to this research, as the aim of this research is to see how AI-enabled AWS will 
affect how states conduct their nuclear deterrence. This aims to look at how AWS will 
potentially disrupt traditional nuclear deterrence and how this will subsequently affect strategic 
stability. Furthermore, the aim of this section was to understand how technology affects how 
states go to war. As stated by Robinson et al (2015): “[f]rom the sword battles of the past to 
the unmanned drone strikes of today, this game of power is constantly driven to shift and evolve 
by technology”. Technology has always had an impact on the battlefield and an impact on a 
state’s national security policy, as states often ended up in ‘arms races’ to get an advantage 
technologically over their adversary. As stated by Haner and Garcia (2019), states are making 
heavy investments into AI-enabled autonomous systems. The global spending on AI is 
expected to reach between $16–$18 billion in 2025 (Haner & Garcia, 2019: 331). Furthermore, 
Rickli (2019: 91) emphasises the statement made by Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, that a 
state that becomes a leader in AI will become the ‘ruler of the world’. This shows the 
importance of AI to international powers and also creates the impression that there could be a 
possible AI arms race. This section of this research does not aim to discuss the theory around 
AI in terms of what is autonomy or what is AI. It aims to look at how US policy sees AI and 
what are current examples of AI-enabled AWS. This section discusses prominent examples 
and their current capabilities. It will begin by looking at how the US DoD (2012) directive 





military where AI can be applied and the possible capabilities it can bring to warfare. Finally, 
it will look at current AI-enabled AWS and future AWS.  
3.5.1 Autonomy in weapon systems: Department of Defense directive 
The US policy on AWS is based on the role of humans in the operating systems, over the 
technologies’ sophistication (Artificial intelligence and national security, 2019). The DoD 
directive (2012) defines AWS as a system that, once activated, will then be able to engage a 
target without any further intervention by a human operator. The DoD directive (2012) 
positions that autonomous and semi-autonomous systems will be designed to allow human 
operators to exercise an appropriate level of human judgement when it comes to the use of 
force. Semi-autonomous systems, according to the DoD, will be allowed to apply lethal or non-
lethal forces (DoD Directive, 2012). However, the semi-autonomous system must be designed 
so that it will not engage an unselected target if the system loses or has degraded 
communication; meaning that it will only engage authorised targets before it becomes degraded 
or was lost (DoD Directive, 2012). This shows that the DoD puts a specific emphasis on the 
role of humans when it comes to the use of force. The Artificial intelligence and national 
security (2019) report states that this means that they have control over the why, when, where, 
and how and does not mean that they need to have control over the weapon system. The DoD 
further states that there needs to be: “[a]dequate training, [tactics, techniques, and procedures], 
and doctrine are available, periodically reviewed, and used by system operators and 
commanders to understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of the system’s 
autonomy in realistic operational conditions” (DoD directive 3000.09 as cited by Artificial 
intelligence and national security, 2019: 1). Furthermore, the system must have an interface 
that is user-friendly so operators may use the system effectively (Artificial intelligence and 
national security, 2019). Finally, these systems must be tested to be sure to minimise failure 
and they must also get senior level review when it comes to their operations (Artificial 
intelligence and national security, 2019).  
3.5.2 AI capabilities across different domains 
This section aims to briefly look at AI capabilities across Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, Cyberspace, and Command and Control. It will take a more 
in-depth look into Autonomous Vehicles and AWS. This will be done in order to give an 
overview of the different military applications for AI which have a specific emphasis on AWS 





3.5.3 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance   
One of AI’s main capabilities is its ability to process large amounts of datasets and analyse 
them (Artificial intelligence and national security, 2019). One project highlighted by the CRS 
is an AI project that combines computer vision and ML that analyses this data and identifies 
possible hostile threats (Artificial intelligence and national security, 2019). A prevalent 
example of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) enabled with AI is called 
Project Maven which was launched in April 2017. Tarraf et al (2019) refer to Project Maven 
as an Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team which sits between AI and operational AI 
known as mission support AI applications.  Project Maven has received a lot of attention in the 
media as Google employees protested Google’s involvement in the project (Shane & 
Wakabayashi, 2018). According to a CRS report about a dozen Google employees resigned 
and about 4 000 signed a petition against the company’s involvement in the project (U.S ground 
forces robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) and artificial intelligence (AI): consideration 
for congress, 2018). Google was one of many companies involved in the DoD contract; 
however, in 2019 it stated it will not renew its contract that was set to expire at the end of the 
year (U.S ground forces robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) and artificial intelligence 
(AI): consideration for congress, 2018).  
Shane and Wakabayashi (2018) states that the Pentagon program aims to use AI to interpret 
video imagery and could be used to improve drone strikes. Air Force Lt Gen Jack Shanahan 
states that project Marven is an initiative to use drone footage combined with ML to create 
‘useful intelligence’ (Air Force Lt Gen Jack Shanahan as cited by Corrigan, 2017). The 
program aimed to use AI to autonomously identify objects of interest from either moving or 
still UAV imagery (U.S ground forces robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) and artificial 
intelligence (AI): consideration for congress, 2018). Project Maven aimed to develop computer 
vision that would be trained by ML techniques to better identify objects (U.S ground forces 
robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) and artificial intelligence (AI): consideration for 
congress, 2018). The ultimate aim of the project was to make analysts’ work easier by getting 
rid of labour-intensive drone footage analysis and allowing human analysts to process two to 
three times more data (U.S ground forces robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) and 
artificial intelligence (AI): consideration for congress, 2018). This would allow for the delivery 
of more time-sensitive data and lower collateral damage and civilian casualties (U.S ground 





for congress, 2018). The current contract for project Maven was taken over by Palantir and due 
to the project being classified, there is limited information.  
3.5.4 Logistic 
An AI company called ‘SparkCogntion’ installed AI into several of Boeing’s commercial 
airlines in order to analyse when they would need repairs. An example of its success is how it 
flagged an engine that needed repair far ahead of its scheduled repair (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018: 
9). When the aircraft was inspected the maintenance team found that one of the blades had been 
nicked. Had this not been discovered it would have cost Boeing $50 million to replace it 
(Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018 : 9). Another example is how the army signed a contract with IBM 
to create a AI-proof concept. Watson was developed and the US plans to use it analyse ships 
due for repairs that could save a $100 million annually (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018). Furthermore, 
AI algorithms that are able to able to manage distribution and transportation tasks as well as 
prioritise them will change logistics (Schütz & Stanley-Lockman, 2017). Schütz and Stanley-
Lockman (2017) state that automation is not new to the military and was used by the US in the 
early 1990s and in the wake of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Schütz and Stanley-
Lockman (2017) refer to this program as a glorified Excel spreadsheet; however, spreadsheets 
transformed logistics. This system has a number of limitations, which will not be discussed 
here.  
The progression in AI, big data and deep learning can create what Schütz and Stanley-Lockman 
(2017) call a ‘nervous system’ for the US military. This nervous system would combine 
advance sensor data and blockchain technology for decentralised digital ledgers (Schütz & 
Stanley-Lockman, 2017).  This nervous system for military logistics will allow for a central 
location that sends signals when different inspections are needed and which parts need repair 
(Schütz & Stanley-Lockman, 2017: 3). This will allow units to operate more efficiently owing 
to data links between disaggregated forces and systems (Schütz & Stanley-Lockman, 2017: 3). 
Other apps created have allowed for four hours in a day to be freed up for airmen that had to 
previously plan air-to-air refuelling by hand (Schütz & Stanley-Lockman, 2017). AI could 
allow for data to be sent to the correct area when it comes to decision-making or even as 
something as simple as a unit needing more fuel (Schütz & Stanley-Lockman, 2017). It may 
also allow for the enhancement of connection between different branches of service or allies 
(Schütz & Stanley-Lockman, 2017). More complete information may allow states to be more 





(Schütz & Stanley-Lockman, 2017). This section shows a brief outline of the possible effect 
that AI will have on military logistics. AI will create more efficient, streamlined, and cost-
effective military operations on the future battlefield.  
3.5.5 Cyberspace  
The CRS quotes Admiral Michael Rogers, who stated that relying purely on human intelligence 
is a ‘losing strategy’ (Artificial intelligence and national security, 2018). The benefit of AI 
cyber defence tools is that they are trained to recognise a change in patterns of behaviour in a 
network which allows them to detect irregularities which then allows for a more comprehensive 
barrier compared to previous unobserved attack methods (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018: 10). 
Hackers need to modify their malicious code in order to circumvent a computer defence, this 
quote shows that AI can be more comprehensive against this (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018: 10). 
DARPA held a Cyber Grand Challenge in which seven computers with custom-designed 
software had real-world vulnerabilities and glitches (Fraze, 2016). Contestants had to develop 
AI algorithms to identify and patch these problems while attacking other teams’ weaknesses 
(Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018). The team behind the Mayhem system that won the Cyber Grand 
Challenge was a group of Pittsburgh-based researchers (Fraze, 2016). According to Fraze 
(2016), the aim of the challenge was to increase the development of autonomous systems that 
have the capability to detect, evaluate and patch systems before adversaries can exploit them. 
The systems that were used in the event were able to find and patch within seconds and not 
months as usual (Fraze, 2016). The result was that bugs were fixed in seconds, quicker than 
humans could, and showed AI’s ability to play defensively and offensively at the same time 
(Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018). Events like Cyber Grand Challenge are of importance to the US 
forces as the cyber domain becomes an increasingly more important hostile and an important 
area of conflict. AI may potentially allow for the US to defend its cyberspace more effectively 
due to AI speed. The Mayhem system was able to find, evaluate and fix patches faster than 
humans ever could. Such speed may allow the US cyber domain to defend itself continuously 
against evolving threats. AI may also offer an aggressive offence tool that is capable of finding 
ways through a state’s cyber defence faster than they can fix it.  
3.5.6 Command and control 
According to the Congressional Research Service, the US air force is developing a ‘Multi-
Domain Command and Control’ system (MDC2) (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018: 10). The aim of 





AI to create this single source (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018: 10-11). This will create a ‘common 
operating picture’ for the US military (Artificial intelligence and national security, 2019: 10-
11). This AI will be able to find issues on communication, real-time analysis and different 
viable courses of action at a faster response rate; analysts believe this will improve the wartime 
decision-making process (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018). This data fusion capability is in the 
development phase with Lockheed Martin, Harris and other AI start-ups (Hoadley, & Lucas, 
2018). An example currently in development by Lockheed Martin is the ‘Joint All-Domain 
Operations (JADO)’ (Kahn, & Thatcher, 2020). Kahn and Thatcher (2020) state that the JADO 
capability will combine electromagnetic and physical common operational pictures. JADO will 
also use AI and other cognitive applications to identify War Reserve Mode (WARM) 
emissions, better optimise IS sensor collection, and finally autonomously update aircraft routes 
based on current threats (Kahn, & Thatcher, 2020: 1). Kahn and Thatcher (2020) state that the 
JADO Full Spectrum Operations is the key to fighting and winning battles in Highly Contested 
Environments (HCE). This system aims to make the right decision faster. Another example 
comes from the CRS (Joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), 2020) and is called the 
Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). The aim of this system is to connect all the 
sensors from each of the military services into one network (Joint all-domain command and 
control (JADC2), 2020). The aim of JADC2 is to enable commanders to make better decisions 
(Joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), 2020: 1). This will be done by collecting 
data from lots of sensors, processing it with AI to identify targets, and then recommending the 
best weapon systems; both kinetic and non-kinetic (Joint all-domain command and control 
(JADC2), 2020: 1). This shows how AI-enabled C2 aims to bring all data from each service of 
the military into a singular point to allow for faster and better decisions to be made.  
3.5.7 Autonomous vehicles and weapon systems 
Hoadley and Lucas (2018) state that applications in this field are similar to commercial self-
driving vehicles, which use sensors to collect data in order perceive the environment and 
execute decisions. This shows the dual-use of AI for military and civilian applications. This 
section will analyse autonomous vehicles and weapon systems in order to give a basic 
understanding of them. This is owing to the fact that the next chapter will be giving an in-depth 
look at AWS and this chapter aims to give a contextualisation of technology and warfare.  An 
example of a military application would the US Air Forces ‘Loyal Wingman’ program 
(Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018). This involved pairing an unmanned fighter (F-16 was used) with a 





able to respond to events that had not been programmed into it, meaning that it reacted 
autonomously to unforeseen events (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018: 11). The events that it reacted to 
were unforeseen obstacles and weather conditions (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018: 11). This could 
be made more helpful by adding extra weapons to the unmanned systems or the ability to jam 
electronic threats (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018). The Marine Corps tested a ‘Multi-Utility Tactical 
Transport’(MUTT) which is an ATV-size vehicle which follows marines around the battlefield 
by radio link. It is not AI-enabled yet, but the Army aims to enable it with AI (Hoadley, & 
Lucas, 2018). Furthermore, the Navy tested a swarm technology, which is AI cooperative 
behaviour, for defending harbours or certain areas (Hoadley, & Lucas, 2018). Furthermore, 
multiple companies such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman are all 
developing AI-enabled AWS that operate in air, land and sea. 
3.5.8 Final discussion of AI 
The aim of this final section was to look at AI in order to make a contextualisation of this 
transformative technology. This chapter stated at the beginning that it did not aim to discuss 
AI theory as it aims to look at current US policy on AI and current examples of it. This section 
began with a look at the role of humans in AWS according to the US’s DoD. The DoD puts a 
heavy emphasis on maintaining a human-in-the-loop when it comes to AWS. The human-the-
loop emphasis by the US will be dealt with in-depth in the next section. Furthermore, the DoD 
stated that it wants thorough reviews and training on these systems in order to make sure there 
are no possible errors. What followed this was a look at AI across different domains of the US 
military. The different domains that were looked at were: ISR, logistics, cyberspace, command-
and-control, and autonomous vehicles and weapon systems. Each of these sections gave a brief 
overview of each of these domains and their current capabilities. What can be seen in all of 
these domains is that AI offers a high potential when it comes to increasing each section’s 
capabilities.  
3.6 Conclusion  
 The aim of this chapter was to look at how technological innovation changes the way states, 
more specifically the US, conduct warfare. The premise of this chapter was that technology 
changes the way states conduct warfare. After a look at four different technologies, it can be 
conclusively said that technology does influence the way in which states conduct warfare. 
Furthermore, these technologies provide problems outside of the military sphere due to their 





and what a nuclear triad is. The nuclear triad consists of three legs: land, air and sea. The land 
consists of ICBMs that allow states to respond quickly with accuracy and strength. The air leg 
of the triad includes a range of nuclear capable bombers such as the B-52, which allows states 
to send out these bombers as a deterrent and if the crisis is resolved, to recall them. This gave 
the US capability as well as flexibility when it came to the nuclear triad. The final leg of the 
triad is the sea leg. This consists of SSBNs. The ability for SSBNs to disappear under water 
and travel long distances gave the triad legitimacy and secured the US’s second-strike 
capability, due to the ability of the SSBN to hide underneath the ocean’s surface. The final 
section discussed AI, with the aim of dealing with what the US policy stated and how the US 
viewed their capabilities. It also provided this research with an understanding of different 
companies leading the way in autonomous weapons systems. This section has created a 
contextualisation and background for this study in understanding the connection technology 






Chapter 4  
4.1 Introduction: The rise of Autonomous Weapon Systems and its 
effect on the US’s nuclear deterrence 
This thesis goal is to analyse how states go to war and how AI will affect this. Owing to the 
fact that these are two very broad areas of study, this research aims to look at a specific aspect 
of both AI and modern warfare. The aspects that were chosen to be analysed were those of 
AWS and nuclear deterrence. The main aim of this research is to study how AWS would lead 
to a potential disruption in nuclear deterrence and subsequently affect strategic stability. The 
case site that was chosen was the United States of America (US), owing to the fact that the US 
prides itself in its technological innovation and military dominance. This will become 
abundantly clear as this chapter proceeds. Furthermore, to create a theoretical framework in 
which to conduct this study, Kaldor’s new war thesis was reviewed in Chapter 2 with the aim 
of using it to create a framework for this study. The new war thesis will therefore be used and 
presented in this chapter in three different sections: actors, goals, modes of warfare and forms 
of finance. Each section of the new war thesis plays a vital role in understanding modern 
warfare. Some of these sections will not be as intensive as others. For example, this chapter 
will be primarily dominated by modes of warfare. This is owing to the fact that this section will 
answer the main and secondary research questions. Meanwhile ‘goals’ and ‘actors’, which 
entail populism and President Trump, will create a contextualization and background for this 
study.  Forms of finance 9does not play a vital role in this research because the funding of AWS 
comes from the US government. This will be discussed further in the discussion of limitations 
of this research in the next chapter.  
 
9 The 2021 US budget aims to deliver on President Trump’s promise to rebuild the US’s military, strengthen its 
readiness, and support the US personnel (Office of Management and Budget 2020). The budget aims to implement 
the 2018 National Defense strategy which aims to invest in modernisation, innovation and lethality that will allow 
the US to face its current and future challenges (Office of Management and Budget, 2020). The budget that was 
requested was $705.4 billion, which represents only an increase of $0.8 billion in 2021 over 2020 (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2020: 33). The budget for the DoD science and technology programs amounts to over 
$14 billion (Office of Management and Budget, 2020: 35). This shows the US’s commitment to maintaining its 






4.2 Actors: Who are the actors involved?  
The actors that are involved in the development of AWS need to be outlined to create a better 
contextualization for how AWS will affect nuclear deterrence. This is because nuclear 
deterrence is based on perception, which makes understanding the actors involved important. 
Kaldor’s (2013) new war thesis maintains that new wars are fought by actors such as private 
security contractors, non-state actors, regular armed forces, and warlords. It is important to 
understand the actors involved in the development of AWS due to the complexity of actors in 
modern warfare. During the Cold War the global arena was dominated by the US and the 
USSR. However, the modern arena is dominated by a number of powerful nuclear armed states, 
such as Russia and China. Furthermore, the development of AI is diverse, in that AI is 
developed in both the US government and the private sector, with a crossover between the two 
spheres. Both of these sectors are actors involved in AWS, but they are not strategic 
competitors, they are involved in innovation together. This section will not focus on the 
relationship between the US government and the private sector but on strategic adversaries to 
the United States. It is important to understand the actors involved in AWS owing to the issue 
of perception of nuclear deterrence but it is more important to understand how the US perceives 
these actors. Understanding who the US perceives as their strategic advisory will allow this 
study to create a better background and more complete secondary contextualization. Finally, 
this section will not talk about the US as an actor as this will be discussed in the ‘goals’ section.  
4.2.1 The US’s 2017 National Security Strategy: What can this tell us about 
the US’s perceptions of its adversaries? 
The US’s National Security Strategy (NSS) (2017) aims to ensure peace through strength 
(National Security Strategy. The US aims to renew its competitive advantage to maintain its 
strength so as to successfully deter and if necessary, defeat any aggressor that is going against 
US interests (NSS, 2017). The NSS views the US as having taken a break from maintaining its 
military dominance and believes that Russia and China have taken this opportunity to change 
the international order in their favour. The US NSS views China and Russia as having the aim 
of eroding US influence, its interest, and to erode its security and prosperity. Furthermore, the 
NSS (2017: 8) states that both China and Russia are developing advanced weapons and 
capabilities that could become a possible threat to US critical infrastructure and command and 
control infrastructure. Other actors that the US perceives as threats outlined by the NSS (2017) 





a series of events that unfolded in 2020. On 3 January 2020 the US conducted an air raid aimed 
at killing top Iran General Qassem Soleimani (Iran’s Qassem Soleimani killed in US air raid at 
Baghdad airport, 2020). The subsequent killing of General Soleimani lead to a retaliation by 
Iran with it firing more than a dozen ballistic missiles at a base in Iraq that was hosting US 
troops (US-Iran tension : how confrontation between rival escalated, 2020). Furthermore, both 
North Korea and Iran are points of tension for the US regarding their nuclear weapons 
proliferation programmes.  
4.2.2 China: A strategic rival and threat 
The US’s NSS (2017: 21) further views the Chinese government as problematic due to its 
alleged theft of US intellectual property. They view this theft as being in the hundreds of 
billions of dollars and giving China an unfair ability to tap into US innovation. The NSS (2017: 
25) attributes part of China’s military modernisation coming from access to US innovation 
economy, with an end emphasis on US universities. Furthermore, from key informant 
interviews, it was found that China is a problem for states when it comes to industrial espionage 
and cyber intrusions in order to steal information (key informant 1, key informant 2, & key 
informant 3, 2020). Key informant 3 (2020) went on to state that the Chinese specifically target 
the military sector and personnel. The US aims to deal with China through the use of the four 
pillars outlined in its NSS: “(1) protect the American people, homeland, and way of life; (2) 
promote American prosperity; (3) preserve peace through strength; and (4) advance American 
influence.” (United States Strategic approach, 2020: 1). This will be done in order, as already 
stated, to protect US interests. More specifically, China’s growing military is a significant 
threat to both the US and its allies (United States Strategic approach, 2020: 7). Another issue 
outlined is the fact that China has a military-civilian fusion (MCF) strategy, which allows the 
Chinese military to have unfettered access to civilian entities that develop and gain advanced 
technologies (United States Strategic approach, 2020: 7). The US and other foreign countries 
are feeding the People's Republic of China (PRC) military research and development programs 
dual-use technologies owing to the PRC’s non-transparent MCF linkages, this is in turn 
strengthening the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to suppress domestic opposition and 
threaten the US and its allies (United States Strategic approach, 2020: 7). This is problematic 
as the US is very aware of the fact that China is pursuing greater military capability and 





Finally, China is commonly referenced throughout the literature when it comes to AWS. As 
already stated in this thesis, China aims to become the leader of AI, which makes it an important 
actor to analyse. Furthermore, theorists such as Johnson (2020a, 2020b), highlight that there is 
a specific tension about AI when it comes to the US and China. Geist and Lohn (2018) state 
that China and Russia both believe that the US is leveraging AI to undermine the survivability 
of their nuclear forces. Furthermore, China is a good example of an actor as their military 
innovations have led to multiple successful tests. This shows that China is a significant threat 
and issue to the US. It is also seen as a valuable example of an actor involved in the pursuit of 
AI and AWS. This rising tension between the US and China combined with a possible AI arms 
race could be potentially destabilising. This statement is supported by Johnson (2019), who 
states that a fast-emerging US-China AI innovation race will have a potential and profound 
destabilising effect on strategic stability of the future. How the NSS and theorists view China 
shows that it is an important actor. This is owing to the fact that it is an incredibly threatening 
adversary to US interest and is in the pursuit of military and AI dominance. This is threatening 
to the US as it views China’s pursuit of military and AI capabilities as potentially disruptive to 
its influence, security and prosperity. It is important to understand how the US views China, as 
one of the major tenets of nuclear deterrence is perception. The US only needs to perceive 
China as having an AWS capability that could threaten its second-strike capability in order for 
there to be a destabilising effect on strategic stability.  
4.2.3 Russia: A renewed threat 
The NSS (2017: 25) states that Russia aims to restore its status as a great power and create a 
sphere of influence near its borders. The NSS (2017: 5) further states that Russia aims to 
weaken the US’s influence around the world and divide the US from its allies and partners. 
According the NSS (2017: 25-26), Russia is investing in military capabilities, which include 
nuclear systems, and cyber capabilities which have proven to be destabilising. Furthermore, 
the NSS (2017: 25-26) sees Russia’s nuclear capabilities as one of its biggest threats. The NSS 
(2017: 26) states Russia’s ambition and its increase in military capabilities are a risk to the 
Eurasia area, especially with the chance of a Russian miscalculation that could lead to conflict. 
Furthermore, the NSS (2017: 47) claims that Russia is using subversive measures to weaken 
the US’s credibility in Europe, weakening NATO, and weakening European institutions and 
governments. Russia has also invaded Georgia and the Ukraine, showing their lack of 
commitment to other states’ sovereignty in Europe (NSS, 2017: 47). Russia uses nuclear 





The Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs within the US Department of State sees Russian 
foreign policy as aggressive and attributes it to domestic political issues (U.S. Relations with 
Russia, 2020). The United States aims to deter Russia and only create a level of cooperation 
when it suits US interests.  
“The United States has sought to deter Russian aggression through the projection of 
strength and unity with U.S. allies and partners, and by building resilience and reducing 
vulnerability among allies and partners facing Russian pressure and coercion. The United 
States would like to move beyond the current low level of trust with Russia, stabilize our 
relationship, and cooperate where possible and when it is in the core U.S. national security 
interest to do so. To achieve this, Russia must take demonstrable steps to show it is willing 
to be a responsible global actor, starting with a cessation of efforts to interfere in democratic 
processes. The long-term goal of the United States is to see Russia become a constructive 
stakeholder in the global community.” (U.S. Relations with Russia, 2020). 
This above quote from The Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs gives a good insight into 
the US’s perception of Russia and how they subsequently aim to deal with Russia. However, 
this is not the only issue for the US. Like China, Russia aims to become a global leader in AI. 
Laird (2020) states that AWS will likely raise the risk of crisis instability and conflict escalation 
in future confrontations between the US and Russia. Russia already has aims of creating an 
autonomous unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) called Status-6, which they believe will be 
able to secure their second-strike capability. This shows that Russia isn’t just an adversary with 
an aggressive foreign policy, but an adversary interested in pursuing AI in order to gain a 
technological advantage over the US.  
4.2.4 Discussion  
The US’s NSS sees the world as increasingly competitive, which is the foundation for their 
response, to increase their competitive edge that they deem has slipped (2017). More 
specifically, the US views their military as the strongest in the world, but see other states as 
increasing in strength and shrinking the US’s strength. Lots of actors now have the capability 
to field a broad arsenal of advanced missiles, some of which have the capability to reach the 
US homeland, which allows weak states to be empowered and emboldens them (NSS, 2017: 
3). Even without these ‘otherwise weak states’, the US faces two hugely powerful nuclear-
armed states, Russia and China. The US faces the issue of two powerful threats that come 





forces. This is an important aspect of AWS that will be discussed further in the methods section, 
along with the actors and the pursuit of AWS as these play a vital role in this research, are the 
two most cited threats by the NSS and are found frequently in the literature. This section now 
gives this thesis a background to look at the goals of the United States, with a specific look at 
President Trump, as the NSS does not hold much power if President Trump decides to take up 
another strategy during a time of crisis or escalation.  
4.3 Goals: Making America Great Again and reasserting US global 
leadership   
In Kaldor’s new war thesis there is a link between identity politics and conflict. A part of this 
research is trying to create a contextualization on how prominent movements like populism, a 
form of identity politics, can help to understand how the US pursues its NSS and ultimately 
better situate the reader. Wars used to be fought on ideologies such as communism or 
democracy; new wars are fought on identity (Kaldor, 2013). Identity politics is the source of 
violence, specifically a unidimensional personality (Kaldor, 2013). The more specific example 
of identity politics that this thesis is studying is ‘populism’. Populism can be seen as anti-elitist 
and usually pushes an agenda of what a ‘true citizen’ looks like (Marchlewska et al, 2017: 
151). Fukuyama (2017) also highlights how populist leaders create an image of the national 
citizen and denounce the elite. Lofflmann (2019) highlights how President Trump’s ‘brand’ of 
populism has targeted the establishment as the culprits of economic and political failures, 
building an antagonistic relationship between the elite and ‘ordinary Americans’, and 
exploiting Americans’ emotional triggers. In Löfflman’s (2019) research the characteristics of 
the ‘true citizen’ and anti-elite can be seen, points previously highlighted by Marchlewska et 
al (2017) and Fukuyama (2017).  
“Popular discontent with the status quo opened the space for Trump’s populist 
messaging, which, alongside contempt for the Washington establishment, promised 
national revival and renewal through economic protectionism, aggressive deregulation, 
strict anti-immigration measures and a transactional focus on prioritising US interests 
in international affairs that would ‘make America great again’. On specific issues of 
foreign policy and national security, this rhetoric addressed a longstanding gap between 
public opinion and the attitudes of a bipartisan elite on American global engagement, 





Löfflman (2019) states that President Trump’s message became so powerful because he was 
able to exploit the disconnect created between the elite and public opinion. While the elite 
wanted global economic liberalisation, the public wanted to focus on domestic issues and leave 
other states to sort out their own affairs (Löfflman, 2019). However, Löfflman (2019) believes 
that Trump’s national-populist rhetoric has not fully influenced the US’s NSS; it has, however, 
opened a debate and allowed the US to recalibrate its foreign policy. However, according to 
Löfflman (2019: 130), Trump has opened the door for a potential recalibration of US grand 
strategy by questioning the political dominance of the foreign policy establishment and its 
strategic standpoint. The recalibration could potentially move towards a closer alignment 
between public and elite opinions, moving away from bipartisan consensus on liberal 
hegemony (Löfflman, 2019: 130). Löfflman (2019: 130) argues that this is driven neither by 
post-Cold War primacy nor by populism.  
The studies by Löfflman (2019), Hall (2017) and Feaver (2017) state that President Trump’s 
rhetoric and the NSS are inherently different from one another. Löfflman (2019) argues that 
Trump’s rhetoric is anti-globalism and anti-elite; however, Trump’s foreign policy is different 
from his rhetoric. Löfflman (2019) substantiates this claim by highlighting how the US still 
supported NATO, approved congresses sanctions against Russia, and secured Japan and South 
Korea by increased military activity in the Asia-pacific (Löfflman, 2019). Cordesman (2017) 
would agree with Lofflman’s (2019) argument as he argues that Trump’s ‘America First’ 
means internationalism and not isolationism. This shows that Trump may move from position 
to position in his short statements or tweets, however, he has ended up closer to the centre when 
it comes to his national security positions than many critics fully account for (Cordesman, 
2017). This shows that Trump as an actor differs from his foreign policy. In simple terms, what 
Trump says on twitter or at a rally and what his policy is differ substantially. Löfflman (2019: 
125) argues that the main impact of Trump’s nationalist-populist agenda has been a disdainful 
perception of the US’s partners and allies along with a more self-centred view of world affairs. 
Trump’s populist language can ultimately be seen as anti-elite view of world affairs combined 
with a belief that the US should take less of a hegemonic role. However, whether the NSS 
(2017) shows populist sentiments or has a more internationalist view, President Trump does 
not have to abide by it during a crisis. This is where it becomes important to understand Trump 
as an actor for potential aggressors.  
This argument is found in the research done by Pifer (2018). He states that when it comes to 





must be implemented to deal with these situations. Pifer (2018) states that: “I do not recall any 
meeting in which a US. official argued that we had to adopt a certain policy course because of 
the prescriptions contained in the National Security Strategy.” These policies, according to 
Pifer (2018), can be overturned, which is an issue to both the US’s adversaries as well as its 
allies owing to the fact that Trump views unpredictability as an asset (Pifer, 2018). For Pifer 
(2018) the biggest question about how Trump will act is based around his instinct and volatility. 
Key informant 3 (2020) stated that understanding the actor is of significant importance, as an 
actor like Trump will not blink in a fight and there would be a strong response from his 
administration. Meanwhile, a Biden administration may prefer a more watered-down 
diplomatic response when it comes to a moment of crisis (Key informant 3, 2020). The 
argument of this section is that Trump as an actor sees his unpredictability and volatility as an 
asset. Furthermore, understanding Trump’s foreign policy may not be a reliable source in 
understanding how he would act in a moment of crisis or escalation. This type of strategy may 
prove viable during a time of crisis, as an actor may not choose to escalate as Trump’s strategy 
during a moment of crisis cannot be predicted by either his actions or his policy.  
4.4 Methods of warfare: How AWS will affect the US’s nuclear 
deterrence and subsequently strategic stability 
This section looks at methods of warfare which is the next tenet of the new war thesis. Kaldor’s 
(2013) methods of warfare are based on the premise that warfare has changed. This means that 
war is no longer fought in a decisive battle between two well-armed states (Kaldor, 2013). A 
decisive encounter between two well-armed states was regularly referred to as ‘old wars’ in the 
literature. This thesis investigates the effect of AWS on nuclear deterrence, so the specific 
method of warfare that was looked at was nuclear deterrence, which could subsequently affect 
strategic stability. This thesis goal, among other things, to analyse how warfare is changing. 
However, this thesis cannot cover all of the numerous developments in modern warfare 
technology. A good example is the US’s Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons which aim to create 
a level of manoeuvrability that will inhibit enemies from tracking its trajectory, which is 
possible with ballistic re-entry vehicles (Johnson, 2020a, Johnson, 2020b). This section will 
begin with a look at the US’s current thinking on nuclear deterrence under the Trump 
administration. It is important to understand the US’s thinking in order to understand its 
perception of factors such as the rise of China and its modernisation of its nuclear forces and 
Russia’s nuclear modernisation. This will help to understand why the US wants to modernise 





will give this thesis a better understanding of the US’s current nuclear thinking and set this 
research up to look at AWS. It will also allow for a better understanding of US’s current nuclear 
strategy which is important to this research as nuclear deterrence is its ‘mode of warfare’. The 
section that will follow nuclear deterrence will be AWS. There are several tenets that will be 
discussed under this section and it will subsequently dominate most of this chapter. This section 
will look at conventional military applications such as drones, swarm technology, the issue of 
speed, current capabilities regarding sensors, the issue of AWS being nuclear armed, the issue 
of miscalculation and possible de-escalating nature of AWS, human in the loop, and the issue 
of perception. Ultimately, this section goal is to analyse data that will help to answer the main 
and secondary research questions.  
4.4.1 Nuclear weapons: The cornerstone of US National Security Strategy 
This section on modes of warfare now takes a look at the US’s nuclear strategy. This is of 
importance because the chosen mode of warfare in this research is nuclear deterrence. The NSS 
(2017: 30) notes that nuclear weapons have served as a vital part of its national security strategy 
for the past 70 years. Nuclear weapons have created a foundation in order to deter aggressors 
and preserve peace and stability for the US and more than thirty of its allies (NSS, 2017: 30). 
However, the NSS (2017) states that the US’s nuclear Triad is ageing while its adversaries have 
expanded their arsenal and delivery systems. This is an issue for nuclear deterrence as the Triad 
plays a vital role in the US’s nuclear strategy. The NSS (2017) mandates that the US must 
maintain a credible nuclear deterrence and an assurance of its capabilities. The NSS (2017) 
aims for this by increasing investment in maintaining its nuclear arsenal and infrastructure. The 
NSS (2017: 31) states that the US does not need to match the nuclear arsenals of other powers, 
but they must still maintain their stockpiles so that they can deter adversaries, assure their allies 
and partners, and achieve objectives if deterrence fails. Furthermore, the NSS aims to invest in 
its nuclear enterprise in order to keep an effective and safe nuclear triad that is capable of 
responding to future security threats.  
The need for the US to modernise the Triad is also seen in the 2018 NPR. According to Vergun 
(2019), the US highlighted in the NPR that it needed to modernise its nuclear triad. Vergun 
goes on to quote Hyten, who states that each leg of the Triad is of critical value when 
maintaining an effective deterrence. Hyten goes on to highlight the importance of each leg of 
the Triad in creating an effective nuclear deterrence (as cited by Vergun, 2019). The strategic 





in moments of crisis (Hyten as quoted by Vergun, 2019). However, Submarines are the most 
survivable element of the nuclear tried (Hyten as quoted by Vergun, 2019). Submarines gave 
the triad the ability to hide from adversaries, it gave the US the ability to secure their second-
strike capability; a critical tenet of nuclear deterrence and key to MAD (Hyten as quoted by 
Vergun, 2019). ICBMs are the most problematic for adversaries as there are more than 400 
locations across the US (Hyten as quoted by Vergun, 2019). Finally, Vergun (2019) highlights 
that modernisation is important and does not mean a new class of nuclear missiles; it refers to 
improving the existing triad. This shows that the US still values its nuclear deterrence as seen 
by its desire to modernise its nuclear triad. Vergun also shows the importance of each leg of 
the triad when it comes to the US’s NPR.  
This need to modernise the US’s nuclear forces is not a new strategy under the Trump 
administration. The NPR (2018), according to Rose (2018), continues the modernisation 
program from the Obama administration. According to Rose (2018: 3) the NPR states that the 
US must move forward with the Obama administration’s strategic modernisation programme. 
This involves modernising the Columbia-class SSBNs, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent 
(GBSD), the B-21 bomber, and the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile (Rose, 2018: 
3). Roses (2018) states that this modernisation program continues to have bi-partisan support 
by Congress. These systems modernisations are of importance to the US as they enhance 
strategic stability and are in line with arms control obligations and commitments (Rose, 2018: 
3). This shows that the US believes strongly in the importance of the nuclear triad when it 
comes to maintaining an effective nuclear deterrence.  
While it is valuable to understand what theorists have to say about the NPR, it is also valuable 
to analyse the policy directly. The NPR (2018) affirms the issue of the US continuing to commit 
to a reduction of nuclear weapons while adversaries like China and Russia do not. Furthermore, 
the NPR brings up the issue of both Iran and North Korea, which further highlights the issue 
of a multipolar world and subsequently many threats for the US. The NPR (2018) goes on to 
further highlight numerous other threats such as chemical, biological weapons and cyber. 
Cyber threats are of interest to this research as it was a recurring theme found in the primary 
research that was conducted; it will, however, be discussed later. Regarding China and Russia, 
the NPR (2018) continues to maintain the narrative of a competitive global arena that entails 
adversaries that the US has allowed to gain ground militarily. This is what the actors’ section 
of the thesis found to be called ‘principled realism’ a version of Trump’s populism mixed with 





The US also highly values their nuclear capabilities as the NPR (2018) attributes this to 
successful deterrence of both nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. Furthermore, the US’s 
nuclear deterrence also ensures allies and partners achieve the US’s objective if it fails and 
allows the US to hedge against an uncertain future (NPR, 2018). The NPR (2018) goes on to 
further state that potential aggressors must not miscalculate the use of nuclear weapons. As 
mentioned already in this thesis, perception plays a vital role in nuclear deterrence. Adversaries 
must understand a defender’s capability and will to use nuclear weapons in a crisis.  
“Potential adversaries must recognize that across the emerging range of threats and 
contexts: 1) the United States is able to identify them and hold them accountable for 
acts of aggression, including new forms of aggression; 2) we will defeat non-nuclear 
strategic attacks; and, 3) any nuclear escalation will fail to achieve their objectives, and 
will instead result in unacceptable consequences for them.”  (NPR, 2018: VII).  
The NPR (2018) states that this module is adaptable across a range of actors and that the US’s 
nuclear capabilities need to remain flexible and have the ability to carry out a strike against 
unfavourable actions against itself and allies and partners. For this to be maintained, the NPR 
(2018) mandates that the US needs to modernise its nuclear forces. The NPR (2018: X) 
highlights that there is an increasing need for flexibility and diversity which is one of the main 
reasons for sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad and other non-strategic nuclear 
capabilities, and modernising command-and-control systems. The triad’s synergy allows for 
the US to maintain its nuclear credibility; allowing one of the legs of the triad to be eliminated 
would greatly impact the US’s nuclear credibility (NPR, 2018).  
What this section has shown is the huge emphasis the US puts on nuclear deterrence under the 
Trump administration. The emphasis is on the point that the US is planning on modernising 
their nuclear triad in order to maintain its credibility at a time when other powers such as Russia 
and China are modernising their nuclear forces. Furthermore, the US believes that Russia is 
violating the INF and the US is currently on course not to renew the START treaty based on 
the belief that other powers such as Russia and China are not obeying START. All these 
complications and the US’s emphasis on its nuclear deterrence shows the relevance of nuclear 
weapons and the need to understand how AWS will affect such an important tenet of US’s NSS 
policy. Furthermore, in a time of already heighted tensions with China and Russia’s, AWS 
could further create tensions between these global powers. It is noted that there are a number 





involvement in US domestic politics and states such as Georgia and Ukraine. Furthermore, 
China’s persistent industrial espionage and involvement in the South East China sea which 
aims to inhibit freedom of navigation and increases tension with the US and its allies. These 
are all noteworthy factors that will add to increased tension in global politics. However, this 
research cannot look at everything and will stay focused on AWS and nuclear deterrence.  
4.4.2 Conventional application for AWS 
This section on modes of warfare has covered nuclear deterrence, which is the chosen mode of 
warfare for this research. This part now aims to look at the technology aspect of modes of 
warfare and how this can affect the US’s nuclear deterrence. This research is now moving from 
the strategy side of warfare to the technological aspect. It was important to look at the US’s 
NSS (2017) and NPR (2018), to gain a better understanding of how the US conducts its nuclear 
deterrence, but it is now important to see how AWS will subsequently effect this. The above 
section found that the US is aiming to maintain its military dominance and its military 
innovation over other states. The US is pursuing a range of advanced military technologies in 
order to bolster its military posture (Miller, Fotaine, & Velez-Green, 2018). These weapons are 
expected to speed up the military conflict as well as create a level of uncertainty about these 
systems which will increase risk owing to miscalculations or misunderstandings (Miller et al, 
2018). It is expected that AWS will make thousands of complex and highly complex decisions 
at machine speed (Laird, 2020). This speed could lead to a sudden and potent attack that could 
leave actors in a threatening situation as AWS opens the possibility that this speed could push 
an adversary to up the escalation and turn to nuclear use (Laird, 2020). Furthermore, AWS may 
give states the ability to pursue and reliably target an adversary’s SSBN or mobile ICBMs 
(Miller et al, 2018). This would be problematic as mobile nuclear missiles are what makes a 
second-strike credible. Geist and Lohn (2018) also highlight how AWS has the potential to 
undermine MAD. Johnson (2020a & 2020b) states how AWS can be used in order to conduct 
ISR and monitor mobile missiles and submarines. Furthermore, AWS can be used in order to 
turn drones into ‘swarms’. This is the largest cited area for AWS and probably the most 
significant due to the current low cost of drones and their proposed potential capabilities. This 
also allows for the US military to increase their quantity. As mentioned already, the US is 
facing a challenge of quantity owing to the high cost of military technology. Drones and 
specifically swarm technology will help the US offset this issue. This brief introduction has 
highlighted some of the factors that will be discussed in this section regarding AWS. The first 





4.4.3 Drones and swarm: The future battlefield  
This section now looks at a specific example of technology that could cause a potential 
disruption to US nuclear deterrence; this is drone technology and its ability to create swarms. 
This section continues to look at how AWS as a mode of warfare could potentially affect 
nuclear deterrence. Johnson (2019: 150) states that future progress of AI technology will have 
an effect on autonomous systems and robotics that could create capabilities that will change 
the military balance and how states conduct warfare. Johnson (2019: 150) further states that 
these autonomous systems would theoretically be able to incorporate AI technology such as 
speech, perception and facial recognition and decision-making tools that will allow them to 
execute operations without human intervention or supervision. AWS offer states the ability to 
project power in areas known as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) contested zones (Johnson, 
2019: 151). This is not the only issue that the US faces in (A2/AD), as the role of the 
information revolution has allowed enemies to follow the US and build reconnaissance strike 
networks that can detect US forces and strike them at long range with precision-guided 
weapons (Scharee, 2014: 10), showing that the US already faces significant challenges to their 
power projection without the introduction of AWS or swarm technology.  
Furthermore, AI infused with data-analytics combined with quantum-enabled sensors could 
make adversaries’ submarines potentially easier to locate which may force states into a ‘use it 
or lose it situation’ that will worsen strategic stability. A UAV by itself would be no threat to 
the US’s F-35, however, a swarm of AI-augmented drones may be able to evade and 
overwhelm an adversary’s sophisticated air defence systems (Johnson, 2020b: 20). This 
highlights what has predominately been seen through the literature, the rise of swarm 
technology. An example of swarm capability is seen this quote from Laird (2020):  
“Take for example, a hypothetical scenario set in the Baltics in the 2030 timeframe 
which finds NATO forces employing swarming AWS to suppress Russian air defense 
networks and key command and control nodes in Kaliningrad as part of a larger strategy 
of expelling a Russian invasion force” (Laird, 2020). 
Such a move could be seen as a large tactic against Moscow and lead to nuclear escalation by 
Russia (Laird, 2020). Drones are seen as more effective as a swarm than by themselves when 
it comes to how effective their capability could be. There are currently limitations to drones’ 





possibly the next. However, from this research came the notion that it is of importance to ask 
these questions and further understand AWS could affect how states conduct warfare.  
Hitherto, from what has been seen in the literature, it can be stated that the rise of swarm 
technology is the most prominent example of AWS. This section aims to show how swarm 
technology could potentially have the biggest impact on nuclear deterrence which could 
subsequently lead to a disruption in strategic stability.  Examples of swarm technology looked 
at in this research are known as Perdix and Sea Hunter. These drones could potentially be used 
to ‘hunt’ mobile missile launchers such as SSBN, which is highly problematic for nuclear 
deterrence and subsequently strategic stability. Ultimately, such a capability from uninhabited 
systems will allow the US forces to counter threats at increased ranges, persistence, and enable 
them to take a higher level of risk creating a new form of operation (Scharee, 2014). Key 
informant 1 (2020) states that drones have kept the US in the position it has been in for the last 
25 years. If they build it first, it could be hugely beneficial for the US and maybe the allied 
nations (Key informant 1, 2020). However, If the US is not able to gain this capability it will 
take the shine off the US (Key informant 1, 2020). Key informant 1 (2020) states that the size 
and cost of the drones will be significantly less. Whoever does this would have a tremendous 
advantage over the US and would subsequently destabilise the US’s role (Key informant 1, 
2020). 
In order to understand how swarm will affect nuclear deterrence a deeper understanding of the 
potential capability of swarm technology needs to be ensured. What exactly do theorist define 
a swarm as? Scharee (2014: 10) states that: “[n]etworked, cooperative autonomous system will 
be capable of true swarming – cooperative behaviour among distributed elements that gives 
rise to a coherent, intelligent whole.”  Scharee (2015) gives an example by comparing 
swarming in animals and robotic swarm technology, the argument being that relatively 
unintelligent animals can create intelligent collective behaviour when swarming together. 
Kallenborn and Bleek (2018: 526) state a similar view of swarms: : “[d]rone swarms consist of 
multiple unmanned platforms and/or weapons deployed to accomplish a shared objective, the 
platforms and/or weapons autonomously altering their behaviour based on communication with 
one another.” Furthermore, the concept that drones in a swarm technology allow for more 
complex behaviour than a singular drone is stated by Kallebron and Bleek (2018: 526).  
“Uninhabited systems offer an alternative model, with the potential to disaggregate 





platforms. Because they can take greater risk and therefore be made low-cost and 
attritable – or willing to accept some attrition – uninhabited systems can be built in 
large numbers. Combined with mission-level autonomy and multi-vehicle control, large 
numbers of low-cost attritable robotics can be controlled en masse by a relatively small 
number of human controllers” (Scharre, 2015). 
What can be seen so far from this introduction to swarm technology is how the theorists view 
it as intelligent behaviour that is created by a large number of drones that would not be possible 
with a singular drone (Scharre, 2015; & Kallebron, & Bleek, 2018). This cooperative behaviour 
comes from the drones’ ability to communicate with one another and also allows for a large 
number of drones to be controlled by a smaller number of humans. Furthermore, a commonly 
stated asset for drone technology is the potential cost, as stated earlier, the US is facing the 
issue of increased cost of military technology that is lowering the size of their forces. The costs 
of drones may allow the US to offset this as they are inexpensive and can allow for mass on 
future battlefields or conflicts. The final aspect that is noteworthy from the quote by Scharre 
(2015) is human-control; how a swarm of drones would need a lower number of humans to 
control them, which could be a further asset to increasing the size of the US military.   
In the primary research conducted key informant 1 (2020) raised the issue of how swarms of 
drones could potentially affect modern warfare. For example, drones can be deployed and 
effective in minutes, giving a state the advantage of mass and speed (Key informant 3, 2020).  
Key informant 1 (2020) also stated that drones have the ability to flock, go above enemy radars, 
and should be able to have a lot more manoeuvrability due to the systems being able to take 
more g-forces than a human could. Key informant 1 (2020) highlights this as important as a 
human pilot would black out. This is the one advantage in the near term. He agrees that the 
numbers of drones are a capability within itself. This gives a general idea of what drone 
technology is. This section will now move on to how drones could affect nuclear deterrence 
and strategic stability. Drones have become such a problem and traditional defence cannot 
handle drones (Key informant 3, 2020). Specifically, drone swarms could carry a potential 
payload, and beat air defence systems (Key informant 3, 2020).  
Johnson (2020b: 19) states that AI-augmented AWS could be used in ISR and strike missions. 
Once again, this section aims to look at the conventional application of AWS, with a specific 





for conventional operations and possible proliferation could be destabilising as it can up the 
risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation.  
“For example, AI augmented drone swarms may be used in offensive sorties targeting 
ground-based air defenses and by nuclear-armed states to defend their strategic assets 
(i.e., launch facilities and their attendant C3I and early warning systems), exerting 
pressure on a weaker nuclear-armed state to respond with nuclear weapons in a use-
them-or-lose-them situation” (Johnson, 2020b: 19).  
A further issue highlighted by Johnson (2020a, 2020b) is the issue of states fielding unreliable, 
unverified, and unsafe AI-augmented AWS. This is notably problematic and an important 
aspect for this thesis, which will be discussed later. The use-them-or-lose-them situation raised 
by Johnson (2020b) highlights the issue of states feeling insecure about their ability to strike 
back; meaning their second-strike capability feels insecure. This will lead this state to nuclear 
escalation as they will be in an asymmetric position with their adversary. Johnson (2020b) 
highlights how a state may rely on a first-strike due to these insecurities. This shows the 
possible influence of AWS on nuclear deterrence. However, this thesis will now look at three 
different areas of technology such as:  air (Pedrix), sea (Sea Hunter) and undersea. This 
highlights the general aspects of drone and swarm technology. The next section will start to 
look at specific examples of how swarms will affect nuclear deterrence and subsequently 
strategic stability.   
4.4.4 Swarm technologies’ effect on nuclear deterrence 
As stated already, drones and swarms give states the ability to conduct ISR and strike missions 
against their adversaries.  This section will further the analysis of the capabilities of drone and 
swarm technology and subsequently give a relevant example being developed by DARPA. The 
debate of the current capabilities of such technology will be discussed at the end. This section 
aims to look at how such a technology would be able to affect a state’s mobile nuclear missile 
launches that gives their nuclear deterrence credibility. This section therefore aims to look at 
AWS swarms that have the capability to ‘hunt’ for the US’s mobile nuclear weapons, like 
SSBNs, eroding the credibility given to nuclear deterrence by these weapons. Johnson (2020a) 
gives a good summary of such a capability:  
“Drones used in swarms are well-suited to conduct preemptive attacks and nuclear ISR 
missions against an adversary’s nuclear and non-nuclear mobile missile launchers and 





facilities (for example, C3I and early warning systems, antennas, sensors and air 
intakes).” (Johnson, 2020a: 5).  
This quote by Johnson (2020a) also shows that swarms of drones may have the capability to 
not just threaten mobile missile launchers, but their attendant facilities as well. This can be 
argued as a strategic move that could be severely crippling to the US mobile missile launchers 
which would subsequently make such technology incredibly threatening and potentially 
destabilising for nuclear deterrence and strategic stability.  
A specific example of such a drone would the DARPA’s Sea Hunter. This allows this research 
to move forward to a more concrete example of AWS and make it more than just a theoretical 
debate. Key informant 4 (2020) stated that the Sea Hunter is being built in order to find 
submerged submarines. Johnson (2020b) highlights that the Sea Hunter is being tested in order 
to support anti-submarine warfare operations. Sauer (2019) further states that the Sea Hunter’s 
capabilities could be used to detect and pursue SSBNs, which could potentially limit a state’s 
second-strike capability. Johnson (2020b) argues identically, stating that technology like the 
Sea Hunter may render the underwater domain transparent, which will then threaten a state’s 
second-strike capability. What is emerging from the literature is the potential for AWS, such 
as the Sea Hunter, to find mobile missile launchers that could then threaten a state’s secure 
second-strike capability. The Sea Hunter, according to Johnson (2020a: 22), demonstrates how 
AWS are furthering the completion of the targeting cycle. By doing this, the Sea Hunter is 
exerting additional pressure on an adversary, potentially putting them in a ‘use it or lose it’ 
scenario when it comes to their second-strike capability (Johnson, 2020a: 22). Once again, it 
must be re-emphasised that a state may only need to perceive their second-strike capability as 
under threat from AWS in order to provoke a destabilising situation, which supports the 
argument that the invention of such a technology like the Sea Hunter and its application would 
be hugely destabilising to strategic stability. The Sea Hunter does not need to have a high-
calibre capability, it only needs to have a capability that makes an adversary feel insecure.  
Furthermore, the Sea Hunter is significantly less expensive than a warship, which would help 
the US deal with its issue of quantity on the future battlefield. Martin (2017) states that between 
50-100 of these ships can be bought for the price of a singular warship. This would allow the 
Sea Hunter to be deployed as a swarm across the ocean. Klare (2019) states that instead of 
deploying well-armed, well-equipped and extremely expensive warships, the Navy could 





are equipped with AI and sensors could be trained to operate in a coordinated swarm that will 
allow them to overwhelm an adversary and give the US a quick victory (Klare, 2019). These 
swarms of Sea Hunters should in theory be able to detect SSBNs and subsequently threaten the 
most important leg of the triad.  
These capabilities for the Sea Hunter are reviewed by the CRS, plus an additional two 
unmanned vehicles (UVs) (Navy large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles, 2020). The 
two additional platforms are the Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUVs) and 
Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MUSV) (Navy large unmanned surface and undersea 
vehicles, 2020). In the report the Sea Hunter is categorised as a MUSV. A MUSV project for 
the US navy aims, like that of LUSV, to be low cost, have high-endurance, and have the ability 
to have its payload reconfigured (Navy large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles, 2020: 
13). The first payload for this MUSV project will be ISR and electronic warfare (EW) systems 
capabilities (Navy large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles, 2020: 13). Furthermore, the 
US navy awarded a $34,999,948 contract to L3 Technologies to develop a single MUSV (Navy 
large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles, 2020: 13). This shows the Navy’s dedication 
to building autonomous MUSV in order to conduct ISR. Such large investment could well 
mean that in the future there could be AWS that are able to search the ocean for nuclear mobile 
missile launchers.  However, Johnson (2020b) states that the current effect AWS will have on 
deterrence is perception. According to Johnson (2020b) the near-term effects of AI on a state’s 
nuclear deterrence would come from autonomy with an ML-augmented sensor which may 
potentially threaten a state’s second-strike ability. This threat of crippling a state’s ability to 
strike back may force a state into a position that will make them use nuclear weapons first. 
Johnson (2020b) calls this response a ‘retaliatory first strike’. For the future of sea-based AWS, 
Johnson (2020b) attributes further advancement in ML and computing power to be a 
contributing factor to increase the capabilities of swarm technology to hunt SSBNs. This is a 
credible statement owing to the fact that the rise of AI in recent years has come from the 
increase in computing power.  
Another potential use for AWS could be under the sea. AWS could potentially be used to hunt 
and attack SSBNs. Horowitz argues that the creation of undersea AWS that have the capability 
to track adversaries’ SSBNs could lead to escalation where an enemy decides to strike first out 
of fear for their second-strike capability. Cebul (2017) states that unmanned undersea vehicles 
(UUVs) used in swarms could perform dangerous ISR under the ocean, this can be 





states that the ability for an undersea AWS to track an adversary’s submarine has caused some 
to be fearful of such a capability. The fear would come from the capability of tracking undersea-
based deterrents and ultimately undermine them (Horowitz, 2019: 781). This would be 
especially threatening if done on a nuclear-armed state, as it could then incentivise them to 
strike first (Horowitz, 2019: 781). However, Horwitz (2019) states that for technical reasons 
such capabilities are currently unlikely; he attributes it to power and communication. These are 
two frequently cited examples of limitations when it comes to AWS that operate in the sea. It 
will, however, be discussed in the next section that will look at the limitations and solutions of 
current AWS. The ability for a state to one day gain the capability to find SSBNs, either by the 
Sea Hunter or UUV, will be destabilising as it will threaten a state’s ability to strike back in a 
nuclear first strike. In a moment of crisis, such a technology could force a state into the position 
of ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ that may force them to strike first.  
An example of such of a UUV is the XLUUT (Boeing, 2017). Boeing (2017) claims that its 
XLUUV can travel 6,500 nm and can go for months on an operation fully autonomously. 
Furthermore, it does not need a launch and recovery platform; it can be launched from a port 
(Boeing, 2017). Furthermore, Boeing (2017) states that the current ‘environment’ for UUVs 
has several issues, such as range and endurance, which will be discussed in the next section. It 
is noteworthy now though, as Boeing (2017) claims their XLUUTV can overcome these 
challenges. The CRS reported that Boeing’s Echo Voyager will be used in order to inform the 
design of Boeing’s Orca XLUUV for the US Navy (Navy large unmanned surface and undersea 
vehicles, 2020: 14). Boeing partnered with Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) to build the Orca 
XLUUVs (Navy large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles, 2020: 15). According to the 
CRS the Navy has mandated that the future of its forces should have up to fifty XLUUVs (Navy 
large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles, 2020: 14). Baker (2019) states that the US navy 
awarded Boeing $274.4 million to acquire just five of the Orca XLUUVs. The purpose of the 
Orca XLUUV is anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, strike missions, mine 
countermeasures, and electronic warfare (Baker, 2019). This shows the US’s commitment to 
making the ocean transparent and investing heavily in AWS. There may be limitations in 
current AWS, which will be discussed in the next section, but the US is committed to investing 
in it, which may allow eventually for AWS that will be very capable of tracking SSBNs and 
subsequently threatening a state’s second-strike capability. The Orca XLUUV enabled with 
swarm technology may enable it with a higher capability when it comes to ‘hunting’ for mobile 





allow these undersea AWS to be more effective in a swarm than by themselves. A combination 
of different technologies from different domains may prove to be even more effective. This 
will be analysed in the next section. Finally, such investment from the US could well destabilise 
in itself as states may start to fear their second-strike capabilities being under threat. As 
mentioned throughout this thesis, nuclear deterrence is heavily based on perception, the 
capabilities don’t need to necessarily exist, a state must just need to think that they do for it to 
be destabilising, which supports the argument that such investment may be destabilising in 
itself.  
The final domain for AWS that will be discussed is air. Autonomous UAVs are another 
prominent example of a drone system that can be used in a swarm system and used to ‘hunt’ 
mobile nuclear missile launchers. As stated previously, drones used in swarms can be very well 
suited to conducting ISR and possible strikes against an adversary’s mobile nuclear forces 
(Johnson, 2020a). An example of a UAV currently being tested by the US Air Force is given 
by Sauer (2019: 89), and has already been mentioned in this chapter; it is known as Perdix. The 
aim of Perdix is to operate as a ‘team’, this is done by communicating through radio and 
informing one another of what they are doing (Martin, 2017). Furthermore, Perdix is fitted with 
what Martin (2017) refers to as ‘cellphone cameras’.  A practical example of their capability 
was conducted by Martin (2017). The night before, Perdix was fed with 50 000 different 
pictures of Martin (2017) and sent out the next day to ‘hunt’ him. Once Martin (2017) was 
found, the drone relayed his coordinates back to a missile ship sitting on a nearby river. Martin 
(2017) states that this information fed from Perdix to the missile ship would allow it to send a 
direct missile strike. Another example of Pedrix in action is when the US Department of 
Defense launched 103 Perdix drones into the Californian skies (Lachow, 2017: 96). The 
demonstration showed Perdix’s ability to fly without ‘human help’ and make decisions on its 
own (Lachow, 2017: 96).  
Perdix offers a viable solution for finding land-based nuclear missile launchers. Furthermore, 
drones have the ability to go under as well as over traditional enemy radar (Key Informant 1, 
2020), which will make them incredibly hard to detect. Key Informant 3 (2020) highlights that 
drones have become hugely problematic to traditional air defence systems. This issue is also 
mentioned by Kallenborn and Bleek (2018), who state that drone swarms have the potential 
capability to beat anti-submarine measures, missile defences, and air defence systems. This 
section on air-based AWS has briefly shown the current ability for drone technology by looking 





swarm in a way that allows for effective ISR on nuclear mobile missile launchers. The brief 
example given by Martin (2017) shows that Perdix potentially have the capability to be fed 
large amounts of data on mobile missile launchers and then sent to hunt them. There are 
numerous technical issues that may arise regarding the drone’s sensors and issues based on 
deception by adding a sticker to a mobile missile launcher to deceive the drone. The issue of 
deception will be discussed in the next chapter and the theory of integration and limitation of 
AWS in the next section.  A potential capability for AWS could also be a mixed swarm which 
will be able to threaten SSBNs, which is significantly more important to nuclear deterrence 
than mobile missile launchers. 
4.4.5 Limitations and solutions of AWS 
This section now moves on to discuss the limitations of current AWS. This section will start 
with the sea domain of AWS and the move on to the air. Gates (2016) states that AWS are 
linked to the laws of physics and because of this, certain aspects of AWS that will make the 
ocean transparent and SSBNs findable, is difficult. Gates (2016) states that SSBN were chosen 
to carry nuclear missiles owing to the fact that they are incredibly hard to detect and are 
designed to disappear into the ocean. Furthermore, SSBNs nuclear power allows them to be 
submerged for months at a time. However, Key Informant 4 (2020) states that SSBNs locations 
are roughly known by states, owing to intelligence and how states continuously track one 
another. There are other indicators that allow for the military to figure out where SSBNs are, 
such a warship, as there is usually a SSBN in the area (Key informant 4, 2020). Most 
importantly, as stated by Gates (2016), if an SSBN is hard to find there will be strategic 
stability. This emphasises the importance of SSBNs to a state’s second-strike capability and 
the further importance of understanding the limits and capabilities of AWS.  
The first challenge for finding SSBNs highlighted by Gates (2016: 30) is the ability to detect 
them. According to Gates (2016), current sensors on UUVs aren’t capable of sensing SSBNs 
due to a number of reasons such as rain and waves, which provide very useful cover for 
submarines, as well as ships and sea life. Even powerful sensors are not necessarily capable of 
finding submarines, Gates (2016) equates it to using binoculars in fog: it will not necessarily 
help. Johnson’s (2020b) research also indicates this to be an obstacle to finding submerged 
SSBNs. Johnson (2020b: 22) goes further to highlight three different obstacles that ocean-based 
AWS will have: 1. the ability for AWS to have reliable sensors on board to detect SSBNs is 





size of the ocean will make it hard for even a swarm of drones to detect an SSBN. Furthermore, 
current computing ability aboard UUVs are problematic for sensor processing (Martin, Tarraf, 
Whitmore, DeWeese, Kenney, Schmid, & Deluca, 2019). Significant advances will need to be 
made in order for this capability to become possible.  
Such advances could be the combination of ML and ocean sensors. Key informant 5 (2020) 
stated that you can train a bot, for instance, you can put sensors at the side of the road and listen 
to different cars. You can then train an AI bot to pick up different engine sounds and tell you 
what type of car it was (Key informant 5, 2020). Furthermore, Johnson (2020a: 11) states the 
progression in ML sensor technology will allow for better detection of Chinese SSBNs. Martin 
et al (2019: 12) also state that ML is the most viable candidate when it comes to bettering 
sensor information; however, they state that current ML is more based on supervised-learning 
algorithms. Furthermore, they require a larger amount of data retention and cloud computing 
in order to operate (Martin et al, 2019: 12). Martin et al (2019: 12) highlight potential 
limitations such as the availability of labelled datasets, sufficient time in theatre, and how well 
these algorithms can be implemented with embedded computation on board the AWS poses a 
challenge to naval applications. Martin et al (2019) are implying that current algorithms are 
computationally intense which is currently difficult to put into AWS; this is an issue that has 
already been looked at in this research and this once again re-emphasises the issue.  
The next major issues for AWS are based on the issue of power; more specifically propulsion, 
which requires a large power source. Gates (2016) states that the ocean is dense and requires a 
considerable amount of propulsion and power to sufficiently propel a UUV through it. 
However, Martin (2017) claims that the Sea Hunter will have a speed of 26 knots and be able 
to track diesel-powered submarines for weeks. Such a capability may allow for AWS to 
effectively hunt SSBNs. Nevertheless, Gates (2016) states that an autonomous vehicle in the 
ocean must have sufficient propulsion and yet remain undetectable to SSBNs. However, while 
the Sea Hunter may have the capability to track SSBNs on the ocean surface for weeks, it is 
currently a limitation of undersea AWS. The limitation of current UUVs can be seen in Boeings 
Echo Voyager Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV). Boeing (2017) states that 
current environment of UUVs is limited by its endurance and subsequently there is a need for 
a launch and recovery platform. This is indicated in the research done by Martin et al (2019), 
who conducted a survey for RAND on different unmanned ocean platforms. Martin et al (2019) 
concluded that one of the main areas that needs significant growth is the area of endurance and 





energy-dense battery technology. They further state that battery technology is in the interest of 
both the military and non-military sector, which promise growth (Martin et al, 2019). 
Furthermore, as stated in the preview sections, the US Navy is heavily invested in MUSV, 
LUSV and XLUUTV (Navy large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles: background and 
issues for congress, 2020). Such investment may allow for these technical issues to be 
overcome and sea-based AWS may one day be capable of detecting and tracking SSBNs 
effectively. However, as institutions like DARPA are trying to make SSBNs detectable, SSBN 
makers are trying to make them less detectable. This shows that the challenge to track SSBNs 
may be an incredibly difficult task, but it does have a certain degree of potential. There are also 
ways to overcome the issue of hunting in the ocean, this may be done by limiting the area to a 
‘choke point’.  
This is a noteworthy solution for the current limitations in AWS as placing systems such as the 
Sea Hunter or Orca in ‘choke points’ may allow them to overcome their limitations and create 
an effective hunting capability based on their current strengths and weaknesses. In the primary 
research conducted, this solution came from Key informant 5 (2020). Key informant 5 (2020) 
suggested a slightly different version of this strategy to the one that will be argued for in this 
section. Key informant 5 (2020) suggested that a network of nodes could be placed in a 
geographical area, a choke point. These nodes can then be used to monitor submarines coming 
in (Key informant 5, 2020). It has already been mentioned that Key informant 5 (2020) stated 
that an AI bot can be trained to recognise sounds and tell which cars are approaching based on 
the sound of their engines. These nodes could be trained in a similar way to detect submarines 
coming into strategic choke points. A more relevant example that also uses the choke point 
strategy came from the findings of Gates (2016). Gates (2016) states that loitering at a choke 
point may allow loitering autonomous vehicles to trail SSBNs when they leave that choke 
point. Loitering within certain choke points could also potentially be seen as an act of 
aggression and have political implications (Gates, 2016).  Therefore, these systems will need 
to loiter outside of these choke points (Gates, 2016). According to Gates (2016), all navies are 
aware of these strategies and have a number of techniques to lose other submarines or vessels 
that may attempt to follow them out of a choke point. Once again, the issue of being able to 
effectively follow these SSBNs and remain undetected is highlighted by Gates (2016). An 
example of technology being built in order to deal with choke points is Chinas ‘Underwater 
Great Wall’ (Wong, 2016). The Great Wall will consist of a network of ships and subsurface 





2016). This will allow the Chinese to track US or Russian SSBNs, or other crafts, in strategic 
areas such as the South-East China sea.   
A system similar to the Great Wall made up of technology like the Sea Hunter, Orca and Key 
informant 5s (2020) nodes could further increase tension in strategic choke points like the 
South China Sea; an already noted point of tension for the US-China relations. Furthermore, 
such technology could be deployed into choke points or just outside of them depending whether 
it’s for offensive or defensive purposes. According to Johnson (2020a), drones will not need to 
have ocean-wide coverage to detect or track submarines, an even spread of sensors may be 
capable of doing this. Furthermore, they could be located in check points or gateways (Johnson, 
2020b). The defensive purpose can help the US find hostile SSBNs and the offensive capability 
may allow the US to track Chinese or Russian SSBNs leaving strategic choke points. Such an 
example would threaten Chinese and Russia’s SSBNs which will in turn threaten their ability 
to maintain a secure second-strike capability. Whether the US could practically and willingly 
implement such a strategy that would directly undermine MAD is arguable. However, such a 
strategy could help mitigate certain shortcomings of current AWS and make their deployment 
feasible based on AWS current capability. However, a combination of both air and sea may 
create a more feasible option when it comes to effectively tracking SSBNs or other mobile 
nuclear missile launchers. This type of strategy is referred to as a ‘mixed swarm’ in the data 
that was collected.  
Kallenborn and Bleek (2018) state that a mixed swarm of drones from undersea, surface, and 
air could be used in order to advance anti-submarine warfare. When it comes to autonomous 
communication between unmanned undersea, surface, and aerial vehicles, they would allow a 
wider area of coverage and surveillance which would allow them to relay information for a 
potential attack (Kallenborn, & Bleek, 2018: 536). Johnson (2020a) also states that in the 
maritime domain a combination of UUVs, USVs and UAVS that are supported by an AI-
enabled ISR and intra-swarm communication could be deployed simultaneously for both 
offensive and defensive purposes. This would allow for the saturation of the enemy’s ASW 
defence and more importantly allow for AWS mixed swarm to hunt SSBNs or non-nuclear 
submarines (Johnson, 2020a). A combination of these different systems may allow for a more 
effective capability when it comes to ISR. It may also allow states to overcome the 
shortcomings of each different area. This may provide an effective strategy for hunting an 
adversary’s mobile nuclear missile such as SSBNs. The more effective AWS are at tracking an 





this capability will impact a state’s secure second-strike capability that could force them to up 
escalation or strike first in a use-it-or-lose-it type of strategy.  
In conclusion, this section aimed to look at different AWS and swarm technology. It started 
with a look at what exactly swarm technology was, then different drones systems combined 
with swarm, and finally the limitations and solutions for AWS swarms. Swarm-enabled AWS 
offer a significant advantage when it comes to hunting mobile nuclear weapons. It allows for 
the overcoming of certain limitations that current AWS have. Furthermore, mixed swarm 
technology that was looked at last offers the most viable solution to hunting mobile nuclear 
missile launchers as the different domains combined together offer a complete and potentially 
effective strategy. This will be looked at further in the next chapter of this research which will 
work on data and theory integration which will help to answer this thesis’s research question. 
The next section of this chapter will look at loading nuclear weapons onto AWS; whether states 
will do this currently is highly unlikely, but it is of significant importance to analyse that data 
around it.  
4.4.6 Loading AWS with nuclear weapons 
One of the most important aspects of this thesis is looking at AWS being loaded with a nuclear 
payload. Due to the severity of nuclear weapons, equipping AWS with them is hugely 
problematic for the US and will probably not be pursued by them based on the US’s value 
system. Value system was an important aspect when talking about the US with Key informant 
4 and Key informant 1 (2020). Horowitz, Scharre and Velez-Green (2019: 4) argue that a state 
may deploy nuclear delivery uninhabited platforms for a number of reasons.  Horowitz et al 
(2019: 4) state that nuclear-armed long endurance UAVs may allow states to have more nuclear 
signalling or strike options. Such uninhabited nuclear-armed platforms may allow states to 
secure their second-strike capability or utilise delivery systems that are capable of beating 
enemies’ defences and target selection (Horowitz et al, 2019: 4). An example of a state 
pursuing AI-enabled platforms is Russia. Russia’s AI strategy aims to reach a number of AI 
goals when it comes to AI platforms (Saalman, 2020). Russian AI goals are AI-enabled 
bombers, nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicles, and hypersonic glide vehicles that 
can carry nuclear and non-nuclear missiles (Saalman, 2020: 2). Another study by Horowitz 
(2019) also states that Russia is aiming to develop an AI-enabled platform known as ‘Status 
6’. Horowitz (2019) states that the US is also developing the new B-21 Raider which could 





strongly for maintaining a human-in-the-loop, making it arguable that they will not hand over 
the kill call to an autonomous system when it comes to conventional weapons, let alone nuclear 
weapons. Horowitz states the same premise, that the US is focused on nuclear surety and would 
subsequently not deploy uninhabited nuclear platforms (Horowitz et al, 2019). However, other 
states might not show as much restraint as the US (Horowitz et al, 2019).  
Giest and Lohn (2018) state that there are major changes for nuclear balances ahead and go on 
to state how Russia aims to create killer robots that have nuclear powers. Like that of Horowitze 
(2019) and Saalman (2020), Giest and Lohn (2018) go on to also mention Status-6. It would 
be able to overcome enemy defences through the use of speed and endurance (Giest, & Lohn, 
2018: 2). Horowitz et al (2019) state that the Status-6 could use AI in order to avoid an 
adversary’s anti-submarine warfare system. Furthermore, nuclear platforms that have AI 
capabilities may also provide a strategic benefit to whoever uses it (Horowitze et al, 2019: 21).  
Horowitz et al (2019: 21) indicated that the aim of the Status-6 is to secure Russia’s second-
strike capability as well as their confidence in it. This confidence will come from the ability of 
Russia’s torpedoes always being able to reach their targets no matter what advances the US has 
made in their defence systems (Horowitz et al, 2019: 21). The deployment strategy for Status-
6 is the ability to release it from Russian submarines in the Arctic and then being able to traverse 
the ocean at a speed of 100 km/hr (Giest, & Lohn, 2018: 3). Furthermore, the difficulty of 
communicating underwater has become possible recently with the progression of AI. Horowitz 
et al (2019: 22) states that this weapon may give Russian leaders assurance of their ability to 
strike back against the US homeland after a limited nuclear strike. However, any confidence 
gained and effect on strategic stability is likely to be marginal (Horowitze et al, 2019: 22). 
However, this risk could increase if Russia is to field untested and unverified nuclear AWS. 
This section ultimately shows that states like Russia are actively pursuing nuclear AWS and 
highlighted the potential affect it would have on nuclear deterrence.  
4.4.7 The issues of speed, miscalculation and the potential for de-
escalation 
This section looks at the issues of speed, miscalculation, and potential de-escalation potential 
of AWS. There are several frequently cited issues that came from the literature which can all 
have a potential effect on nuclear deterrence. The first issue, and probably the most important 
of the three, is speed. Laird (2020) states that machine speed offers a significant operational 





agile than today’s weapons systems as they are less dependent on human decision-making and 
control. This will give AWS the capability to make thousands of complex and coordinated 
decisions at machine speeds (Laird, 2020). Scharre states that automation will increase the 
speed of warfare and in turn make humans struggle to keep up (2014). Horowitz et al (2019) 
also state that algorithms will increase the decision-making process and create armed conflict 
at ‘machine speed’. Johnson (2020a & 2020b) furthers the issue of AI and speed, stating that 
AI by itself will not be destabilising. However, adding AI to current military capabilities could 
further increase speed and compress the ability for humans to make decisions and create a 
destabilising effect (Johnson, 2020b; 17). Autonomous systems that have been given the 
authority to delegate over certain actions will be able to give that military the ability to react at 
machine speed (Horowitz, Allen, Saravalle, Cho, Frederick, & Scharre, 2018). This speed will 
give the military that has it an unprecedented capability over its adversary and this may be 
destabilising to strategic stability and nuclear deterrence, as states without a capable AI will 
not be able to react as quickly and as effectively as states that have AI.  
Another possible capability of AI is the ability to process information faster that will allow 
commanders to make decisions faster in a rapidly changing battlefield (Horowitz et al, 2018).  
“A new generation of AI-augmented advanced conventional capabilities will 
exacerbate the risk of inadvertent escalation caused by the commingling of nuclear and 
strategic nonnuclear weapons (or conventional counterforce weapons) and the 
increasing speed of warfare, thereby undermining strategic stability and increasing the 
risk of nuclear confrontation” (Johnson, 2020b: 28-29).  
All of the cited theorists thus far, reiterate the issue of ‘machine speed’ when it comes to the 
future battlefield. These machines will be able to make decisions faster than humans and 
increase the speed of future conflict.   
Horowitz (2019) states that the speed of AWS may potentially threaten a state’s first-strike 
capability. Horowitz (2019) further states that AWS will allow for states to win faster and 
likewise to lose faster. A state could fear that an aggressor with AWS capabilities might take 
out their command-and-control systems which may inhibit their ability to retaliate (Horowitz, 
2019). If a state fears that it is at a disadvantage due to machine speed it may decide to strike 
first (Gates, 2016). Furthermore, within conflict, a state that fears it may lose at machine speed 
may escalate the intensity and possibly decide to escalate to the level of nuclear use (Laird, 





incentivise a state to escalate fasters to nuclear use. Horowitz et al (2019: 30) also argue that 
‘sustained thinking’ will allow states to back away from the nuclear brink, while AWS will not 
allow this to happen due to the speed it can respond at and subsequently undermine the security 
of time. What Horowitz et al (2019) mean is that the threat of losing time to machine speed 
could equate to a state upping escalation to nuclear first use. The ability to combine AI with 
ISR and defence could also create a destabilising effect, the ability to efficiently find an 
enemy’s strategic assets and protect yours could erode away MAD (Technology for Global 
Security Reports, 2019).  
“The combination of exquisite ISR with an effective defensive shield could make it 
tempting to conduct a disarming, decapitating or blinding first strike at strategic targets, 
including nuclear command and control (NC3), early warning radars, or dual-capable 
missiles and aircraft” (Technology for Global Security Reports, 2019: 10).  
This shows the potential for AI to increase military capabilities that could shrink the amount 
of time for human decision-makers and threaten nuclear stability. This could lead states to a 
use-them-or-lose-them situation; furthermore, speed plus range, mass, coordination, and 
intelligence can further compound this issue in future conflicts (Johnson, 2020b) 
Another potential issue of AWS could be its ability to miscalculate a decision that a human 
will not be able to counter. If the speed of machines outruns the decision speed of humans, this 
means that humans will not be able to counter miscalculated decisions by AWS. An example 
given by Horowitz (2019) is an autonomous system that hits a strategic command-and-control 
system by mistake. Such an incident could cause possible escalation management issues 
(Horowitz, 2019). Furthermore, Miller et al (2018) state that uncertainty around these systems 
alone could cause an increase in the risk of miscalculation or a misunderstanding. Such 
miscalculations may come from AWS that have not been properly tested, verified and could 
possibly be unreliable.  
However, such miscalculation could also allow for a chance to de-escalate a situation. Leys 
(2018) states that AWS offer a crisis bargaining opportunity; for example, AWS taking down 
another drone may be equated to a mistake and a potential opportunity to de-escalate a moment 
of crisis. An example is an F-35 flying in the South China Sea and being trailed by a Chinese 
AWS. The F-35 and the drone get too close and the F-35 slams into the drone, destroying it 
(Leys, 2018). Owing to the fact that no human life was lost and only a drone got destroyed can 





there could be a possible moment of de-escalation. Another potential de-escalating potential of 
AWS came from key informant 1 (2020), who highlighted the issue of attribution. If AWS is 
able to gain the capability to either go over or under traditional radar and strike a strategic asset 
without any markings stealthily it could be difficult for the US to attribute the attack (Payne, 
2020). Payne (2020) highlights that it is difficult to attribute such an attack; however, the US 
is very good at it. The time gap that is created due to the problem of attribution may allow for 
a moment of de-escalation, as the US would not be able to respond immediately with a strike 
and then time may change their tactic after the attack is attributed. The inability to attribute an 
attack would be a huge strategic disadvantage (Key informant 3, 2020). This section has 
subsequently highlighted the issue of speed, miscalculation, and the de-escalating value of 
AWS. The most significant issue to come from this section is the issue of machine speed 
outrunning the human decision-making process and the subsequent issues that arise from it.  
4.5 AWS arms race impact on strategic stability 
Another potential impact on strategic stability and an important tenet in nuclear deterrence is 
the possibility of an AWS arms race. Giest and Lohn (2018: 8) describe arms race stability as 
when a state is not attempting to exploit its adversary’s military capabilities. The ability for 
states to find their adversaries mobile missiles could be a capability that states may find worthy 
of pursuing and equate to a possible arms race (Bracken, 2017).10  Another example of the hunt 
for mobile missile launchers comes from the work done by Johnson (2019). Johnson (2019) 
states that the fact the Trump administration is building mobile missile launchers and aims to 
triple spending on AI may be a causative factor in a potential arms race that may upset global 
nuclear balance.  Lucas (2016) also states the same premise, that the capabilities of AWS will 
force states to develop their own autonomous capabilities for their weapon systems. This shows 
that states will develop AWS capabilities in order to maintain a military capability that doesn’t 
lag behind those of states that have acquired AWS. Furthermore, the US’s emphasis on 
maintaining its military supremacy and tripling its spending on AI may force other states to 
pursue a similar strategy. This could be compounded if the US were actually able to field 
technology such as the Sea Hunter that is fully capable of detecting and following Chinese or 
Russian SSBNs. The ability to hunt another state mobile nuclear missile will be the outright 
most destabilising aspect when it comes to nuclear deterrence and will trigger an arms race. As 
 
10 This comes from Brackens ‘The Intersection of Cyber and Nuclear war’ which focuses on the cyber aspect of 
hunting for mobile missile launchers (2017). However, this same logic may be applied to AWS hunting for mobile 





other states will pursue creating such a technology in order to Hunt US mobile nuclear missiles 
in order to maintain MAD, it would be imperative that an adversary knows where US nuclear 
forces are in order to stop an asymmetric nuclear situation. Another such aspect would be states 
pursuing technology that will ensure their second-strike capability, such as Russia’s Status-6.  
4.6 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to present all the data collected from secondary data and key 
informant interviews. The next chapter will focus on data and theory integration in order to 
answer the main research question. This section was structured using Kaldor’s new war thesis 
as the theoretical framework. The first section focused on the actors involved in the US’s 
nuclear deterrence and pursuit of AWS. What this means is that this section aimed to look at 
who the US most fears as strategic adversary. Actors are important as nuclear deterrence is 
heavily based on perception. Furthermore, this research aims to understand the full complexity 
of how AWS will affect nuclear deterrence, not just the technical capabilities. What was found 
from the secondary data and key informant interviews is that the US strongly believes that they 
have let their competitive advantage slip and that it must ultimately be restored. The adversaries 
that pose the most major threat to the US, according to the NSS, are Russia and China. It can 
be argued that the US currently sees China as more of a threat as compared to Russia, especially 
based on the fact that the US attributes the increase in China’s military power originating from 
the theft of US intellectual property (NSS, 2017). However, the NSS (2017) stills sees Russia 
as a threat to the US and its allies. The US aims to rebuild its competitive advantage through 
strength. The section that followed on from actors was the ‘goals’ of the new war thesis. This 
section aimed to collect data on populism and identity politics to see if they can be attributed 
as the drivers in how the US pursues AWS. What was subsequently found was that Trump’s 
policy and his actions are different. While Trump’s tweets and statements may show populist 
sentiments and be riddled with identity politics, his policy seems to sit close to the centre and 
is aligned with previous administrations. However, there is nothing binding Trump to his 
policies in a time of crisis, which makes him a potentially volatile actor for both his adversaries 
and allies. This is based on the fact that Trump sees his volatility and unpredictability as a 
strategic asset. This section aimed to look at data for the purpose of creating a contextualization 
for this study. The next section looked at the modes of warfare and made up a major part of 
this chapter. This is where the data for answering the main research question was presented. 
This section was structured into nuclear weapons, conventional application for AWS, 





miscalculation, and potential for de-escalation, and the impact of an AWS arms race on 
strategic stability. The main issue that comes from this section is the current capability of AWS 
due to the limitations of the power and sensor capabilities currently available. However, there 
is potential for AWS to affect nuclear deterrence. This will be looked at more in-depth in the 
























Chapter 5  
5.1 Introduction  
The theme of this research, among other things, was to look at how states go to war. The 
premise of this thesis being that war is changing due to the rise of new technological 
innovations. However, there is a large amount of technological innovation happening and this 
research cannot cover all of it. As a result, this research aimed to look more specifically at AI, 
however, there are also many potential applications for AI. Therefore, this research aimed to 
look specifically at AWS. Furthermore, there are many modes of war that can potentially affect 
strategic stability when it comes to modern warfare. In order to be more specific, this research 
aimed to look at arguably one of the most important aspect of modern war, nuclear deterrence. 
This led to the main aim of this research. This research aimed to look at how AWS could lead 
to a potential disruption of nuclear deterrence and its subsequent effect on strategic stability.  
This research began with a review of the literature on key tenets in order to conceptualise them 
and create a better understanding of the area in which this study is placed. The chapter that 
followed the literature review aimed to create a contextualisation for the study. The scope of 
that chapter was to look at the role technology played in how states conducted warfare. This 
approach was chosen because this research aimed to look at the role technology played in how 
states conducted warfare. Furthermore, it allowed for a more in-depth look into nuclear 
technology and highlighted the significance of the nuclear triad when it comes to nuclear 
deterrence. More specifically, it highlighted the importance of mobile missile launchers and 
more importantly SSBNs. This was found to be of importance to this study as it ‘secured’ the 
US’s second-strike capability, the most important tenet of this research. The following chapter 
discussed the data collected by this study. This data was collected from secondary data analysis 
and semi-structured key informant interviews, which will allow this research to answer the 
main and secondary research questions.  
The aim of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it will begin with an evaluation and analysis of the 
main findings which aims to integrate the theory from Chapter 2 into the data in order to answer 
the main and secondary research questions along with the secondary contextualization. This 
section will take up the majority of this chapter as it is of the most importance to this research. 
Secondly, it looks at the limitations of this study. This section discusses the limitations of the 
study such as the issue of potential interviewees not responding, and the case study being based 





avenues of study. This section will draw the research to a close and discuss how this research 
has created possible future avenues of study.  
5.2 Evaluation and main findings  
As stated, the main aim of this section is to answer the main research questions. This will be 
done by using the theory gained in Chapter 2 and integrating it with the data collected in 
Chapter 4. The structure that will be used in order to answer this question will be the new war 
thesis. This means that the structure of this section will duplicate the one used in the previous 
chapter. This section will focus on data and theory integration so that the research questions 
may be answered.  
Main Research Question: How will Autonomous Weapons Systems affect the US’s perception 
and/or capability of their second-strike capability?  
Secondary Research Question: Will this led to a disruption of traditional nuclear deterrence? 
or will this subsequently affect strategic stability?  
Secondary Contextualization: The new war thesis entails ‘goals’ which looks at how identity 
politics effects conflict. In order to create a background for this research populism and 
President Trump will be looked at. This is a more specific form of identity politics in the US. 
The goal of this is to create a contextualization for this study and not to research populism in 
the US.  
Broader significance of the study: Firstly, Autonomous Weapon Systems will affect the way 
states conduct warfare and more specifically their nuclear deterrence. It is important to get an 
understanding of such a phenomenon so that uncertainty about the future may be mitigated. 
Secondly, populism is a dominate political movement in the US and has been expertly utilized 
by President Trump. Understanding such a phenomomen will allow for this study to full capture 
the effect of the main research question.   
How this question relates to the problem/conversation in the literature: There is a high level 
of uncertainty around the issue of AWS, creating a need to fully understand the complexity and 
effect of such a transformative technology. Furthermore, populism is a rising political ideology 
that has the potential to affect international politics and US national security strategy. Which 






5.2.1 Who is involved?  
Actors were of significant importance to this study because perception plays such a vital role 
in nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, the ability for AWS to effect nuclear deterrence is not just 
based on the technology involved; it is more complex than that. There are other drivers and 
factors involved in this process that need to be analysed in order to reach a significant and 
coherent conclusion. This is why this research chose to create a secondary contextualization of 
President Trump and his populist politics. One of these factors and drivers is the actors 
involved. Furthermore, who these actors are and how the US perceives them is even more 
important. The mere pursuit by one of these actors for AWS that will potentially have the 
capability to threaten the US’s second-strike capability could be more than enough to effect 
nuclear deterrence and subsequently have a destabilising effect on strategic stability. As stated, 
this section will begin with an analysis of the data and be followed by a discussion on the theory 
then an integration of the two.  
What did the data collected show when it comes to actors involved? Firstly, the actors that are 
involved in this analysis are what Kaldor (2013) would define as ‘regular armed forces’.  
Furthermore, there are many ‘regular armed forces’ that the US views as strategic threat to their 
interests and security. This is logical as there are multiple nuclear armed states, states that are 
pursuing nuclear weapons, and states that are powerful enough to pose a potential threat to the 
US. This highlights the fact that thesis decided to look at other states when it came to actors 
and not other non-state actors. This is owing to the fact that this thesis cannot look at everything 
and it therefore decided to look at the most prominent threats to the US. The document that 
was chosen to be analysed in order to collect data to understand these actors was the NSS 
(2017), which was referred to as key informant 2 (2020). What came from this data is that the 
US has two primary concerns when it comes to potential threats: China and Russia. The most 
important facts behind why these actors are threatening is due to their pursuit of what the NSS 
states as advanced weapons and capabilities that could pose a potential threat to US critical 
infrastructure and command and control (NSS, 2017). Furthermore, as highlighted in this 
research, both actors have the desire to gain general intelligence AI.  
It was found that there is a greater threat and higher tension when it comes to the US and China. 
Johnson stated that there is a US–China AI race that could have a potentially profound impact 
on strategic stability. Furthermore, according to Giest and Lohn (2018), both China and Russia 





comes to Russia, the NSS (2017) states that it aims to rebuild its status as a great power. The 
NSS states that it still aims to deter Russia and only create cooperation when it best suits US 
interest. Furthermore, Russia also aims to become a global leader in AI. Laird (2020) states 
that AI-enabled AWS will increase the risk of crisis instability and possible conflict escalation 
in future conflict. Furthermore, as China and Russia aim to increase their military capabilities, 
the US aims at regaining its military supremacy. The NSS (2017) highlights that the US 
believes that it has lost its military power and has let other actors catch up to it. The US also 
sees Russia and China developing military capabilities that could threaten critical US 
infrastructure (NSS, 2017). 
There is also critical tension between the US and China due to China’s modernisation arising 
from the access it has to the US innovation economy and universities (NSS, 2017). 
Furthermore, China has access to MCF which allows them access to advanced technologies 
(NSS, 2017). This could be hugely problematic for the US in pursuit of AI as it could 
potentially be stolen and once they have the AI program they have the full capability. There is 
no need for further R&D as they will have the entire code. This shows that the US already has 
a very negative perception of China. If the Chinese military were able to field an AWS system, 
effective or semi-effective, it will undoubtedly exacerbate tensions with the US. What would 
be even more worrying is if China were able to field an AWS that was incredibly effective and 
capable of finding US SSBNs or other mobile nuclear missile launchers.  
This section has shown that understanding the actors involved is an important part of the new 
war thesis. This is even more compelling when the chosen mode of warfare is nuclear 
deterrence owing to the fact that perception plays a vital role in it. The US views Russia and 
especially China as threatening adversaries. If these nations were able to deploy AWS that has 
the potential to increase their military capability or undermine the US second-strike capability 
it could lead to strategic instability as it would increase tension with the US, who are already 
highly aware of their declining military advantage.   
5.2.2 Goals and identity politics: Making America Great Again 
The data collected for goals in this research offered some interesting insight into President 
Trump as an actor against his actual policy. The objective of this contextualization was to 
understand how Trump’s populism could affect how the US pursued AWS. This research 
looked at this by analysing the US’s NSS, the premise of this being that Trump offered a 





that Trump may take a populist stance and this stance got him elected, however, his policy has 
turned out to be closer to the centre than many of his critics fully account for (Cordesman, 
2017). It is still of importance to understand Trump’s identity politics, as in a moment of crisis, 
there is nothing holding Trump to his policy. This section will now begin with a look at the 
important data collected in Chapter 4 and then integrate it with theory gained in Chapter 2. This 
will help further the secondary contextualization and create a better background for the study.  
One of the first major pieces of data that was collected was based on populism and how Trump 
utilised such a movement in order to gain political power. Trump as an actor and his policy are 
inherently different, according to the data. The data from Löfflman (2019) argued that Trump 
became so powerful owing to the fact that he was able exploit the disconnect between the elite 
and public opinions. Trump targeted the establishment as the ones to lay blame when it came 
to economic and political failures (Löfflman, 2019). He was able to build an antagonistic 
relationship as well as play on US citizens’ emotions (Löfflman, 2019). This supports the 
argument of Batayneh et al (2016), who viewed populism as ‘anti-elitism’ and what the true 
citizen looks like. This tenet was also highlighted by Fukuyama (2017) who stated that populist 
leaders try to make an image of the true citizen and denounce the elite. Furthermore, another 
main tenet that came from the identity politics was the issue of dignity. This issue of dignity 
was utilised by Trump by attacking the elite for ignoring public opinion. What this means is 
that Trump’s stance came from the belief that the elite were interested in economic 
liberalisation while the ‘ordinary citizen’ wanted the US to focus on its own domestic issues.  
Trump was successfully able to create a friend-enemy distinction between the true citizen and 
the elite by highlighting the gap between public and elite opinions on foreign policy. While 
this form of identity, at the time of writing this thesis11, had not created any conflict like 
Kaldor’s view of identity politics; it does have similar traits to the new war thesis. The 
distinction between two identities that is bought forward by the new war thesis is the binary 
that is created in identity politics, which is represented by Trump’s true citizen and the elite. 
Fukuyama states that populism is a direct threat to international order.  
Fukuyama (2018) would be right if the data Löfflman (2019) collected is correct. Löfflman 
(2019) argued that these sentiments are not influencing Trump’s NSS, it did however open the 
debate on recalibrating US foreign policy. This stance by Löfflman (2019) was backed by 
 
11 This research was conducted before the protests and current unrest in the US broke out. Identity politics would 
have been a good theory to use to analyse this and understand the Trump administration. This will be discussed 





Feaver (2017) who also states that Trump and his policy are inherently different. What this 
means for this study is that Trump may say something in line with populism, however, his 
foreign policy does not necessarily reflect the same sentiment. This would be going against the 
literature used in Chapter 2, as Wasko-Owsiejscuk (2018) stated that Trump’s foreign policy 
has a ‘large doses of populism’. While Trump’s NSS does state that it aims to Make America 
Great Again and restore America’s power that has supposedly slipped (2017). Löfflman (2017) 
argues that the US still supports NATO and its allies and it still imposed sanctions on Russia 
which shows that Trump’s America First means internationalism over isolationism. This shows 
that Trump played on the issue of a true citizen against the elite, yet his NSS ended up more 
towards the centre in shaping his NSS. This means that Trump’s belief in listening to the 
ordinary citizen and focusing on domestic issues over international issues has not been true. 
However, according to Pifer (2018), when it comes to a moment of crisis there is no strategy 
dictated by the NSS that must be implemented to deal with this situation. This is problematic 
for both the US’s adversaries as well as its allies owing to the fact that Trump sees 
unpredictability as an asset (Pifer, 2018).  This means that Trump’s instincts as well as his 
volatility are what should be questioned according to Pifer (2018). Key informant 3 (2020) 
gave some key insight into how a Trump or Biden response would look. A Trump 
administration would come with a strong response and not blink in a fight; meanwhile, a Biden 
administration could come with a more diplomatic response (Key informant 3, 2020). A final 
conclusion to this section comes from Hall (2017) that Trump is in a battle with mainstream 
policy thinking and his own instincts. What this means that it is more useful to understand 
Trump as an Actor through his rhetoric and actions over his policy. In a time of crisis, a Trump 
response could be unpredictable and volatile. However, this reaction could be more in line with 
his populist rhetoric that could put the US first and its allies second. It could also see a US 
response that aims to maintain the US’s supremacy as a global power and fight for US interest.  
What can be concluded by Trump’s NSS is that the US will be pursuing AI and AWS if it 
allows for the US to regain its military strength. This can be stated as the US has already 
budgeted around $14 billion for the DoD science and technology programs. Finally, this section 
has shown the importance of a secondary contextualization when it comes to understanding 





5.2.3 Methods of warfare 
This section now aims to answer the main part of the thesis, how AWS will affect nuclear 
deterrence and how this will in turn affect strategic stability. This section was divided into five 
different sections: nuclear weapons, conventional application for AWS, loading AWS with 
nuclear weapons, the issue of speed miscalculation and potential for de-escalation, and AWS 
arms race impact. Each of these sections plays a vital role in understanding how AWS could 
affect the US’s nuclear deterrence. The first section aimed to understand the continued 
importance of nuclear weapons to the US’s NSS. It can be argued that nuclear weapons have 
been the cornerstone of US NSS policy for the last seventy years and will remain the 
cornerstone of the NSS policy. The NSS (2017) states that nuclear weapons have given the US 
the ability to deter potential aggressors, keep peace, maintain stability, and protect its thirty 
allies. The argument that it will stay as the cornerstone of US policy comes from the current 
strategy to modernise the US’s nuclear forces. By doing this, the US will be able to maintain 
its credibility as well as signalling its assurance of its capabilities (NSS, 2017). Maintaining 
the effective nuclear capability will allow the US to continue what Schelling (1966) termed the 
‘diplomacy of violence’ (1966). The diplomacy of violence involves using fear through 
military might and will in order to deter an aggressor from conducting an unfavourable action 
(Schelling, 1966).  
This data collected from the NPR in the previous chapter highlights a few of Quackenbush’s 
(2011) tenets for an effective deterrence. It states that the US will carry out unacceptable cost 
on an attacker and that this threat will be carried out (Quackenbush, 2011). Furthermore, the 
US aims to modernise its nuclear triad, which will then allow for all three tenets of 
Quackenbush’s (2011) successful deterrence to be met as the US will have an effective military 
capability. The triad has maintained both an effective and credible US deterrence. This 
credibility given by the nuclear triad, and specifically SSBNs, allowed for the US to have a 
‘secure second-strike capability’. In the literature it was found that a second-strike capability 
is central to nuclear deterrence. With a secure second-strike capability, states that maintain 
nuclear weapons have the capability to engage in brinkmanship. As nuclear weapons enable 
MAD, in the case of nuclear warfare both states would receive a nuclear strike against 
themselves. Such a dynamic has allowed the US and other superpowers to deter one another 
successfully. The dynamics of brinkmanship involve states taking risks that up escalation 
towards all-out war (Powell, 2003). The most resolute of the states involved in brinkmanship 





(2003) consists of the state’s resolve, its perception of its own resolve and the other state’s 
resolve. The state that is the most certain will be the one most willing to escalate. Therefore, 
having an effective nuclear triad will allow the US to have confidence in its capability that will 
allow it to be the more resolute state as currently both Russia and China are modernising their 
nuclear forces and if the US falls behind it may become less resolute. Finally, the most 
important point to come out of this data was the importance of the US nuclear forces, its second-
strike capability, and its nuclear triad. A state’s ability to strike back is crucial to an effective 
nuclear deterrence, the possibility of AWS cancelling out a state’s ability to strike back could 
be hugely problematic to nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. 
This next part aims to look at the AWS that may threaten the US’s ability to strike back. This 
research aimed to look at current examples of AWS in order to understand if they are currently 
capable of disrupting nuclear deterrence. If AWS has the capability or even the perceived 
capability to take out the US’s nuclear triad it would subsequently erode the US credibility of 
its second-strike capability and cause instability. The research began with a look at the 
conventional application of AWS. The two main points that came forward were drone 
technology and swarm technology. This research decided to negate land-based AWS as sea- 
and air-based AWS were of more importance. The main application of drone technology would 
be the ability for them, as a singular unit or as a swarm, to hunt mobile nuclear missile 
launchers. As highlighted by Giest and Lohn (2018) this capability would undermine MAD 
and nuclear deterrence.  
The first set of data that was analysed was swarm technology. The data showed that swarm 
technology relies on AI, it is assumed that many authors are referring to ‘general’ intelligence 
AI owing to the fact they refer to how these swarms will be able to operate by themselves 
without human intervention. However, as found in the literature review, depending on the 
complexity of the environment, the AI in these systems does not necessarily need to have 
general intelligence. As stated by Boulani (2019), machine learning and deep learning are 
currently more than sophisticated enough to be applied to autonomous systems. It will be even 
more beneficial for a swarm to be able to give rise to intelligent behaviour through its 
cooperative behaviour (Scharre, 2014). Drones in a swarm communicating with one another 
are able to alter their behaviour (Kallenborn & Bleek, 2018). Furthermore, the more data that 
can be fed to AWS that is enabled with narrow AI, the better these systems will be able to 
perform. For example, if these drones are fed large amounts of data about SSBNs, the sounds 





teach themselves how to hunt submarines more effectively. The more data that these systems 
are fed the better and more efficient they will be. Drone swarms will also be able to spread out 
over a larger area and collect more data and communicate with one another that may allow 
them to hunt more effectively. The other benefit of drones is their cost and the need to have 
fewer humans operating them. This will allow the US to gain mass in its military and deploy 
more drones that will gain more data. Swarms will also allow for better speed and 
manoeuvrability than human-operated vehicles (Key informant 1, 2020). Deep learning, 
compared to the more automated and structured ML, could find solutions quicker and faster 
when it comes to hunting SSBNs. It will also allow swarms to operate more autonomously and 
at a quicker speed. This could be further accelerated if these machines are introduced to deep 
learning; however, due to the ‘black box effect’ it is arguable whether states will currently 
equip swarms with this. However, this is all dependent on the quality of the sensor on these 
drones and their processing power. This now brings this section to a discussion of examples of 
drone technology. 
The two main domains that were looked at in regard to drones were air and sea. The sea was 
separated into a further two categories, under the ocean and on top of the ocean. The aim of the 
Sea Hunter, according to key informant 4 (2020), was to hunt submarines. Such a capability 
would definitively impact the US’s second-strike capability owing to the fact that the SSBNs 
play a vital role in the US’s second-strike capability. Furthermore, this capability to hunt 
mobile nuclear missiles could be increased if an adversary was able to use them as a swarm. 
AI in the Sea Hunter, whether it be ML or deep learning, could create intelligent behaviour that 
may allow them to effectively hunt and in new ways. Swarm technology would also allow them 
to cover a vast area of the ocean more effectively. This would require advanced sensors, 
computing power, and enough power to effectively hunt. Johnson (2020b) highlights that ML-
augmented sensors would be sufficient to threaten a state’s second-strike capability (Johnson, 
2020b).  This shows that ML-enhanced Sea hunters operating as a swarm could be capable of 
hunting adversaries’ SSBNs. Furthermore, as the Sea Hunters hunt the oceans, they in theory 
will become more effective, as the more data that that this AI is fed, the more effective it will 
become. 
The next sea-based AWS that was analysed operates under it. The potential capability for AWS 
to hunt SSBNs under the ocean could undeniably impact nuclear deterrence. Horowitz (2019) 
states that this ability, especially against a nuclear-armed state, would cause fear and could 





communication, do not currently make such a capability possible (Horrowitz, 2019). What this 
data found is that the current capabilities of underwater AWS are not efficient. However, a 
swarm of underwater AWS could one day have the capability to effectively hunt another state’s 
SSBNs. Such a capability would undoubtedly be destabilising for strategic stability as it would 
take away one of the most valuable legs of the nuclear triad. But for now, it faces power and 
communication challenges that will inhibit it from doing so. However, based on nuclear 
deterrence theory, these undersea AWS only need to make the US feel uncomfortable about its 
capability to hunt its SSBNs to cause insecurity. With already increased tension with Russia 
and China, such an innovation could cause strategic instability and force the US to nuclear first 
use.  
The final domain that was looked at was air. Autonomous UAVs are a prominent example of 
swarm technology that could be used to hunt mobile nuclear missile launchers. An example 
found in the data was a drone called Perdix (Sauer, 2019). Although not stated, it can be 
assumed that Perdix used a form of ML to process that data given to it and then to hunt down 
its target. The data showed that current AWS in the air have a high capability when it comes to 
working as a swarm in order to execute a task. What the data found is that air-based AWS have 
the capability to sense, decide and act based on their environment by collecting data from its 
sensors. These examples are not based on true autonomy and may sit closer to automation, as 
they are executing a task that was predetermined by humans. However, once they take off they 
were able to hunt on their own and find their target without human intervention. This could 
then still be a highly desirable capability as hundreds or thousands of low-cost drones could be 
sent out in order to hunt the US’s mobile nuclear missile launchers. This would require fewer 
humans and increase coverage as well as speed when it comes to hunting.  
However, there is potential for deception and possible limitation of these drones’ sensors. 
Boulanin and Verbruggen (2018), quoted in Chapter 2, stated that ML has allowed for better 
recognition and targeting. If these aerial AWS are fed a large amount of data and are able to 
get flight time in theatre, they will have the potential to become even better at targeting and 
recognition. The only limitation would then be the current lack of data and the need for more 
flight time. These drones have shown their capability to be given data and commands and then 
execute a mission without human intervention.  Which means these drones meet the true 
definition of autonomous, as they are able to take off and operate without the need for human 
intervention, although there is a human-in-the-loop. It can be argued that the current aerial 





needed and better sensors. Furthermore, potential adversaries need to field reliable and verified 
drones to make sure there are no possible mistakes. 
The final section of the ‘conventional application for AWS’ focused on the limitations and 
possible solutions for AWS.  The current limitations for sea-based AWS are their sensors and 
power source. Such limitations will currently inhibit sea-based AWS from effectively hunting 
SSBNs in the ocean. ML and AI require high-powered computing in order for it to be effective. 
ML has come about recently due to the increase in computing power, which means these AWS 
need to have a sufficient computing capability. ML combined with more improved ocean 
sensors could lead to a more effective capability when it comes to hunting SSBNs. This data 
combined with potential AWS capabilities suggest that the answer to the main research 
question could be that AWS could potentially have the ability to make the US feel insecure 
about their second-strike capability. However, this is not a current issue for the US, as other 
issues such as the rise of China’s military power is more of a threat to the US, especially since 
the Chinese are building and modernising their nuclear forces.  
With all these limitations, it suggests that currently AWS will not have the capability to 
effectively threaten nuclear deterrence. However, a possible solution for the limitations of 
AWS could be using choke points or a mixed swarm. A choke point is a strategy in which a 
swarm or singular AWS are placed in a strategic position so that an SSBN or another mobile 
nuclear missile launcher has to pass through. The point of placing AWS at choke points can 
help overcome the issue of the ocean being vast. The sensors and power of the AWS will still 
need to be more capable than it currently is in order to continuously track SSBNs. Which means 
that the choke point strategy may one day be a viable strategy; however, the current limitation 
of AWS will still inhibit its ability to hunt.  
Another solution is a mixed swarm strategy. A mixed swarm is made up of undersea, surface 
and air AWS. This mixed swarm will enable the ability to create a wider network that can then 
increase coverage of surveillance and possible attack (Kallenborn, & Bleek, 2018: 536). This 
strategy of a mixed swarm was also seen in the report by Johnson (2020b), who states that it 
could be used for both defensive and offensive strategies. This strategy may allow for AWS to 
overcome their shortcomings, as there will be an array of different AWS involved. It will allow 
for an increase of coverage, more data collection, and can rely on each other to overcome power 





for a mixed swarm to be effective. This shows that both these possible solutions may one day 
be effective; however, the current limitations will not allow this to be effective.  
The next section dealt with loading nuclear weapons onto AWS. The reasons for loading AWS 
with a nuclear payload can be to strengthen a state’s second-strike capability or to beat 
adversaries’ defence systems. An example found when it comes to a nuclear-armed AWS was 
Russia’s Status 6. Status-6 aims to overcome enemy defence through speed and endurance 
(Horowitz et al, 2019). Russia believes that Status-6 will allow them to secure their second-
strike capability. However, handing over nuclear payload to AI that is still based in ML may 
be hugely problematic as ML needs large amounts of data in order for it to be effective and the 
deployment of Status-6 needs to be frequent to gain sufficient data. Furthermore, handing a 
nuclear payload over to a deep-learning AI would be even more problematic due to the black 
box effect. The issue of sensors and power will also affect Russia’s Status-6, it does, however, 
allow for a viable solution to maintaining nuclear deterrence in the future.  
There are several advantages to AI-enabled AWS with the main one being speed. It was found 
in Chapter 2 that AI offers speed as a capability, as it is able to think and act at machine speed. 
This was also found in the data and was highlighted by theorists as an important tenet. This 
increase of speed by AI could force states into a use-them-or-lose-them scenario. Johnson 
(2020a & 2020b) states that speed plus range, coordination and intelligence can further affect 
the future conflict. This shows that the speed AI brings may enable AWS to hunt and find the 
US’s nuclear forces faster than humans could. Such a capability may allow an adversary to 
neutralise the US’s nuclear forces, inhibiting their ability to strike back. This would ultimately 
eradicate the US’s ability to strike back and subsequently undermine their nuclear deterrence. 
Furthermore, once the US’s nuclear deterrence is undermined this would cause strategic 
instability.  
The final section dealt with AWS arms race that could possibly affect strategic stability. In the 
literature review in Chapter 2 it was found that an arms race or the emergence of an arms race 
could cause military instability which could then affect strategic stability. Arms race stability 
is created when a state is not pursuing a capability that could exploit an adversary’s military 
capabilities (Geist & Lohn, 2018: 8). The capabilities offered by AWS and states pursuing them 
could cause military instability as gaining these capabilities will allow for another state’s 
military capabilities to be exploited. This is increased by the fact that AWS is augmented with 





slipping and is dedicated to maintaining its edge. China and Russia are also very determined to 
develop and improve their military capabilities in the nuclear and AI sphere. This also points 
towards a possible arms race between states that already have increased tension between them, 
which means there could be military instability, and this also could affect strategic stability.  
5.2.4 Final discussion  
The answer to the main research question is twofold and is based on current and future 
capabilities. Currently, AWS does not have the capabilities to affect the US’s nuclear 
deterrence. The limitations of sensors, power, and computing power currently restrict AWS 
ability in the near term to effectively hunt from mobile missile launchers. With regard to future 
capability, AWS offers a significant challenge to traditional nuclear deterrence and has the 
potential to affect the US second-strike capability. All the information reviewed offers insight 
into how AWS will be able to ‘hunt’ the US’s second-strike capability such as its SSBNs. With 
AI having progressed so quickly and rapidly over recent years there is a possibility that there 
could be an effective version to use in AWS. Furthermore, the US is set on maintaining its 
technological innovation in its military and is subsequently investing heavily in its military 
capability. In the future there could be AWS with better AI, sensors and power that will allow 
them to find and track the US’s mobile nuclear missile launchers.  
As discussed in this thesis, AWS effect on nuclear deterrence is more complex than just its 
capability to ‘hunt’ mobile nuclear missile launchers. This thesis tried to understand the US 
drivers and its perception of major threat. This was done owing to the fact that this research 
used the new war thesis in order to understand how AWS will affect nuclear deterrence. 
Furthermore, this research had the objective to create a secondary contextualization which then 
allowed for a better background for the study. This allowed this thesis to understand the goals 
of how the US would pursue AWS. With the rise of populism in Western democracies and the 
ever more prevalence of identity politics it was important to understand how such phenomena 
would affect the US perception and drive. The literature showed that President Trump is a 
populist, and the data did indeed show this; however, his NSS is more towards the centre. The 
US NSS policy can be argued as ‘Making America Great Again’, but in an international 
perspective and not isolationism. The actors section allowed this research to understand that 
the US is highly concerned about China. It is still concerned about Russia, but more emphasis 
was put on China as an adversary and building cooperation with Russia. Ultimately, the US 





belief in rebuilding is what will fund AI and lead to the development of AWS, especially owing 
to the fact that the US faces a quantity issue due to rising prices in technology and AWS offers 
an alternative and will allow for a large quantity and high capability. Finally, President Trump 
as an actor could be unpredictable when it comes to the pursuit or reaction to AWS. This is 
owing to the fact that Trump views his volatility and unpredictability as an asset. In the event 
of such a transformative technology and Trump stability becoming instability, he will not blink 
in a fight.  
The final conclusion is that AWS in the future will have the potential to affect nuclear 
deterrence which will subsequently cause strategic instability. However, currently, AWS does 
not have this capability. The current issue of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability is the 
modernisation of the nuclear forces of the US, Russia and China. Furthermore, with an actor 
such as Trump as president there could be more of a hard response to China in a moment of 
escalation compared to a more diplomatic response from a Biden administration.  
5.3 Limitations of study 
This section aims to outline the limitation of this study. There are several factors that can be 
pointed to when it comes to the limitations. The first limitation of this study is the response 
rate from possible interviewees. This research aimed to have 8–10 key informants and arrived 
at only 5. This was despite the numerous emails sent out to possible interviewees. However, 
the interviews that were conducted offered valuable data and insights into the area of research. 
The second limitation of this study was the secondary data that was able to be collected on this 
topic. This area of study is very specific and niche, owing to these facts it was hard to find a 
lot of data on the topic. However, the data that was found was valuable and sufficient. Thirdly, 
the global pandemic changed the way that this study was conducted. However, with online 
resources and access to platforms such as Skype and Zoom this was easily overcome. Fourthly, 
the forms of finance section should have been negated from the beginning as it did not have a 
part in this study, as the funding comes from the US government.  
5.4 Conclusion and avenues for future study  
The aim of this research was to, among other things, look at how states conduct warfare. The 
premise of this is that warfare has changed, and that technology plays an important role in how 
warfare changes. This research wanted to look at how AWS could lead to a disruption in 





found that currently there is no threat to nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. However, 
there is a high possibility that in the future, with more technological advances, AWS could 
threaten the US’s nuclear deterrence. In terms of future avenues of study, the major threat 
currently to the US, in terms of technology, is cyber. The US faces a huge problem with cyber 
intrusions from foreign actors. This means that there need to be continued studies on how cyber 
can cause or effect international conflict and what type of cyberattack can push a state to war. 
However, in terms of AI, there needs to be a continued study on how it will affect the US 
military and international conflict. There also needs to be further study into how AWS could 
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